INTERVIEW

Unit: 18th Tank Bn (Task Force Goodrich) CCA.
Source: Lt Col Guinn B. Goodrich Commanding Officer.
Interviewer: Capt. Joseph Vasta
Place and Date of Interview: 5 May, Bad Harzburg, Germany

Initially, on 28 March, the 18th Tank Battalion was in reserve. When Task Force Poinier was held up on the outskirts of Dorsten, Lt Col Goodrich, who was in reserve, was directed to send a task force into Dorsten. This task force was placed under Lt Col Crittendon. The rest of the unit went into Imloh with the mission of continuing east upon orders from CCA. They remained in Imloh for the night.

Orders were received on the night of 28-29 March to go east with the immediate objective being Polsum. That night, two dismounted officer patrols from the 290th Infantry Regiment were sent east from Imloh to reconnoiter possible routes thru to the main north-south road leading to Dorsten. A detailed map study had been made before reconnaissance and no available routes could be found. This reconnaissance proved only partially successful for they were unable to get thru to the main road due to the fact that there wasn't time and they were also in enemy territory. They encountered obstacles and pillboxes manned by the enemy.

The next morning, due to unsatisfactory results from the reconnaissance, Major Dean and Capt Holderson, Co C Commander, made a route reconnaissance with a peep, but due to mechanical difficulties got only as far as 462372. They knew that the road was passable to the railroad in vicinity of 469372. That's all the time they had to make reconnaissance because it was time to begin the attack.

At 1300 hours we started toward Polsum. In advancing east of the railroad at 469372, we caught up with the tail end of Task Force Umanoff. Upon inquiry, we discovered that he also had the mission of taking Polsum. We spent the rest of the day behind this task force.

The head of the column reached the vicinity of 491375 by late evening. We were ordered to hold up there. In the meantime the road had become bad due to the heavy traffic and inclement weather and we had to get bridges in three places to get the vehicles through. It took us until about 300030 March to get the vehicles into the dispersal area. At the same time, we were awaiting the outcome of CCR's attack.

At 0400 hours (30 March) orders were received to pass through Task Force Umanoff and take Polsum and continue east right on through. During the night of 29-30 March, TF Umanoff's men had put in a bridge and actually entered Polsum but found it untenable, due to heavy artillery and direct fire from the high ground surrounding the town TF Umanoff's force withdrew from Polsum and held only the bridgehead across the stream at 511364.

Col Goodrich issued orders at 0600 hours that the attack would start at 0800 hours. The line of departure was the bridge at the stream.

The town of Polsum was setting on a hill with wide, open approaches and barren slopes. The infantry had some cover going into the town by going through the ditches and the trees along the sides of the road. Because of this, the infantry was ordered to go in dismounted. The tanks were to cross the bridge and deploy in the fields on each side of the road and to support the attack by fire. When the infantry had secured the approaches to the town, the tanks were to move in.

A 15 minute artillery preparation was placed on the town, after which the infantry advanced dismounted, supported by fire from tanks and tank destroyers deployed on the west edge of town. The infantry succeeded in taking the first six buildings by 0930 hours. About this time, enemy tanks and artillery fire was so heavy that the infantry was unable to advance. Air support against these tanks was requested about 1100 hours and was received by noon. The planes knocked out one tank and caused the others to withdraw. As soon as the air support lifted, the attack continued and a platoon of tanks and infantry were ordered to move to the northwest section of town and destroy the enemy located there. They took 25 prisoners and destroyed the remaining enemy elements in that section. Scattered resistance was met following this and our elements, tanks and infantry, were able to clear the town promptly. The town was cleared by 1500 hours.

About 1500 hours orders were received to remain in place and outpost the town and that the 75th Infantry Division was to pass through at 0630 hours 31 March. At 1730 hours a counterattack was received from the vicinity of 535368 by three tanks, supported by artillery, mortar and direct fire weapons. Col Goodrich believed this to be more in the nature of a delaying attack to enable the infantry to withdraw. Two of the tanks, a Mark V and a Mark IV, were destroyed.

At 1630 hours orders were received to send an infantry company and a tank company to outpost Dorsten. The task force was under the command of Col. Crittendon.

Harassing fire was received throughout the night in Polsum.

The next day (31 March) the task force remained in Polsum and the 75th Infantry Division passed through as planned.

On April 1 the task force moved to Selm, arriving at 1630 hours. On 2 April they moved from Selm to Klausheide, arriving at 1750 hours.

