INTERVIEW

Source: Major Donald F. Burr, S-3, 80th Tk Bn.
Interviewer: Capt. Joseph Vasta
Place and Date of Interview: Goslar, Germany, 27, 28, 29 April 1945.

80th Tank Bn - CCR

The battalion crossed the Rhine River early on the morning of 27 March 45 and arrived at Bruckhausen (322348) at 0730. At that time, one platoon from C Co 809th Tank Destroyers and one section from Battery C 473 AAA Bn were attached.

About 0230 on 28 March, B Co was attached to Task Force Umanoff (Bn CO in 290 Inf Regt, 75th Inf Div). A Co from the 1st battalion from the 290 Inf Regt was attached to Task Force Walker (80th Tk Bn) at 0630. At that time TF Walker was composed of: 80th Tk Bn (- A & B Cos); one plat from C Tp 88th Rcn Sqdrn; one platoon from C Co 53d Armd Engineer Bn; one plat from C Co 809 TD Bn; one section from Battery C 473 AAA Bn; A Co 58th Armd Infantry Bn.

The mission was to pass thru the 30th Inf Div zone at H-hour on the 28th of March. The intermediate objective was the Emscher-Zweig Kanal (562282) to a junction at 752425. The final objective was to cut the road between Hann and Soest. CCR was to move out and pass thru the 30th Inf Div initially in a column of task forces. They were to pass thru at 0630 and upon CCR's passage thru the 30th Inf Div, they were to deploy with three task forces abreast.

The infantry company which had been attached to TF Walker did not arrive until 0615 that morning. Since they were so late in arriving, there was no opportunity to brief the men properly. They had to be briefed while they were riding on the tanks, TF Walker passed thru at 0700.

The order of march was as follow: one plat from C Co 88th Cav Rcn Sq; one plat from C Co 80th Tk Bn; the demolition squad from 53d Armd Engr Bn (in H/T); one plat from A Co 58th Aarmd Inf Bn; one plat from C Co 80th Bn; one plat from Co A 58th AIB; C Co 80th Tk Bn (-); the assault gun platoon; the mortar platoon; the platoon of engineers (-); the battalion CP; Hq Co (-); one plat from D Co 80th Tk Bn; one plat of TDs; D Co 80th Tk (-); A Co 58 AIB (-). One platoon of D Co 80th Tk Bn was the rear guard. Two platoons of infantry on the first two platoon of tanks and the rest of the company came up on D Co 80th Tk Bn tanks.

The route of advance was along the following axis: Kirchellen, Fedlhausen, Scholven, Langenbochum, Recklinghausen, Ickern, Breethen, Kamen, Werwe, Kump, Berwicke, and then to seize and hold the road to Soest.

At 0805 Co C encountered mines in the vicinity 431339. These were removed by the engineers and there was just one row of them. Shortly after these mines were encountered, the enemy arty started coming in. It was being fired from SP guns. It was heavy arty from then on throughout the day. The firing positions or emplacements could not be located from the ground and so liaison cubs were called upon to locate the enemy arty. They did succeed in finding two of the enemy positions. Air support was requested on located and suspected enemy positions and the air support given was excellent.

Due to the heavy losses sustained by C Co, D Co had to pass thru and take over from them. This was at 1230 hours. The column continued to move forward until D Co encountered roadblocks in vic of 441333 and along with that, heavy arty fire. A bypass was found around the roadblock and by 1800 hours, D Co had moved on thru Zweckel. The arty fire continued to come in after our movement thru Zweckel. By 1845 hours, TF Walker had come into town, cleaned it out and consolidated their positions. Then, permission was requested to button up for the night and permission was granted.

The mission for the morning of the 29th was to continue in zone. TF Walker jumped off at 0630 hours and continued forward passing thru Scholven without meeting any resistance. In the vicinity of 508325, we met arty and direct 88mm fire. We called for arty and got it on the suspected positions but the enemy fire continued to come in. At 1230 hours C Company's leading elements were pulled back because three tanks had been knocked out.

C Company from 1st Bn 290 Inf Regt which had been attached to TF Walker that morning, was sent forward to take over the lead. The infantry sent patrols forward to locate the enemy gun positions and were given arty support. At 1600 hours the patrols returned and reported that they had been successful in locating gun positions and barriers which they couldn't get thru. These barriers were usually entanglements and logs covered by machine guns and small arms fire. We laid artillery on these positions but still couldn't silence these guns. We also requested air support but it was not available. Corps Artillery was available but these guns still refused to be silenced. About this time (1900 hours) we were ordered to hold and remain in place.

