INTERVIEW

Unit: Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division
Action: Roer-Rhine
Source: Lt Col Morgan G Roseborough, CO, 49th Armored Infantry Bn; Major Charles P Brown, Exec; Capt Edward H Look, S-2; Capt Malcolm J Dugas, S-3; M/Sgt Richard F Matlat, Bn Hq Det.
Interviewer: 1st Lt Howard L Oleck
Place and Date of Interview: Venlo, Holland, 1100, 13 March 1945
Maps: 1/25,000 (Germany) 4416, Sheets 4405, 4505

INTERVIEW
LT. COL. MORGAN G. ROSEBOROUGH (C. O.)
MAJOR CHARLES P. BROWN, JR. (Exec. O.)
CAPTAIN EDWARD H. LOOK (S-2)
CAPTAIN MALCOLM J, DUGAS (S-3)
M/SGT. RICHARD F. MATLAT (Bn Hq Det)

TO: 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, (Historical Officer)
AT: Venlo, Holland, 1100 hours, 13 March 1945
STENOGRAPHER: Pfc Kenneth L. Kinser

Forenote: Lt. Col. Roseborough gave this interview, with the members of his staff above listed assisting him with their own recollection of events. In addition frequent reference to notes and reports was made by all throughout the interview. Maps: All references are to 1/25000 (Germany) 4416, Sheets 4405, 4505.

Major Brown commenced:

The advance guard under my command for the advance on Lintfort and Rheinberg was composed of Co. C of the 49th AIB; Co C of the 36th Tk. Bn. (- 2nd Platoon with combat command trains); Battery C of the 399th F.A.; 3rd platoon of TD's from Co. B, 809th TD Bn.; one platoon of Co. B, 53rd Engineers; 2nd Rcn Platoon of the 49th AIB. We advanced along the route indicated on the attached sketch until we came to the stream where the bridge over the stream at HS Eyle (152215) was blown. At that spot it was necessary to bring up engineers to repair the bridge in order for us to continue on to Lintfort. At that time, inasmuch as we were held up, Col. Roseborough came up.

Col. Roseborough continued the narrative:

As Major Brown told you, B and C Companies of the 49th dismounted and were brought up to across the bridge on foot and C Co. of the 36th was brought forward along the side of the road in the field to the bridge site, also the mortar and assault gun platoons of the 49th were put in position in the field just northwest of HS Eyle. When we reached HS Eyle the combat commander became concerned over heavy tank fire from the north where tanks of the 35th Infantry Div. were engaged with enemy to their north in the vicinity of Kamp (154237). He feared that our tanks, deploying behind us preparatory to moving east, might attract the attention of these first mentioned tanks and result in a fight between our own forces.

In order to prevent this, I sent an officer to these tanks to explain the situation, and Col. Kimball sent Major Threadcraft (his S-3), to the CP of the 137th Infantry Regiment to explain the situation there and assure coordination.

C Co. moved across the bridge dismounted with the mission of seizing Zeche (173227) and pushing on along the west and north of Lintfort in order to clear a route through town for the combat command. Shortly after they moved out the bridge was completed and B Co. of the 49th and C Co. of the 36th moved out in this order: 3rd platoon, Co. B of the 49th; 3rd platoon, Co. C of the 36th; 2nd Platoon, Co. B of the 49th; 1st platoon, Co. C of the 36th; 1st platoon, Co. B of the 49th. (Elements of Troop B of the 88th Rcn. Sq. outposted the bridge site during the time that the engineers were preparing the crossing. The 3rd platoon of Co. C of the 49th Infantry, immediately on arrival at the bridge site, proceeded to clear all of the surrounding houses to insure that the engineers could work on the bridge without interruption.)

The group of infantry and tanks mentioned above moved rapidly through Zeche and through Linfort meeting only light resistance and scattered small arms fire. They passed through Co. C of the 49th Infantry who had reached the western edge of Lintfort dismounted. The infantry and tank companies together proceeded rapidly to just south of the Steegmann (173247) when the leading half-track of the 3rd platoon of Co. B of the 49th was hit with 2 rounds of direct fire from an anti-tank gun located at the Fossa road directly west of its position. The infantry in this half-track and in the other half-tracks of the platoon immediately dismounted and took cover in the ditches on either side of the road. They were subjected to heavy small arms fire from all the houses in the vicinity and from positions in the fields on either side of the road. They immediately set about clearing the houses while the tanks which had halted along the road, took the enemy positions in the fields under fire. Small arms fire was coming from the fields and houses on the west, north and east.

