INTERVIEW

Unit: Combat Command B.
Source: Lt. Col. Edwin Burba, Commanding Officer, Combat Command B.
Interviewer: Capt. Joseph Vasta.
Place and Date of Interview: 14 May 45, Northeim, Germany.

HEADQUARTERS
COMBAT COMMAND "B"
8TH ARMORED DIVISION
14 May 1945.

BLANKENBURG

CCB, 8th Armd Div was assigned a defensive mission in a 44 KM sector along the right flank of XIX Corps, l5 April 1945. Prior to 18 April 1945, the enemy held a strong pocket in the E edge of the woods S of DERENBURG. Realizing that we had to hold those woods in order to protect our OPL, and in order to secure a suitable LD against BLANKENBURG which was in our Z but had not been ordered taken, CCB launched an attack of Co strength (Co A, 49 AIB) at 0800, 18 April 1945. The woods were cleaned up late that evening and the position consolidated along the LANGENSTEIN - HEIMBURG Rd. On that day, plans were made to burn FORST HEIMBURG, which is between the LANGENSTEIN - HEIMBURG Rd and BLANKENBURG, by incendiary bombing.

A combat command OP was established S of LANGENSTEIN and wire communications installed from which the bombing attack could be controlled and movement of ground troops into the woods coordinated. The squadron of airplanes assigned the mission was unable to fly until 1400 due to weather conditions. They came out loaded with fragmentation bombs instead of incendiary, but were used to advantage in bombing and strafing enemy positions in FORST HEIMBURG which had been located by patrols and PW interrogation. Results of the bombing were the complete withdrawal of the enemy from FORST HEIMBURG, except for a few snipers and small patrols. The following day, 20 April 1945, FORST HEIMBURG was cleaned out completely by Tr C, 88 Cav Rcn Sq; one (1) man was wounded in the operation.

In view of the fact the pocket of enemy resistance centering on BLANKENBURG was considerably reduced by the advance of the 1 Inf Div, 9 Inf Div, and 330 Inf, 83 Inf Div, and not wishing to sustain heavy casualties by premature assault of the town, plans were drawn to exert the maximum pressure and make use of propaganda to the fullest extent in order to obtain the surrender of the town. The town of HEIMBURG NW of BLANKENBURG had not been cleared and had the preceding week withstood a 12-hour assault by one Bn of Inf attached to the 113 Cav. Co A, 49 AIB was relieved by Co C on the HEIMBURG - LANGENSTEIN Rd and was used to clear HEIMBURG. This was accomplished by 1200, 20 April 1945 against light resistance. When HEIMBURG was cleared, phase 2 of the plan was ordered which provided for movement to assault position on high ground N of BLANKENBURG by TP ROSEBOROUGH which consisted of 49 AIB minus Co B, plus Co B, 36 Tk Bn. TF VAN HOUTEN consisting of 36 Tk Bn minus Co B, plus Co B, 49 AlB had moved into assault position from the E along the WESTERHAUSEN - BIANKENBURG Rd by 0930 that morning with a mission of demonstrating great strength.

The air strike which had been requested the preceding day was made on schedule at 1000. A 13-plane squadron dive-bombed the town and then strafed for a total period of 45 minutes, leaving the center of town in flames. After 10 minutes, one Co of Tks which had moved out from WESTERHAUSEN to the protective shelter of a low ridge 2 1/2 KM's W of BLANKENBURG, moved forward in full view on the ridge in line formation and fired five (5) rounds from each tank in order to impress the defenses with our strength in armor. Upon completion of the firing, the Tks backed into defilade and a 2-Bn Arty TOT was fired. Then a loudspeaker from the P&PW, Ninth Army, mounted on a 3/4-ton truck was taken to the closest point approximately 2 KM's from the OP defenses of the town and a broadcast was made asserting the hopelessness of their continued resistance. PW's later stated they could hear only a portion of the broadcast, but enough was understood to indicate to them we would accept a parliamentaire to discuss their surrender. Immediately following the broadcast, the Burgomeister and his Adjutant from the town of WESTERHAUSEN were sent with a white flag into the town of BLANKENBURG with instructions to tell the commandant of that city they were surrounded by 6,000 troops and 200 Tks, and in the event additional resistance was met from the town, another bombing attack would occur shortly after noon and the town would be taken by force.

Having previously surrendered his town without resistance, the Burgomeister was willing to make our force appear as formidable as we stated, and later evidence indicates that he repeated the story as instructed. The Burgomeister and Adjutant were released about two (2) KM's from BLANKENBURG and were observed going into the OPL of the enemy at 1130 where the officer in command of the enemy OP questioned them. At 1300, the Adjutant returned stating that the Burgomeister had been questioned by the enemy OP commander, and sent on through the town into the mountains beyond to talk to the commandant of the town who had withdrawn. The Adjutant asked that the bombing attack be postponed until we heard from the Burgomeister.

As a result of the propoganda broadcast and the Burgomeister's passage through the OPL, two (2) surrender parties representing different forces came out with white flags. One came from the woods and ridge line directly SE of BLANKENBURG, representing the Sv Co and wagon train of the 116 Pz Div. He offered to surrender the trains if some show of force was made, and a Tk Plat with an Inf Plat mounted on the Tks was sent to the area indicated to bring out the troops and equipment. While engaged in this, one of our infantrymen was shot and killed. Approximately 200 men, 150 horses, and 100 wagons, including the kitchens, and considerable stocks of rations and other supplies were taken. (see Signal Corps Photos)

The other surrender party consisted of one (1) S/Sgt who came from the enemy OPL directly up the highway. The S/Sgt indicated that his commanding officer would like talk to an American officer. He was sent back with instructions to have his CO come out halfway and he would be met by the CO, CCB. This meeting was accomplished at approximately 1330.

The second squadron of planes which had been requested earlier was circling over the town ready to carry out the second bombing and strafing mission as the conference proceeded. The German commander found it impossible to surrender his forces without a fight because of German military tradition. However, he was willing to surrender his forces if they were opposed by an overwhelming number of Tks. After considerable conversation about what constituted an overwhelming force, 50 Tks were agreed upon and the hour of attack was arranged. The planes were contacted and instructed to determine profitable targets, if possible, in the mountains W of the town and unload their bombs. This flexibility of control impressed the German commander very much.

H-hour was set at 1715 in order to permit TF ROSEBOROUGH to move down from the vicinity of HEIMBURG. Since there were not 50 Tks available in TF VAN HOUTEN on the E of the town, halftracks were deployed to make up the difference. The attack jumped off as planned at 1715 and met only isolated resistance from a few strong points which either did not receive the order to surrender when overpowered, or did not follow the order. No casualties were sustained and one dugout with its occupants who resisted were destroyed. The town was occupied and mopped up by dark, and the entire combat command less one Rcn Tr and one TD Co moved in for the night. 1,176 prisoners and 177 horses were taken.

The 58 AIB which had been assigned to the combat command at 1600, arrived at approximately 2000 and moved into the W edge of the town to deploy for an attack the following morning into the mountains beyond. This attack jumped off at 0800, 21 April 1945 and contacted elements of the 1 Inf Div in HUTTENRODE at 1100.

BURBA,
Comdg.