The next day (30 March) TF Artman constructed and crossed a treadway bridge (519338) and TF Walker came across behind them, about 1400 hours. There was a large traffic tie-up in the town but they finally managed to get thru by 1800 hours. Upon reaching the edge (eastern) of the town of Bergmannsgluck, they were held up by direct fire coming from the woods in the vicinity of Westerholt. They were forced to stop, pull back, and bring up infantry. At this point they received orders to stop, pull back and hold, inasmuch as the 35th Infantry Division was going to clean out those woods the next day.

At 0300 hours (31 March) C Co 290th Infantry Regt was detached. The plan was to move out in a column of task force, TF Arman in the lead. Initially, that morning, TF Walker was in reserve, subject to call to follow the other two teams. There was one plat of tank destroyers and one plat from D Co in support position (530346) to support and cover the right flank of the infantry as they went thru.

At 1020 hours TF Walker left Bergmannsgluck with D Co leading. At 1145 hours the lead tank was knocked out by direct fire at 582354. They were receiving heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire. An artillery liaison plane was promptly requested to spot the enemy artillery positions which were located and fired on them. However, they were unable to stop the direct fire.

Meanwhile, the enemy had been moving back toward Recklinghausen. Just west of Recklinghausen at Kolonie-Gertrudenau, the enemy decided to establish a strong point. Our infantry tried to get thru but could not move without drawing fire. The air corps worked the area over but the enemy still continued to fire. Patrols were sent out and attempted to infiltrate into the enemy positions but found it impossible. When the tanks tried to get thru, the enemy would put direct fire on them. At 1900 hours orders were received to hold the present positions and that relief would be forthcoming by elements of the 290th Infantry Regiment.

At 1100 hours 1 April, relief was accomplished and those elements of the 290th Infantry Regiment which were attached to us, reverted to the parent unit in place. At 1200 hours, TF Walker departed from Langenbochum to a new zone or concentration area in the vicinity of Bork (815409).

At this time the task force was composed of the following: 80th Tk Bn (-A Co); A Co 58th AIB; two platoons from 809th TDs; two platoons from 53d AEB, one platoon or section from C Battery 473d AAA Bn. TF Umanoff less elements of the 75th Inf Div was attached to our Task force at the time we moved out.

At 1645 hours the task force closed in the new area (815409) and remained there for the night.

On 2 April D Co was attached to Division Trains and the engineers, tank destroyers and antiaircraft were released from TF Walker. During the afternoon TF Walker departed for a new concentration area in the vicinity of Elsen.

At 0300 hours 3 April, TF Walker received word that Elsen was still probably in the hands of the Germans. (CCR had informed us that CCB had attacked the town adjacent to Elsen unsuccessfully.) (CCB had also received a strong counterattack from the vicinity of Elsen). Shortly after we had received the situation on Elsen, we received orders to attack and take the town. We moved on the town the next morning with the infantry in the lead. Before a full scale attack was launched against Elsen, Major Walker, the battalion commander, pulled out part of C Tp 88th Cav Rcn and sent them into the town just ahead of the infantry. They were supported by tanks, assault guns and mortars. Arty support was on call. The reconnaissance unit was instructed that if one shot were fired at them, they were to advise the bn headquarters and the headquarters would put artillery on the town. No resistance was encountered in taking Elsen.

That afternoon TF Walker was notified that it would move to a new concentration area in the vicinity of Hirschberg. Our task force was the second force in the column. As we left Elsen, D Co reverted to our control. It was approximately 1900 hours when we were halted about four miles northeast of Lippstadt by TF Arman who had come in contact with the enemy. At that time it was decided to spend the night in the vicinity of Lippstadt.

At 0600 on the morning of 4 April, TF W departed from Lippstadt and moved south by two parallel routes in our zone to Oberhagen. No resistance was met there and we continued in our zone toward Norddorf (378378). The leading elements received direct fire from the vicinity of Norddorf and the woods in the vicinity 3837. An artillery concentration was laid on Norddorf and the woods at 0800 hrs. Shortly after the assault gun and mortar platoons took up positions to bring fire on Norddorf.