The mission of the task force on 3 April was to turn south at Eikeloh and continue south to Westereidon, Ostereiden and Weckede and to contact the 1st Infantry Division which was on the left (east) flank. A patrol from the 1st Infantry Division was found in the town of Ostereiden. (The 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had the mission of screening the flank.) TF Goodrich was held up by TF Poinier which had encountered heavy fire upon approaching Erwittee and whose vehicles extended beyond Eikeloh. TF Goodrich moved out of Eikeloh about 1900 hours and proceeded to the line between Ostereiden and Weckede about 2200 hours. No enemy was encountered. About that time, General Colson sent a message to Col Goodrich that there was a possibility of the German 116th Panzer Grenadier Division attempting to break out of the pocket. The line between Ostereiden and Weckede was to be held at all costs. The line was heavily outposted and every precaution was taken in order to prevent this breakthrough. However, no enemy elements attacked during the night, but a reconnaissance element sent into Berge drew fire.

At 0900 hours 4 April, orders were received to continue south. The task force went into Berge which was not in our zone, but had to be cleaned out because of its flanking position. The first tank and first halftrack in the attack were knocked out. Berge was cleared by 1300 hours and 90 prisoners were taken. After Berge had been cleared, Col Goodrich sent up a platoon of tanks and a platoon of infantry to relieve the pressure on TF Poinier in Erwitte. When this task force attacked, firing from the flank, TF Poinier was able to enter the town of Erwitte. This small task force later rejoined TF Goodrich at Altenruthen.

Task Force Goodrich continued south to Altenruthen. The mission was to outpost the Mohne River. No resistance was encountered on the way, the task force reached the river about 1700 hours, and the river was outposted before dark. They spent the night there.

On 5 April orders were received to go west out of Menzel to a line running north and south through Ulde as its objective. The task force moved out at 0700 hours and met no resistance at Effeln. A reconnaissance patrol was sent into the town of Ulde and reported that the Germans desired to surrender the town. This was about 1000 hours and 50 prisoners were taken. TF Goodrich reorganized and continued on to Waldhausen. Again a patrol went into the town and again, the town wanted to surrender. The town was screened and produced from 50 to 60 prisoners. This task was finished by noon and the task force moved on to the crossroads at 368236 where they were to hold up until contact was made with TF Poinier at Alten-Mellrich. A patrol was to go to Alten-Mellrich about 1430 hours and establish contact there.

As the reconnaissance elements started north, they drew heavy tank fire from Egelnpoten. This fire knocked out the leading armored car. Out tanks immediately returned the fire on the enemy tanks and a fire fight ensured for 30 minutes. Artillery and tank fire was put on the town and the infantry moved in dismounted. One German Mark V tank was destroyed and approximately 30 prisoners were taken. During this attack, the leading elements received heavy, accurate artillery and mortar fire. It was during this shelling that Col Goodrich was wounded. Contact was made with TF Poinier about 1700 hours and the task force remained in the area for the night.

The mission for the 6th of April was to continue to the line 324228-318242 where CCB was to pass through. This line was reached about 1100 hours. In the attack on Ellingsen, some small arms fire was encountered. However, this was not sufficient to delay the attack. At 1300 hours orders were received to take the town of Wamel. This was necessary in order to secure the south flank of CCB as it passed through CCA. The area in front (west) of the road junction at 326227 was heavily wooded. While going through this area we drew tank fire. Visibility was very poor and as a result, we ran into enemy tanks and dug-in infantry along the edge of the north-south road at 3222. Our infantry withdrew and a fire minute heavy artillery preparation was dropped on the enemy positions. After that, the enemy pulled out and we continued on to Wamel, taking about 25 prisoners there. Some mortar fire was received from across the river. We outposted the line running approximately from 344212-322232-319238 and remained there for the night.

The mission of the task force on 7 April was to clear the zone along the river from Sichtigvor west to Stockum and to outpost it. This was accomplished by 1230 hours. No real resistance was encountered in clearing out the area although approximately 30 prisoners were taken.

At about 1600 hours we got the mission of taking Korbeke. We sent the mayor of Stockum to see the mayor of Korbeke with the message that we would be over in 45 minutes and that if they didn't surrender, we would level the town. The mayor of Stockum returned with the message that there was a company of soldiers in Korbeke who wanted to surrender. When we came into the town, the enemy soldiers were all lined up ready to surrender. There were about 110 soldiers in this column. We arrived in the town about 1830 hours and organized the place at once.

We held the line along the river from Eorbeke to Sichtigvor that night. The reason for outposting this line along the river was because the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment was cleaning out the area south of the river and coming west. The outposting of the river would prevent the enemy from crossing the river. The total number of prisoners taken that day was 575.

On 8 April the task force was relieved from outposting the line from Sichtigvor to Vollinghausen and the line was moved to Delecke. At Delecke, the mission was to guard the bridge across the river. When Col Goodrich arrived there, he sent a squad of men across the bridge to relieve friendly elements guarding the south bank. When the guards had advanced halfway across the bridge, the bridge was blown up at the south bank by enemy infantry which had advanced on the bridge from the south bank. We outposted the river from 245215 to 340205.

