HEADQUARTERS 8TH ARMORED DIVISION
Office A. C. of S., G-2.
APO 258, U. S. Army.

11 March 1945

SUBJECT: After Action Report.

TO: Adjutant General, 8th Armored Division.

The following report for period of 1 Feb 1945 to 1 Mar 1945 is submitted:

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD:

a. General Summary.

    At the end of February the enemy situation on the front of the 8th Armd Div. was somewhat obscure. However, the reasons for the obscurity were good ones. Having been moved rapidly from the ECHT area in Holland, and thus going headlong into a new sector we encountered forces hitherto untested by us. Moreover, the enemy himself seems to have been confused, since cohesive units were not employed. Perhaps most important of all, the G2 crystal ball was damaged in the mad dash into Germany, and the picture it presented was a cloudy one at best.

    The enemy situation, therefore, was confused. It might best be summed up as follows: To our front the enemy was falling back to the RHINE, leaving behind delaying detachments at road junctions, key terrain features, and in towns to stem, as best they could, our advance. These detachments were composed of men from various units; they were not uniform detachments from a larger organization. The 176th and 183d Inf Divs. contributed the bulk of our prisoners, which at this time were comparatively few. In general, therefore, the Germans were salvaging the best of their men and were leaving behind those they considered least essential. For this reason, their delaying forces were none too effective in slowing our advance. Notable was the absence of AT and artillery fire in quantity. Anxious to salvage all he could, the enemy was moving his guns to the East. It was not known where the Germans would attempt a stand, but it seemed certain that he would establish lines in strength to protect his bridges over the Rhine at WESEL, ORSOY and UERDINGEN. Crossing to the East bank of the Rhine, as he was, he could ill afford to let the full strength of an armored division catch up to his rear, and since his delaying forces were being brushed aside, it was imperative that he establish a line in some strength. In our Zone there was no mobile enemy force strong enough to launch a successful counterattack, and to our right and left the pressure exerted upon the enemy by the 35th Inf Div and the 84th Inf Div prevented any shift of forces to our front. However, we expected to encounter elements of 7th and 8th Para Divs., 116th and 130th Pz Divs., who would very probably drop down from the Kleve -Goch area where they had opposed the First Canadian Amy.

b. Enemy Front Lines: K9786 -K9487through TETTELRATH K968882 to K970883. (Map: Germany GSGS 44l4, 1/50,000, sheet #8)

c. Units in Contact: 176th VG Div., l83d VG Div., 888 Light AAA Bn.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. 1 Feb 45 - 21 Feb 45:
    8th Armored Division not in contact with the enemy.

b. 21 Feb 45 -28 Feb 45:
    On 21, Feb 45 the 8th Armd Div began relieving the 7th Br Armd Div, thereby coming into contact with the enemy. Initially the enemy opposing us, with the exception of his artillery, was content to remain inactive. Sporadically he would shell our positions, varying 105mm fire with 75mm and with his mortar fire. Here again the enemy picture was obscure. The British believed that Para Regts Hubner, Muller, and Hermann had opposed them. We were not so sure. The enemy remained quiet behind numerous minefields laid over terrain which was low and marshy. Our patrols went out nightly and the enemy reacted by staying in place and by firing at any target that presented itself. Small groups of enemy infantry were observed from time to time moving into positions, occupying bunkers or moving aimlessly about, but there was no definite trend to his movement. On 24 and 25 Feb, Tac/R reported enemy activity (consisting of large groups of men and vehicles moving both East and west) along the ROERMOND - ELMPT road. (A PW taken the night of 26 Feb revealed the information that during the night before he had acted as a guide for officers and NCO's of a unit which was to relieve his organization.) In order to clarify matters, on 26 Feb, CCR of the 8th Amd Div launched a reconnaissance in force to clean out the LINNE - ROERMOND triangle. The enemy resisted this advance by firing intense S/A, mortar, and moderate artillery fire. Their defense was aided by the presence of numerous mine fields, an anti-tank ditch, a mass of communication and fire trenches, and by well located strong points. The soldiers themselves seemed to be of poor quality but their leadership was good, not good enough, however, to prevent our advance to the factory north of LINNE along the north edge of HEIDE WOODS and thence east to the ROER RIVER. Along this line the enemy hung on tenaciously. On 28 Feb, the 8th Armd Div was rushed South to partake in the Ninth Army offensive, and contact with the enemy was broken.