Enemy tanks were reported in the town both by the artillery liaison planes and the 58 AIB who had seen them take off there. B Co tanks succeeded in knocking out two of the three tanks located in the town. Then, an attempt was made to get the infantry into the town together with the tanks, but the tanks and infantry drew so much artillery fire that they were unable to move forward. Another attack was launched that afternoon by the infantry which was supported by the tanks and assault guns. A two minute artillery preparation was fire before the attack. The attack was successful and the town was taken.

D Co which was behind the attacking forces was fired on by a bazooka team and also received some small arms fire from the woods at vicinity 392400. They attacked the woods with two platoons of tanks, spraying the area with machine gun fire and succeeded in taking some enemy prisoners.

A Co 58th AIB with direct support B Co 80th Tank and the assault guns and mortars attacked Ebbinghausen (3722357) at 1750. In capturing the town, they met only slight resistance in small arms. The rest of the task force came into the town and the bn spent the night there.

At approximately 2230 that evening, we received orders from CCR to move necessary elements from the task force to Oberhagen to set up defense against a possible breakout by the enemy from the Ruhr pocket. C Co plus one section of engineers was given this mission.

The next morning, 5 April, the burgomeister from the town of Horn (3535) came to the battalion CP to surrender the town if we would quite shooting at it. At 0630 A Co 58 AIB occupied the town and by 0900 the remainder of the task force was in it. Our method of working on this morning was that the infantry would go into a town and if they received no fire, the rest of the task force would move in and town would be outposted. The infantry was supported by the tanks from B Co. At 0900 the infantry reported that the town of Schmerlecke (3530) was occupied by them and at 0915, Seringhausen (3431) surrendered without resistance. At 1000 hrs we were notified by CCR to hold the present positions as CCB was to relieve us in place. We were told to be prepared to move to relief positions in division reserve at Westernkotten (434375). This relief was accomplished by 1330 hours.

We moved to our new concentration area and remained there until the morning of the 7th. This gave us an opportunity to perform maintenance and get some much needed rest.

About 1130 hours 8 April, we were alerted by CCR. Our mission was to seize and hold Bremen (155230). The task force moved out at 1500 hrs and followed the route thru Mermingsen - Eppsingsen - Sieveringen - south to Bilme - Volbringen - Oberense (182235). We arrived in the vicinity of Oberense at 1615 and there, we were receiving artillery, small arms, and direct fire from the direction of Bremen. A Co 58 AIB with C Co 80 Tk attacked the town (Bremen) at 1700 hrs with D Co and B Co giving fire support. The town was completely taken and cleared by 1810 hrs.

While C Co was engaged in taking the town of Bremen, they thought they were getting direct fire from Ruhne (155240). An arty prep with direct fire from B and D Cos was laid on this town. B Co moved into Ruhne at 1915 hrs without encountering any resistance.

It had been planned that after Ruhne was taken, A Co 58 AIB and C 80th Tk would outpost the towns while the remainder of the task force would remain in Oberense.
At 2230 hrs B Co was relieved and returned to Oberense.

During the night orders were received that we would attack west in our zone. We were to attack from Bremen in the direction of Waltringen with TF Walker on the south and TF Artman on the north. The attack jumped off at 0545 hours (9 Apr) and was led by B Co 80th Tk and A Co 58th AIB. Instructions were to blitz thru every town and reach phase line "Y" by nightfall. Upon approaching Waltringen (1323), they received direct fire from south of the Ruhr River. There was a heavy fog that morning. When we received this direct fire, we moved north to the vicinity of 150237 and from there swung west. B Co took up supporting positions on the ridge just north of Waltringen. At 0825 the infantry was on its way into the town and followed by B Co. There was no resistance encountered in the town itself. The only fire we received was coming from across the Ruhr River.

(The route designated for this mission was Bremen - Waltringen - Wickede - along the Ruhr River edge to Frondenberg - Langschede. Major Walker, Bn Commander, objected to this route because the terrain was such that the tanks were exposed to hostile fire from across the river. Without recourse Major Walker requested permission to move out of his zone so that he could get his tanks thru without exposing them to such an extent. Permission to do so was denied.)

