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Merbeck
INTERVIEW
1st Lt. Arthur J. Fisher, CO, Company B, 7th Armored Infantry Battalion,
1530 hours, 16 March 1945, Wankum, Germany to Capt. Vasta.
The company moved out as advance guard for Combat Command A on 26 February 1945 (this seems to be a variance of actual facts as CCA was not alerted to move out until 27 February according to the operations report from Hq CCA dated 1 March 1945 and signed by Major John R. Sheridan, S-3, Hq CCA). Company B with one platoon of tanks was leading the column. They halted just before Merbeck about 300 yards leading into the road leading into Merbeck (the road from Wegberg) where they found a roadblock. Colonel Crittendon asked them to send a platoon of mounted infantry and a platoon of tanks. The mission of this section was for the infantry to dismount and form a bridgehead in front of the roadblock to protect the engineers while they worked. The section moved but and formed a bridgehead. Lt. Fisher brought up the second platoon to be ready to support the first platoon and also to send out two patrols to the first platoon to find out what kind of opposition there was in the town.
The road-block was removed and the patrols moved within 100 yards of the town. They were pinned down by small-arms fire at that point. The Task Force CO figured they might as well go ahead with a full scale attack. At about 0630 hours the first platoon was placed on the right side (west) of the road and given the mission of cleaning the western section of the town and the second was on the east side of the road and had the mission of cleaning out the eastern sector of the town. At the same time, the tanks moved up on the road, followed by one platoon of mounted infantry. The tanks were firing their machine guns as well as their bow guns as they approached. Just short of the town the tanks came to a stop at a place where the enemy had attempted to setup a road-block. Lt. Fisher tried to contact the tank commander so that he could get the tanks rolling foward again but he was unable to find him. However, Lt. Fisher's runner finally located him and gave him the instructions about moving forward. The tank commander was hesitant about going into the town; he wanted the infantry to go ahead of the tanks. Finally, however, the tank commander was talked into going into the town ahead of the infantry. Initially, there was only small-arms fire and no AT weapons were fired. Later on, two 88's were found but to Lt. Fisher's knowledge they had not been used against us. Entry into the town was made about 0700 hours.
The tanks moved through the town and out to the northern edge so as to protect Company B as they cleaned out Merbeck. Company B cleared out the entire town and then moved back into the cender of town to reorganize. Then they when back into support. That was about 0900 hours. During this action they had six men wounded and took between 15 and 20 prisoners.
At 1330 hours that afternoon, they moved out cross-country to the wooded area directly to the west of Merbeck and skirted the edge of the woods to a point southeast from the town of Tetelrath. They moved with one squad as advance guard and on their way they didn't hit anything. The third platoon, which was leading, moved out to the neck of the woods (952878). The second platoon moved on a line and to the right (east). About 1430 hours, Lt. Fisher lost contact with the third platoon. The first platoon was back in the woods (948873) in reserve. The third platoon did not stop where they should have but kept on going and got into a fire with the enemy. Or second platoon wasn't drawing any fire. Lt. Fisher, who was with the second platoon, could see that the third platoon was in a fire fight but couldn't figure out how much fire they were receiving or the strength of the enemy. Finally, the third platoon sent back word that they were involved and that they felt that the Germans were coming in behind them and cutting them off. Lt. Fisher sent word back to the first platoon to move around on the left and assist the third platoon. As the first platoon started to move out to the left, they were pinned down by enemy fire coming from the northeast direction and a heavily wooded area. The third and first platoons sent word over their 536's that the enemy was apparently coming around the rear to out off the whole company. (Lt. Fisher found out later that the report was a little exaggerated.) Lt. Fisher got word to the third platoon to cover the first and second platoons with fire so that they could hold out. The second platoon wasn't really in need of covering fire but the first platoon was. The first and second platoons drew back to the houses on the edge of the town of Merbeck at 955870. Lt. Fisher got word to Col. Crittendon about the enemy's situation. A platoon of tanks was sent over to the third platoon and between the tanks and infantry, 42 prisoners were taken. When the tanks shoved up, the enemy seemed to lose interest in the scrap and started to come out. The third moved back into Merbeck and the company was organized for defense for the night.
No further action against the enemy took place after this.
Dorsten / Unna
On 28 March the second platoon under the command of Lt. Glenn Tegge took off on a reconnaissance patrol of 20 men. Their mission was to determine the nature of the enemy defenses around the town of Dorsten. The patrol left at 2200 hours and returned at 0100 hours 29 March. They reported that the enemy was digging in on the outskirts of the town. They found one 88mm emplacement and fired rifle grenades at it. They evidently knocked out the emplacement as there was nothing there the next morning.
