EXPERIENCES OF 2D LT JOHN M. DRUARY, FO #3, "Battle of Nennig."

On Monday, 22 January 1945 my crew and I were attached to Company 'B' of the 18th Tank Battalion. I reported to Captain Miller, commanding officer of Company "B" and told him that I was to be the forward observer with his company. At that time no definite plan of action for the 18th Tank Battalion had been evolved; so there was nothing to do but wait for future developments and orders which we did for two days.

On Wednesday 24th January Lt Hanmer, who was acting in the capacity of coordinator of all forward observers working with the tankers, told me to report to Company 'C' of the 18th. That noon I reported to Captain Halderson, commanding officer of Company 'C' and told him who I was and what my mission would be. Plans for employment of the tankers were more nearly complete by this time, so Company 'C' was alerted.

Wednesday night, Company 'C' moved up from the bivouac area at Petite LeLange to the vicinity of Apach. I was attached to the third platoon which was to be held in reserve. Lt La Roque, platoon leader of the third platoon, found a couple of houses in Apach and put his platoon in them to keep them as comfortable as possible until the platoon was committed. We stayed there until 1400 that afternoon when the order came down for us to move up to the town of Nennig, to help relieve the tankers and infantry who had thrown the Germans out earlier that day. By the time we entered Nennig and passed through Berg, a small adjacent town to the northeast, the only Germans left in the town were a few snipers. We took positions on a hill to the north of Berg, overlooking the ill-famed Chateau, upon which Lt Cokinos, FO with the 7th Infantry Battalion had adjusted 1000 rounds of artillery fire. The tankers began firing into the woods approximately 600 yards to our direct front in hope of provoking the Germans into bringing out their tanks for a fight. None came out, and the only known target was one German half-track which was immediately destroyed by 75 mm AP ammunition.

By the time I was in position to observe, it was getting dark fast; so there was no point in wasting ammunition when I could not see the target. I did adjust a few rounds of HE on one concentration in the woods hoping the trees would cause air bursts thereby causing casualties if enemy were in the woods. I also requested one smoke round to prove the location of one concentration and also to prove my own location. We withdrew from our position that night about 2230, and each tank commander led his tank through the town of Berg, past the infamous and shell-marked Chateau, got inside and rode through Nennig, back to Besch. As we led our tanks through Berg just outside the Chateau, I counted eight recently killed Germans which one of the doughboys told me had come out of the Chateau only a few minutes before. None of them got more than halfway across the road before they were cut down by small arms fire. The infantryman told me previous to the tanks withdrawal that when the platoon leader and I had walked past the Chateau down into the town to try to find out what we were supposed to do, coming back to the tanks we were fired on by a sniper, but he was evidently a damned poor shot.

The third platoon returned to Besch, refueled and had expended ammunition replaced. We got to bed at 0130 the next morning, Friday, 26 January. At 0140 Captain Miller, commanding officer Company 'B', awakened me and said that I was re-attached to him and for me to be ready to move with my crew at 6730. At 0600 I got up, awakened my men, and was ready to move at 0730. We moved at 1400 after a cold meal, the first real food we had eaten in two days. Naturally we were eager to get back up there because nearly everyone was pretty mad because the S-3's death and of Captain Halderson's and Lt Milbury's being wounded. Company 'B' moved up to the hill north of the Chateau, practically the same position that I occupied the day before when Captain Miller formed his tanks in a circle and put me in the middle; so that I would have protection from ground troops. The 94th Infantry was dug in all over the hill.

At 2000 Captain Miller called me and said that he wanted me to accompany him to a meeting at Topside Forward CP at 2200. We went to the CP in his tank and were given our instructions from the General. The attack was to jump off at 0900. There was to be no artillery preparation, surprise being the main element to be considered. Somehow we were to cross an anti-tank ditch that was to be breeched by the engineers. There we were to continue to our objective, the high ground north of Sinz. At 0900 Saturday, 27 January, the attack jumped off. The infantry advanced into the woods and began drawing heavy automatic fire. They advanced, and the tanks followed to the edge of the woods. One platoon of tanks was on the north side of the road; the other two on the south side. One officer was sent down to reconnoiter the anti-tank ditch for a possible crossing site. He was still looking when the company commander decided to go down the road leading to Sinz. I followed him to give him any possible artillery support I could. As soon as I got within sight of Sinz, I called my S-3 and started preparations for adjusting fire on the town.