An attempt was made to move west in our zone but a mined roadblock was encountered. The engineers were brought forward to clear the road and remove the mines. While they were waiting for the engrs to complete the job, B Co was receiving heavy fire from across the river and was what they thought was 20mm AA fire from the woods directly to their northwest (vicinity 1224). Since it was a foggy morning, this was not observed fire but more in the nature of harassing fire. We were having a difficult time trying to locate the enemy firing positions, and continued to get small arms and mortar fire from the woods. An arty prep was placed on the south edge of the woods in our zone but that had no effect whatsoever.

The fog started to lift about 0700 and about that time, the enemy began firing plenty of observed fire. It was impossible to move from then on, because every time the infantry moved, they drew plenty of artillery fire. It was suicidal to move tanks, so the outfit stood fast. The assault guns and mortars in positions at Waltringen were firing on suspected targets.

Major Walker became a casualty at 1145 when a shell hit on the top of the turret of the tank in which he was riding. He was quickly evacuated and Major Phillip J. Connell assumed command of the task force.

Since we could not move forward, permission was requested to withdraw, go around the woods and come around into our zone in that way. This permission was refused. The situation at this moment was as follow: Task Force Artman was in the northern half of the woods (WerleWald and ObinghausenWald) and for this reason, we couldn't put a good artillery concentration on these woods. The situation across the river was unknown because it was out of our zone, so we couldn't shoot artillery there except in an emergency. The infantry which was operating as foot troops, and riding tanks, had tried three time to get into the woods but had been unable to move because of the Arty. They were also drawing a lot of fire from the vic of Wickede. I believe it was because the enemy had a bridgehead over which they were evacuating their troops.

Air support was requested at 1530 to work over Wickede and we received it at 1730. The air did some good, but even after that we were unable to move down the road. Finally, at 1800 hrs, CCR gave permission to leave B Co plus two plat of infantry with the mortar and assault gun plats holding the positions on that road while the rest of the task force pulled out and came thru the woods to get on the main road to Wickede. D Co led and had infantry mounted on their tanks. They moved thru in three waves with the leading wave spraying the area their machine guns as they went.

It was thought that when our force in the high ground just out of the woods and just north of Wickede, the resistance in that town might decrease. If this happened, B Co with its infantry was to move up at the same time as the main body of the TF. What actually happened was that when we did get to the high ground, it was dark and the resistance hadn't decreased at all. D Co pushed on to the vic 094227 where they outposted and bedded down for the night. The orders were that they were to attack at 0700 the next morning.

About 0600 (10 Apr) the two platoons of infantry which had been left behind with B Co rejoined the task force. At 0700 the attack jumped off with A Co 58th and D Co leading. Before the attack there had been a 15 min arty preparation. The town was occupied by 0730 and no resistance was encountered in taking it. D Co was left in the town to outpost it while the remainder of the task force continued on its mission. By 1000 the leading elements of the task force had reached Bentrop (063218). We were receiving heavy arty fire at that point and had asked the arty liaison planes to locate the source of this fire. We passed thru Bentrop and Warmen (058208) and continued on to Stentrop (048216). This town was located on top of a hill.

At this point, we saw tanks all over the place. Since this was the place that TF Artman was to be, we couldn't be sure whether or not they were friendly tanks. It was a foggy morning. We called on them to identify themselves but found this difficult. Positive identification was made and we got busy on them and knocked out three. We were receiving a good bit of arty and anti-tank fire from across the river and also Hohenheide (032213). There was air overhead and apparently they saw our situation because they worked over Stentrop quite well. They did an excellent job on the town. At 1245 TF Connel had reached phase line X.

In the vicinity of 072187, D Co located eight tanks, three trucks and one volkswagen. We didn't want to open fire on them because we were out-gunned. Air support was requested but was not forthcoming. Finally at 1800 hours, fire from two platoons of D Co, one platoon of TDs, and the 405th Armd Field Arty Bn, was bought to bear on the tanks. We received some answering fire from these tanks and had one TD knocked out.

CCR sent orders down at 1830 hours that we were to hold the leading element in place and establish strong points at Warmen, Bentrop, Scheda (072221) and Wickede. We were to prevent any possible intentions of the German to cross the Ruhr River, (from the south).

The next morning (11 Apr) we were starting to advance when we received orders from CCR to hold up the advance. Lt Col Crittendon was coming in to assume command of the battalion and Col Veseley wanted him to give the complete order for the advance.