At 0100 hours orders were received to move out dismounted at 0330 hours to attack Dorsten. We moved out at 0330 with the first platoon on the left (north-west) and the third platoon on the right and the second platoon following in support. We didn't encounter any opposition up to the railroad tracks. There, we reorganized, moved out and came under direct fire from the right flank. This was heavy fire for awhile as they were shooting at individuals. The third platoon advanced to the building just northeast of their front and the first platoon went to the house directly to their front.
At that time the right flank was exposed and the second platoon was brought to the right (east) flank. We called for tanks after we began moving. We were getting into where there were a lot of buildings. After the tanks arrived, we began receiving sporadic artillery and mortar fire. We couldn't get artillery support on this spot because the 88th Cav Recon Squadron was moving up on the right. (Later on we got reports that the 88th had knocked out these direct fire weapons.) The next objective was the athletic field at 465396. The third platoon reached this field first and the first came abreast on its left. They moved on through to the vicinity of 467401 where friendly troops were contacted (Co A 7th AIB with Task Force Harris). The advance elements of the attack units had seen some GIs and went to check.
At this time the platoons were reorganized and told to move on. The vehicles were on their way to the designated area and Capt. Fisher went back to escort them. He brought the vehicles up and the enemy threw in everything. After the vehicles were dispersed, Capt. Fisher made another visit to battalion headquarters.
Orders were then received to send the first platoon and the AT Platoon, over the railroad tracks to form a bridgehead so that the engineers could lay a passageway over the tracks. They went out about 1300 hours and at 1430 took the other two platoon dismounted across the tracks. The mission was to hold that flank and to protect the rest of the task force as they passed thru in the vehicles. The rest of the task force was to cross the tracks and to follow on the inside flank. Flank protection and the bridgehead was established without trouble. The vehicles crossed the railroad tracks and reached the vicinity of 479391 where they were stopped by direct fire. The task force held that position throughout the night.
We arrived in Kesseburen at 0330 hours 11 April. We had orders to cross the line of departure at 0630. Col Poinier called to find out if we could jump off at 0600. Since all the plans were already set for 0630 and the artillery preparation was set for 0615, we told him we couldn't jump off at 0600.
The plan of attack was to be a dismounted action with the third platoon on the right (north) and the second platoon on the left. The tank destroyers (attached) were initially to stay on the high ground at the line of departure and support by fire. The first platoon and anti-tank guns in support were to follow by bounds. C Company was to move on the left flank and to follow at 300 yards.
We moved out at 0630 hours immediately following the artillery preparation. Upon crossing the line of departure, both platoons immediately came under small arms fire. The third platoon kept moving, taking several houses in the vicinity of 981256 and then reorganized. The second platoon had more trouble, mainly coming from their left front and flank. The second platoon, with the exception of one squad that was pinned down, moved up to the roadblock just below the houses. An attempt was made to relieve this situation by dumping some 60mm mortars into the woods near there. However, not too much fire could be placed on those woods because friendly units were supposed to be coming up on the left flank. The second platoon finally succeeded in moving up to houses.
The mission was to move to the crossroads at 975259 (initial objective) and the second objective was to move up to the "Y" and swing to the right to the railroad tracks. The second and third platoons moved to the crossroads at 973265 picking up occasional 88mm fire along the roads. There were many large guns along the way but they didn't fire at us. We entered Unna at 0845. Pushing into town, the main opposition was from small arms fire. At that crossroads (973265), the AT platoon went thru on the left and the first platoon on the right. They moved up to the railroad tracks and organized. The first platoon was then sent across the tracks to check on the situation and try to gain contact with the 95th Inf Division. The anti-tank, the second and third platoons turned west along the axis of the railroad to clean out that section of the town. The opposition put up by the enemy was negligible. Some prisoners taken stated that our troops followed the artillery in so closely that they (the enemy) were caught by surprise.
Meanwhile, the first platoon platoon gained contact with the 95th Inf Division and things were in good order.
When we first entered the town, we could hear the enemy armor pulling out. When we reached the first houses in the town, the tanks came up and did a good job. When there was a fence to go through, we let the tanks break through it instead of cutting or crawling and generally exposing the men.
We reached our final objective at 1000 hours – organized and remained there for the next two days
ARTHUR FISHER
Capt.
Commanding Officer
Company B, 7th Armd Inf Bn.
JOHN MARTINEK,
2d lt, Platoon Leader.
Company B, 7th Armd Inf Bn.
August A. Benedetti,
1st Sgt.
Winfred Isaacs,
T/Sgt.
Sherman Dunn,
T/Sgt.
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