The mission for 9 April was to clean out the pocket from a line (Grid line 22) south to a junction between the Mohne and Ruhr Rivers. We went into the pocket about 0700 and left about 1800 and were relieved by the 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron who outposted it. We received artillery fire from across the river and some small arms fire from the woods at the bottom of the pocket but these men withdrew across the river. Apparently the enemy withdrew just ahead of the advancing troops. At the start, it looked as if a fight would develop because we received artillery fire and had a small fire fight in which eight prisoners were taken and about three enemy killed. However, all resistance disappeared immediately afterwards.

After being relieved we went into an assembly position in the vicinity of Hewingsen and remained there for that night.

About 1430 hours 10 April we received orders to move west into the towns of Ostburen and Kesseburen. We had to hold up the column in front (east) of Osturen while TF Van Houten went in and took the town. Then, C Co 18th Tk Bn and A Co 7th Armd Inf Bn followed TF Van Houten into Kesseburen as there was not enough room in Ostburen. These companies spent the night in Kesseburen while the remainder of TF Goodrich stayed in Ostburen.

At 0400 hours 11 April orders were received to attack Unna from the south. The attack was to start at 0630 hours. The line of departure was a line 970246-984247. Two platoons of infantry moved out of Kesseburen on the road just south of the line of departure. One platoon moved west to the north-south road toward Unna. There they encountered heavy small arms fire. At 974242 the platoon encountered resistance of all types from strong enemy positions to the south and west. Several efforts were made to contact this platoon but it wasn't until about noon that contact was again established. They took about 40 prisoners and had nine casualties. Their action slowed up the attack but turned out to be to our advantage because it was later found out that the enemy had a strong concentration of troops in that area and such a concentration would have jeopardized the rear of TF Goodrich.

The tanks were in an arc to the rear of the line of departure, ready to support the attack by fire. At 0615 hours a 15 minute artillery preparation was delivered by corps and division artillery. The artillery was so planned that as the troops reached definite phase lines and reported back, the artillery would move forward. The troops were instructed that they could not move beyond the phase line until that fact was reported back.

The infantry jumped off at 0630 hours. They were pinned down by fire coming from the vicinity of some barracks at 973254 and some woods just to the east. A platoon of tanks moved to within 300 yards of the barracks about 0730 hours and fire direct fire into the buildings. At this point the small arms fire ceased. The infantry and tanks moved into the edge of town. In the meantime we were drawing fire from the high ground directly north of Billmerich. Col Goodrich reported this fire and requested that it would be located for artillery fire. The arillery liaison plane located a number of tanks, and air was directed against these tanks. The air reported knocking out 14 tanks that day.

For about a block, there was more or less house to house fighting. After that, it was just a matter of going through the town and screening it. The only fire received after that was sniper fire. By 1500 the town was under control and in our hands.

At 1500 hours, while still in the process of screening the town, we were notified that we would be relieved by the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment and that we would advance to Holzwickede. The Glider Infantry Regiment didn't show up so we received orders to leave anyway. We departed from Unna at 1700 hours and got as far as 930237. While on the move, we hit one small pocket of resistance of small arms and took nine prisoners and killed 12 Germans. We stopped for the night and continued the attack at 0630 hours the next morning.

The next day we continued to Holzwickede, arriving there at 0900 hours. This was 12 April. Holzwickede gave up without a fight. Liaison was made with CCR on the left (south) flank and also with the 95th Infantry Division on the north flank who were coming across our front.

After occupying Holzwickede, we drew heavy artillery fire in the southern part of the town. The artillery was coming from across the river. Col Goodrich received orders to secure Holzwickede which was accomplished with C Co 18th Tank Bn and two platoon of infantry from the 7th Armd Infantry Bn. The rest of the task force returned to Unna to do maintenance.

At 1000 hours 13 April TF Goodrich received orders to assemble his entire force in Unna at 1200 hours. C Co 18th Tk Bn and A Co 7th AIB were relieved at noon and returned to Unna at 1400 hours. At 1900 hours the task force moved out for Wolfenbuttel, arriving there on the 14th of April.

On 20 April we received orders to move from Strobeck to Wernigerode with the mission of establishing roadblocks at 012626, 013600, 055595, 108642, 120627, 098595, 068612, 092609 and 051586. The purpose of this was to prevent the enemy from retaking the woods to the east and northeast which had been screened by the 83d Infantry Division, before contact could be made with the 1st Infantry Division. The roadblocks were on the army boundary. We relieved elements of the 83d Division at 0900 hours at these points.

On 22 April we were relieved of this mission and moved to Bad Harzburg, and given control of the surrounding area for administration.

GUINN B. GOODRICH
Lt. Col.,
Commanding Officer,
18th Tank Battalion.

WILLIAM G. DEAN,
Major,
Executive Officer,
18th Tank Battalion.