THE DRIVE TO THE RHINE
And
THE BREAKING OF THE WESEL POCKET

COMBAT COMMAND B
EIGHTH ARMORED DIVISION
NINTH U.S. ARMY
(22 February - 11 March 1945)

BY: 1ST LT. HOWARD L. OLECK, (Historical Officer)
And
PFC KENNETH L. KINSER (Assistant)

Fifth Information and Historical Service
(While on temporary duty with Fourth Information and Historical Service)

23 March 1945    

(Note: Numbers after each sentence indicate footnotes referring to detailed authentication or surrounding circumstances.)

On 22 February 1945 Combat Command B of the 8th Armored Division had its Command Post in a monastery at Diergaarde, Holland. (758784). (1) They had relieved the British 7th Armored Division in that sector, and were preparing for a drive across the Roer River to the Rhine River. (2).

The 8th Armored Division was, with the 35th Infantry Division, the northern flank of the Ninth U.S. Army. (3). To the north, near Venlo, Holland, (910090) were the Second British and the First Canadian Armies. (4). The overall plan of movement, as subsequent events were to reveal, called for CCB and the other elements of the 8th Armored Division to move north and northeast toward the bend of the Rhine River at Wesel. (220405) (5).

While awaiting orders to begin its movement, the combat command prepared for all possible eventualities by setting up defensive plans for its sector as well as reconnoitering routes for advance across the Roer River. (6).

On 23 February 1945 other elements of the XVI Corps, of which the 8th Armored Division was a part, began to move east across the Roer River. (7). The combat command as well as other units in the corps supported this attack with the fire of their artillery and all available heavy weapons. (8).

On 24 February 1945 the combat command rested quietly merely maintaining regular patrols. (9). On the 25th of February the 49th Armored Infantry Battalion of CCB sent patrols across the river as far as Trieste (K828839) and Voorsel (K819838) and found the towns so little defended that one squad infantry took each town. (10).

Task Force Van Houten, composed principally of the 36th Tank Battalion, reinforced, prepared an attack on Vlodrop (843829) which never materialized, and the 26th day of the month found the unit still awaiting movement orders. (11).

On 27 February 1945 CCB was ordered by Headquarters, 8th Armored Division to move to Hilfarth, Germany (K937723). (12). Their vacated sector was taken over by elements of the 15th Cavalry Group. (13). On the 28th of February the advance guard moved out of Diergaarde toward Hilfarth, and reached Hilfarth after some delay due to a confusion of its column with that of the 35th Infantry Division, resulting from a XVI Corps order to both units to move through Hilfarth along the same route, at the same time. (14). While enroute the column received orders from 8th Armored Division to by-pass resistance wherever possible and to proceed to Ober Kruchten (K9490) at once. (15). Resistance all along the route was negligible, consisting of occasional sniper fire, and the column, led by the 49th Armored Infantry Battalion, proceeded through Hilfarth to Arsbeck (935838) with no difficulty worthy of note, taking the town against no more resistance than a few scattered snipers. (16).

On 1 March 1945 the CP of Combat Command B remained at Arsbeck while road reconnaissance on routes east and north was made. (17). On the 2d of March division orders for movement were issued and cancelled several times during the day. (18). Finally that day the combat command was ordered to move north once more and proceeded through Kaldenkirchen (930085) and Herongen (967111) to Wankum (005125) with no real resistance. (19). On the 3d of March they moved again from Wankum northeast to Aldekerk, (084166) again meeting almost no resistance and taking about 50 prisoners. (20). Most of the prisoners were docile and eager to surrender. (21).

The combat command closed into CP at Aldekerk at 1345 that day, having traversed a considerable distance through enemy territory with hardly more difficulty than if they had been on a road march. (22). The 49th Armored Infantry Battalion, which was the advance guard for the entire movement thus far, like the rest of the command had not yet experienced a major action, and had suffered no casualities other than a few slight scratches sustained by a few of its infantry men. (23).

On 4 March 1945, by order of XVI Corps, CCB was detached from the 8th Armored Division and attached to the 35th Infantry Division. (24). They were assigned the right flank of the 35th Infantry Division sector, with the mission of moving northwest from Aldekerk to clean out a pocket of resistance east of Rheinberg (214282) along the Rhine River and then to assist the 35th Infantry Division in a drive for the Wesel bridges (225406) across the Rhine River. (25).

That night Colonel Edward A. Kimball, Commanding Officer of Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division, was called to the CP of the 35th Infantry Division at Nieukerk, Germany (055185), where details of the general plan directed him to by-pass all resistance where possible, seize the town of Rheinberg and cooperate in the move north to Wesel, which was to be performed jointly by CCB of the 8th Armored Division, and the 137th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Infantry Division. (26). The senior officer of the two units was to take command of operations after the seizure of Rheinberg. (27).

The next morning at 0500 (5 March 1945) CCB moved northeast out of Aldekerk just as it had moved for the past 2 weeks, expecting only light resistance. (28). Air reconnaissance only as far as Lintfort, but not up to Rheinberg, had been requested by CCB on 3 March 1945, and had revealed nothing. (29). No preliminary air or ground reconnaissance north beyond Lintfort was obtained. (30). No preliminary artillery preparation was ordered, nor was there any coordinated artillery support until the afternoon of 5 March when some general support was given by the attached 399th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. (31).

For the move on Lintfort and Rheinberg the combat command was divided into two task forces, the first of which, called Task Force Roseborough, was composed principally of the 49th Armored Infantry Battalion, reinforced, commanded by Lt. Col. Morgan G. Roseborough. (32). The other group, called Task Force Van Houten, consisted of the 36th Tank Battalion, reinforced, commanded by Major John H. Van Houten. (33).