The results of CCR's action were as follows:
    The unit opposing us was a Para Lehr (Training) Regt composed of three battalions of four companies each. This regiment was under control of 8 Para Div, though not an integral part of that division. Their mission was a purely defensive one. Details on strength, disposition and armament, which are not included in this summary, were also determined.

28 Feb: While CCB and CCR were completing their withdrawal from the LINNE - VLODROP area, CCA had crossed the ROER at HILFARTH and had moved North between the 35th and 84th Inf Divs. Resistance to CCA was scattered initially, but stiffened considerably at TETTELRATH K968882, where the enemy defended his roadblock and AT ditch by fire from well constructed pillboxes. Mortar and AW fire at this point was intense. Mortar and artillery fire also fell on MERBECK K906807 in moderate quantity.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AT END OF PERIOD:

The enemy was faced with the problem of halting our advance by one of two means, or a combination of both.
a. By establishing a defense line based on unfavorable, forested terrain in the BRUGGEN K9295 - BOISHEIM K9896 area and the fortified towns of DULKEN F0296 - VIESEN F0697 - MUNCHEN GLADBACH, employing all the available infantry he has for this defense or,
b. Delaying our advance by defending along the line as stated above and employing his armored reserves for local counterattacks.
c. Withdrawing his forces to the East of the RHINE, -while executing capability b.

4. WEATHER AND VISIBILITY: Annex B.

5. G-2 Section Operations:

a. General Summary:

1 Feb -3 Feb: During this period the G-2 section moved by motor convoy as a part of DHQ from PONT-A-MOUSSON, France, to HEERLEN, Holland. Before leaving PONT-A-MOUSSON arrangements were made with the 53d Armd Engr Bn for the collection of all maps of the Third Amy area. These maps were returned to XX Corps Map Depot. Due to the very short notice received by the Division for the move, some difficulty was involved in collecting the maps.

4 Feb -20 Feb: On 4 Feb DHQ moved once again, this tine going to SIMPLEVELD, Holland. The CP was established in a very nice schoolhouse. At once G-2 began planning for possible operations across the Roer River. Maps (in limited quantities) were secured from XVI Corps Map Depot. In this respect it was felt that the map allotment in scales 1/25,000 and. 1/50,000 was not generous enough to provide sufficient maps wherever they were needed. The PI team was directed to conduct studies of enemy defenses along the XVI Corps front. One half the team was dispatched to aid XVI Corps PI team in making up a mosaic of the ROER R and surrounding area in XVI Corps Zone. At the same time the OB team conducted a study of the enemy situation confronting us. Because XVI Corps was a comparatively new one and because the Corps sector had been quiet, not too much was known about enemy dispositions. An SCR 506 radio was set up to monitor tactical air reconnaissance broadcasts. Though valuable information was received from this source, there was also a great amount of information which was of no value at division level. Hence, it was suggested to G-2 Air at XVI Corps that a consolidated report be disseminated at periodic intervals each day. The suggestion was adopted, and Tac/R thus became a source of information which involved no loss of time.

During the entire period daily briefings were held by G-2 - G-3 for liaison officers. Both the division plans and the "big picture" were discussed. The subject of most vital interest was the condition of the ROER River. Swollen and flooded already, it was a formidable obstacle, and with the Germans in control of the ERFT dams in the First Army Zone there was always the threat of much more flooding. Accordingly all plans had to wait in a stage of suspended animation until our troops could seize the dams. On Feb 10 a warning system (see annex 1) for flooding of ROER River was established.

20 Feb - 27 Feb: When the 8th Armd Div relieved the 7 British Armd Div in the LINNE -VLODROF section of XVI Corps, G-2 began concentrated study on enemy defenses and dispositions in our new sector. An active patrolling program was instituted. It was felt that here was an excellent chance to thoroughly indoctrinate the troops with the necessity for constant, aggressive patrolling and that it was an opportunity for them to perfect their methods. Moreover, we needed prisoners and ground inspection of the numerous enemy installations to our front. The enemy disposition in our sector was determined and following a reconnaissance in force by CCR it was evident that the unit facing us was a Para Training Regt.

27 Feb - 28 Feb: During this period, G-2 moved with DHQ from ECHT to HUCKLEHOVEN, Germany. The immediate problem for G-2 was the unraveling of the confused enemy situation and the determine of where he would defend in strength.

b. Team Methods and Results: (See attached team reports}