About this time the anti-tank gun which had knocked out the half-track, opened fire and knocked out the second tank behind the one in which Captain Malcolm J, Dugas (the S-3) and I were riding, and just ahead of the tank in which Captain Stanley A Bodin, the C Company Commander, was riding. Captain Dugas saw the flash of the anti-tank gun and directed my attention to it. We took it under fire with the co-axial machine gun on our tank and almost immediately afterwards, Captain Bodin in the column behind us, seeing our tracers, opened fire on it with his 76 MM tank gun. (This was approximately 11 o'clock in the morning.) The first round from the tank gun hit the building right next to the ant-tank gun and the gun crew was seen to abandon the gun.

After the silencing of the anti-tank gun, there was close heavy fire on both sides of the road leading to the canal, particularly heavy fire from the house to the west. Several houses to the right of the road contained enemy rifle men and machine gunners. Our infantry men pressed into their positions and drove them out. Some were seen to withdraw west to a ditch approximately 200 yards away. We suffered several casualties in the process.

Thereupon I ordered the leading tank to by-pass the knocked-out half-track blocking the road, and proceeded to the main road and there turned northeast.

Just before we moved forward again, I found that my own tank radio was dead, the batteries were dead, and we couldn't get the engine started. The tank crew got out of the tank under fire, detached the towing cable from their own tank and attached it to the tank in front of them and had them tow the tank to start it. After the tank was running, the tank driver dismounted to disconnect the towing cable and was shot and killed in the process. His name was T/4 Samson C. Willoughby, 35097978. I then changed from the light tank that I was in to the medium tank just ahead of it in order that I might regain communication.

Just before reaching the turn, I saw friendly tanks coming up the main canal road from the southwest on my left. These tanks never joined me and were never identified other than as friendly tanks. Just after turning to the right we noted what we thought was a German tank about 600 yards to the north, but neither the platoon leader of the leading platoon, (2nd Lt. William F. Irwin, 3rd platoon, Co. C, 36th Tank Bn), nor myself were able to positively identify the tank as enemy, and since we had seen friendly tanks in the area, we held our fire. The suspected tank soon moved behind a house and was seen no more.

About this time, in searching the road ahead of us toward Rheinberg, we noticed an 88 MM gun in position along the road approximately 800 yards to the northeast. This gun was taken under fire by the 2 leading tanks and apparently was knocked out or abandoned for the fire was never returned.

At the point (1300), Technical Sergeant Edward E. Ripplemeier, the platoon leader of the Recon Platoon of the 49th Infantry reached me and told me that the rest of the combat command had taken another route and that the combat commander was anxious to contact me. A close study of my map revealed that the task force (the infantry and tank company) that I had taken through Lintfort had gotten on the wrong route and had ended up north of the town rather than east of the town as they were supposed to. The erroneous turn was taken in the exact center of Lintfort at the Hindenburgplatz where 6 streets intersect. I received an order to withdraw the force that I had from north of the town and to follow the force commanded by Major Van Houten, which had proceeded out of Lintfort to the east.

BATTLE FOR RHEINBERG

After reorganizing my force and starting them to the east from Lintfort I marched in the following order: C Co. of the 49th Infantry; C Co. of the 36th Tank Battalion, (minus the second platoon which was still attached to the combat command trains as security); B Co. of the 49th Infantry, less the 3rd platoon which had not completed its reorganization; and Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 49th Infantry. After organizing my column in this order, I proceeded forward and reported to the combat commander at Klein Bongardt (202243) who informed me that Major Van Houten's force was heavily engaged and receiving heavy losses and needed more infantry. (This was at about approximately 1400). He ordered me to bring all of my infantry forward to assist Major Van Houten.

C. Co. of the 49th Infantry was the first company to arrive and was immediately placed under the command of Major Van Houten and was assigned the mission of attacking north from Tremohlen (206248) to relieve the forces that were pinned down to the north. Soon after C Co. launched its attach, Major Van Houten asked for another infantry platoon to be sent, mounted, to assist Co. A of the 36th 'Tank Battalion which was reported to be receiving a counter attack. I ordered Lt. Kimpel, the platoon leader of the 3rd platoon of Co. C of the 49th, which was then the support platoon of Co. C to mount his platoon in half-tracks and proceed north to assist Co. A of the 36th in repelling the counter attack.