Just about that time the commanding officer of Company 'B' of the tanks asked me to drop artillery fire on the town which mission I immediately relayed to my S-3 with the proper concentration number. I had a good OP for one end of the town, but I could not see all of it. The tankers had the best spot for observation and were firing so fast and furiously that I could not move because I would have to pass directly in their line of fire; so I contented myself with what I had. I had missed first round the S-3 sent out; so he kicked it up, and I adjusted from there. I lost the other round, moved it to the right, and the next round was directly over the building I wanted. Then I was told that no more fire could be put on the town, and that the reason could not be divulged at the time. Later a tank on my right was hit and set on fire by an 88 which was promptly knocked out by fire from Lt Hanmer's tank gun. I ordered my crew to fire the 75 and co-axial machine gun into the far end of the town. I did this because I didn't want to become too conspicuous to the Germans by not firing at all. We knocked out a possible Jerry OP and set some buildings on fire.

After I was ordered to cease firing on the town of Sinz, I shifted my fire up on the hill to the west of the town. As soon as I came within sight of the hill I saw Krauts coming swarming down the hillside. They seemed to be headed for the town. I saw about thirty go into a ditch, but I didn't see any Nazis climb out. Then I saw about ten run into a small bush so I put fire on that. I didn't see any come out of there either. By this time the tanks had expended just about all of their ammunition and were low on gas; so they began withdrawing. Mine was the last tank to leave because I wanted to be able to give them fire support to cover the withdrawal if they needed it. At this time the commanding officer of the infantry of the 94th Division in the woods north of the road jumped in my tank and asked me if he could use my radio. He said he was a Colonel in command of the infantry battalion on my left. He called the commanding officer of the tank company I was with and told him that if the tanks would lead the way, the infantry would follow to the final objective. The tank commander told him he couldn't that he was out of gas and ammunition, and that another tank company was coming up to relieve him. The infantry has suffered heavy casualties, and the commanding officer was evidently very upset about it. I rode him up the road to Captain Miller's tank and let him talk to the Captain personally.

A Kraut counter-attack was taking place in the wood north of the road, and we could hear the evil sounding German burp gun as it sprayed the woods. The infantry took cover in the ditch that paralleled the north side of the road. We traversed our turret to the right and sprayed the woods until the infantry started going back; then we withdrew up the road at the tail end of the tank column. Lt Hanmer passed me and doubled the column, because he wanted to see what was holding up the tanks. They were picking up tank crews whose tanks had been disabled by mines or 88 fire. I stopped and took one officer and two men, survivors of a tank that had run over a mine. We went back to the hill from which we had jumped off that morning. I got out of my tank and talked to Lt Hanmer, and he suggested that we take our tanks down to the vicinity of the CP and go see my commanding officer to find out if he had any plans or orders for us. Then it happened; just as I got about halfway down in my tank turret, a sniper's bullet brushed across my breast and bounced off the turret hatch. I lost no time in closing up and staying that way until I got to the CP.

My men were dead on their feet. They had had no sleep to speak of in seventy-two hours. The night before we had spent in the tank, but no one could sleep because it was too cold and because the mortars and artillery and screaming meemies" came over so often and hit so close that we couldn't sleep. Shell fragments ripped the driver's bedroll, a tarp on the back deck, and the bottom of my musette bag. There was a large powder burn on the left front of the tank below the driver's periscope, and the next morning, the morning of the attack on Sinz, I discovered that the closest any enemy projectile came to the tank was three feet from the right track. My crew and I were relieved by Lt Ash FO #2 on 27January, and after talking with the Colonel, he sent me back to the Battalion in a peep. My tank came in later that night, and the men got sleep and rest for first time in four days. German mortar and artillery fire seemed to be directed at the front sprockets.