The Battalion left Rouves at 181950 January, to move north to Siercle, France as part of CC "A" which was to be attached to the 94th Infantry Division. Road conditions were hazardous with snow and rain falling on road which had already been coated with ice. Once again Col. Dawson ordered that allammunition trailers be towed by half-tracks or six by sixes to facilitate movement. The route was via Nomeny, Metz, Thionville and Hunting, France, the Battalion closing in at Hunting France at 190724 January. It remained in Hunting 19, 20, and 21 January, this period being devoted to maintenance and reconnaissance for positions, routes and observation. This was the Battalion's nearest approach to the enemy. The constant artillery fire was novel to all. It is interesting to note that the inhabitants of Hunting, France, were of German origin, and German seemed to be the spoken language of the village.

At 221330 January the Battalion was attached to the 356th FA Bn, 94th Infantry Division, Third Army, and ordered to occupy positions southwest of the village of Wochern, Germany. At approximately 1430, Headquarters Battery crossed into Germany just beyond the town of Apache, France, which is on one of the main roads to Cologne, Germany. At 1551, Battery 'A' reported ready to fire and sent the first round into Germany in aregistration. Thus, the 398th has the honor of firing the first round against the enemy from Division Artillery. Batteries "B" and "C" followed with registrations at 1620 and 1628 which were conducted by a forward observer of the 356th FA.

The Battalion liaison pilots had not been heard from since the Battalion left England. However, about 1900 they reported at the CP just on the eve of the operation. The CP and FDC were located at Sendorf, Germany, about one mile from the battery positions. This was selected because of cover, good roads and housing facilities for troops. Static OPs were established in the church steeple at Remich, Luxemburg and on a high hill in back of this town. These Ops were unique in that they had commanding observation of all the battle-field. The Moselle River separated the enemy territory from this OP. the nearest point to the enemy being about 400 yards. During 22, 23, 24 January the Battalion remained attached to the 356th FA Battalion. Most missions were of unobserved reinforcing and harassing fires.

On 25 January, CC 'A' was ordered to action. Its plan was to advance from a bridgehead established northeast of Berg Chateau by the 9th Infantry. Beyond and within the bridgehead was an anti-tank ditch which had to be breached and filled in by the engineers to permit tanks to cross it to the high ground northeast of Berg. After crossing the ditch the 7th Armored Infantry Battalion was to lead the attack supported by the 18th Tank Battalion, in a northeast direction to the high ground astride the road between Sinz and Krueswiler.

The 88th Reconnaissance squadron had the mission of securing the flanks of the bridgehead. The infantry and tanks had the mission of advancing to the high ground mentioned and destroying enemy communications, installations and supplies within the zone of their advance and then to withdraw back of the bridgehead to Berg. The bridgehead was not secured by the 94th Infantry as scheduled due to the stubborn defense of Nenning and Chateau Berg by the enemy plus his repeated counter attacks. This meant that CC 'A' was obliged to effect the capture of the bridgehead before the main attack could commence. The attack on Berg Chateau which was a strong point defending the anti-tank ditch was featured by a terrific artillery bombardment directed by Lt Cokinos of 'A' Battery.The Battalion fired 718 rounds of HE and 78 rounds of smoke, and in addition Corps Artillery fire was brought down upon the chateau. The chateau was captured shortly after the cessation of the artillery fire.

Action after the capture of Berg Chateau was characterized mostly by the infantry working in close cooperation with tanks which continued the next three days. The objective of CC 'A' was not taken because of a tank ditch which prevented tank action on the high ground along the Krueswiler-Sinz road. The attack therefore shifted toward the East and the last day of action saw the 18th Tank Battalion fighting in Sinz itself. All action was characterized by heavy and continuous mortar and artillery fire which were responsible for most infantry casualties.

For the best description of close-in fighting the narratives of battle participants can best exemplify the action of the artillery support which the Battalion gave.