Major Van Houten and I then decided to take B Co. of the 49th Infantry east to the main road leading south from Rheinberg through Winterswick (216263) and to join Co. B of the 36th Tank Battalion which was then in the vicinity of Strommers (212254) and to assist them in their attack on Rheinberg from the south.

In the meantime, Co. A of the 49th Infantry, having been stopped in their attack on Rheinberg from the southwest, had been withdrawn by Major Van Houten and ordered to attack Rheinberg from the south along with B Co. of the 36th Tank Battalion. However, when B Co. of the 49th arrived with a company which was better organized than A Co., it was decided to hold A Co. in reserve in the vicinity of Strommers.

Major van Houten, Captain Smith, the Company Commander of Co. B of the 49th, and Captain David B. Kelly, Company Commander of Co. B of the tanks, Captain King, Company Commander of Co. A of the 49th and myself planned the attack which was to take place shortly. This was about 1600.

B Co. of the 49th, with platoons dismounted on either side of the road, with 2 accompanying tanks from B Co. of the 36th Tank Battalion and 5 more tanks following to give direct fire support, moved north from Strommers and attacked Winterswick. In the midst of the operation Captain Smith was killed while riding on the back of the leading tank and directing his infantry from there. The company, under command of Lt. Meech, pushed forward through Winterswick, seizing that town, and pushing forward as far as the brick factory just east of the road and about 500 yards north of Winterswick. It was in the vicinity of this brick yard that three 88 MM guns and from four to six 20 MM guns were knocked out by the tanks and infantry in this attack. By this time it had become dark and the second and third battalions of the 137th Infantry, which had been sent to pass through our forces and continue the attack, had arrived. After they had passed through, we withdrew and reorganized in Winterswick.

During the night I was called to the combat command CP at Lintfort and received an order attaching Combat Command B of the 8th Armored Division to the 137th Infantry Regiment and forming 3 groups under the new desigination of "Task Force Murray". The group that I commanded was group #3 and consisted of the 49th AIB, the 2nd Battalion of the 137th Infantry, Co. B of the 36th Tank Battalion, Co. A of the 784th Tank Battalion, minus one platoon, Co. B of the 664th TD Battalion minus one platoon, and Co. B of the 153rd Armored Engineer battalion, minus one platoon.

The order that I received that night was to remain in my present position pending the outcome of reconnaissance to the north of Rheinberg, the result of which would determine our plan of attack.

I placed Major Brown, my Executive Officer, in command of the 49th AIB and attached Co. B of the 36th Tank Battalion to him. I also attached Co. A of the 784th Tank Battalion and Co. B of the 664th TD Battalion to the second battalion of the 137th Infantry Regiment, which was then commanded by Major Parker.

During the day the 49th AIB was assembled in the vicinity of Winterswick and the 2nd Battalion 137th Infantry was in Rheinberg. Operations at this point were held up by a blown bridge on the northwest edge of Rheinberg. This bridge was repaired at approximately 1800 and Group #2, under Lt. Col. Bulter, moved across the bridge to attack, at approximately 1900. He proceeded to attack the factory in the vicinity of Ossenberg (Solvay Works, 198304), and spent the entire night fighting in the factory.

Group #3 was ordered to attack at 0600, to seize Ossenberg and 2 patches of woods to the north and west of Ossenberg. The plan was to attack with the two principal forces, that is, the second battalion of the 137th and the 49th Infantry Battalion abreast, with the 2nd Battalion of the 137th passing through the bottleneck just southeast of the factory first, and proceeding to take the right half of Ossenberg, with the 49th AIB following to take the left half of Ossenberg.

The 2nd Battalion crossed the line of departure at the southeast edge of the factory at 0625 and by 0730 had secured the first group of houses in Ossenberg, meeting heavy small arms fire and capturing many prisoners. The 49th AIB on the left, crossed the line of departure at 0810 and advanced abreast of the second battalion of the 137th. Both battalions had completely seized the town of Ossenberg by 1600. Both forces were then pinned down in an effort to take the woods which was their objective.

The next morning another effort was made to seize these woods, again without success, but the woods were occupied that night without resistance other than mortar and artillery fire, the enemy apparently having withdrawn during the day. The withdrawal of the enemy probably can be attributed to a heavy air attack that day on their positions in the pocket between Ossenberg and Wesel.

We remained there until we were relieved the next morning.

| Continued |