At that time our leading elements were at Stentrop and Warmen. B Co plus the assault gun and mortar platoons moved north around Stentrop to take up firing positions north of Hohenheide and prepared to give support to D Co and A Co of the 58th (- one plat) as they assaulted Hohenheide. An arty preparation on the town was begun at 1200 hours. While the arty was being laid on the town, we noticed Col Veseley riding into it in his peep. The arty was called off immediately and we walked into Hohenheide without meeting any resistance.

From there we moved into Frondenberg and again there was no resistance. The infantry was then withdrawn back to Hohenheide.

The task force reorganized and moved out again, led by a plat of light tanks in wedge formation with infantry mounted on them, followed by a plat of tank destroyers, a plat of B Co, a plat of infantry mounted H/Tks, a plat of B Co, a plat of infantry mounted on H/Tks, B Co (-), D Co (-); the entire formation resembling a series of wide open V's with the point facing forward. The task force took off cross country from Hohenheide to the woods. Something opened up from the woods in the vicinity of 0020. Everything in the column opened up on the firing. A plat of light tanks and a plat of tank destroyers went into these woods to stay and clean it out and keep anything from swinging around the flanks of the task force. The rest of the task force wheeled north and headed for the woods in the vicinity of 0122 and then to the woods in the vicinity of 9921. From there they moved to and thru Strickherdieke (980213) and then crossed phase line "Y" and moved thru the woods at 972212.

At 2000 hours TF Crittendon was notified to cease operations for the night in place. B and A Cos 58th AIB were withdrawn to Strickherdieke to outpost to the west and south and D Co was moved to a line 9922 north to cover that zone from west to north. C Co was moved to Hohenheide to cover the approaches from Frondenberg and to outpost crossing over the Ruhr River at that point.

Sometime during the night we were notified that a battalion from the 194th Glider Inf Regt was being attached. Their mission was to advance on the left (south) of TF Crittendon's zone and were to come in sometime during the night. (Because of transportation difficulties, they were unable to get to their assigned zone until 1000 hrs.) C Co together with one plat of A Co 58 AIB was to advance on the right (north) of the zone and the rest of the TF was to hold in position.

At 0700 (12 Apr) C Co plus the atchd inf jumped off in the woods at 972213 and advanced toward the west. When the glider infantry battalion made its appearance, they took their positions just north of Langschede (1999) on a line running north from Langschede to Unna and prepared to attack to the west. By that time (1000 hrs) C Co had reached Opherdicke (935210) with little opposition other than occasional harassing artillery. At Opherdicke, they began receiving direct fire from the woods to their north (vic 935210) and also from the west. At about this point, TF Crittendon was instructed to hold in positions and await relief which was to be accomplished by the 95th Inf Div.

At 1100 hrs the battalion from the 194th Glider Inf Regt was detached and returned to the parent organization. During the one hour this battalion had been with the TF, they received two casualties when a flak gun opened up on them.

While the TF was sitting around awaiting relief, they kept spotting tanks and firing at them but rather ineffectively, also, they kept calling for arty fire on suspected enemy positions across the river. They remained in that vic for the night and outposted the town of Langschede.

The civilians in the town of Langschede were giving a lot of trouble. Apparently, they were observing for the enemy across the river because everytime a patrol moved anywhere, enemy arty would fall on them.

Early the next morning (13 Apr) the outpost from A Co 58th AIB in the vic of 983196 was forced to withdraw due to intense observed fire. About that time, (0920 hrs), the company commander from A Co 58th AIB went up to the burgomeister of the town and told him that unless the firing ceased and they would put white flags up, the town would be burned down. Nothing came of this; so all of our troops were withdrawn and at 1030 a battalion concentration of artillery, consisting of white phosphorus and high explosive was laid on the town. After about five minutes of this, the enemy civilians finally decided that they had had enough and the white flags came out and the burgomeister officially surrendered the town and observed fire from across the river ceased simultaneously.

Things were quiet for the rest of the day with only occasional harassing fire. At 2230 TF Crittendon was relieved by the 377th Infantry Regiment, the 95th Infantry Division and TF Crittendon pulled back to the vicinity of Bausnhagen and were placed in reserve.

DONALD F BURR,
Major,
S-3, 80th Tank Battalion.