The general plan called for Task Force Roseborough to sweep through Lintfort (180225), an industrial town much larger than Rheinberg, and to clear a route through for the tank forces. (34). Just ahead of Task Force Roseborough, reconnaissance units of B Troop of the 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized were to proceed through Lintfort and thence east and north to reconnoiter a route for the tanks. (35). Task Force Van Houten was to pass quickly through Lintfort, and east out of Lintfort. (36). Task Force Roseborough was to join Task Force Van Houten as soon as the tanks had moved through Lintfort, and the combined task force were to turn north after having moved well east of Lintfort, driving for Rheinberg from the south with Task Force Roseborough on the left and Task Force Van Houten on the right. (37).

The 137th Infantry Regiment plan of action called for the 3d Battalion of that regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Albert M. butler, to move northeast on the left flank of CCB, passing through the northwestern edge of Lintfort and driving on Rheinberg from the southwest and west. (38).

Resistance was negligible during the approach march until the columns neared Lintfort, and only short delays were occasioned by waiting required while the engineers repaired several small bridges which had been blown along the route. (39).

Just before reaching the western outskirts of Lintfort, near Pitgen (130225), CCB and the 3d Battalion of the 137th Infantry established contact between their flanks as planned. (40). At this point the first real resistance began to be felt. (41). The 137th Infantry found themselves faced by heavy small arms fire from the east and in fighting through lagged behind the more mobile tank unit. (42). The armor drove through the small arms resistance and proceeded into Lintfort, thus breaking contact with the infantry immediately. (43).

Task Force Roseborough drove into the northwestern edge of town at about 1000 following the reconnaissance elements, and turned after them southeast into the middle of the city. (44). Here the task force made a wrong turn and moved north out of the city instead of east as had been planned. (45). In the city proper resistance was very light although there was some small arms and artillery fire in town. (46). Task Force Roseborough moved north out of the edge of the town and encountering only moderate small arms fire and anti-tank gun fire of 2 or 3 guns from the north and northeast, deployed and became involved in an engagement for about three hours. (47).

Meanwhile, Task Force Van Houten came into Lintfort from the west and, following the proper route through the city, halted at the eastern edge for final orders. (48). Col. Kimball, the Commanding Officer of CCB, was informed by the reconnaissance elements of Troop B that the fire from the northeast outside the city was too heavy to permit this unit to make the reconnaissance upon which they had began. (49).

Nevertheless, Col. Kimball ordered Task Force Van Houten to proceed to maneuver east, northeast and then north against Rheinberg without waiting for reconnaissance or infantry support, and the tanks moved out as ordered. (50).

The tank Column proceeded at about noon, east and then northeast out of Lintfort to approximately halfway between Lintfort and Rheinberg. (51). There Major Van Houten divided his task force into two sub task forces, one of which, led by C Company (commanded by Capt. David B. Kelly) attacked Rheinberg from the south, and the other, led by A Company of the 36th Tank Battalion (commanded by Capt. Kimble Tucker) which attacked from the southwest. (52).

The terrain between Lintfort and Rheinberg and throughout the area to the Rhine is very flat and open, affording very little cover and concealment for the maneuver of tanks and offering many excellent positions and fields of fire for anti-tank guns. (53). In addition, the area around Rheinberg is cut up by many small canals and streams which converge upon Rheinberg and canalize all movement to Rheinberg particularly from the south and southwest. (54).

At about 1400 the tanks moved in with B Company on the right moving north along the main road through Winterswick (216263) to Rheinberg, A Company moving cross country to approach from the southwest, and D Company moving northwest along the Fossa Canal on the left. (55). As they neared Rheinberg, all the columns were met by storms of anti-tank gun and bazooka fire and in a short time two thirds of the tanks were crippled or burning. (56).

The enemy had many anti-tank guns very well emplaced and plenty of infantry, a large percentage of whom were armed with panzer faust and other anti-tank weapons. (57). The Germans permitted the tanks to move into their very midst, and held their fire until the tanks were very close. (58). With no accompanying infantry to root out the German infantry or anti-tank guns nor any air nor artillery fire to hold them down, the tanks drove right in and offered easy targets. (59). About half of the losses sustained were received at the hands of German bazooka men in fox holes who waited until the tanks were very close and hit them with panzer fausts on the flanks and rears. (60). Four tanks of B Company (36th Tank Battalion) actually entered Rheinberg at about 1500 despite the overwhelming anti-tank fire, driving through sheer aggressiveness, guns blazing, but the town could not be held by tanks as long as it was full of enemy infantry, and they had to withdraw. (61).

Although B Company had lost all but 6 tanks, and A Company had lost eleven, Major Van Houten at about 1500 also ordered D Company to attack from the southwest by moving to the north of Lintfort to the canal road and thence northeast against Rheinberg. (62). This company reached the railroad station just southwest of Rheinberg by 1700 but was almost annihilated, losing 17 of its 18 tanks along the road, and finally the one remaining tank had to withdraw. (63).

C Company was in reserve, guarding the trains. (64).

Meanwhile, Task Force Roseborough with the bulk of the sorely needed infantry was being reoriented with considerable trouble by several of the combat commander's staff officers, and moved south into Lintfort again, and thence east and north along the same roads as the tanks had traversed, to support the tank attack. (65).

The tank battalion and company officers had called in vain for infantry support throughout the day. (66). The small detachment of armored infantry with Task Force Van Houten was helpful and enabled the few remaining tanks to cling precariously to the southern edge of Rheinberg, but were not sufficient to hold the entire town firmly. (67). Many of the surviving members of the tank crews had been terribly mauled had dismounted from their burning tanks and continued the fight as infantry. (68).

The combat commander, while accompanying some of his forward elements had been cut off by heavy fire and did not return to his command post until one o'clock the following morning. (69). Many units received little or no coordinated direction or control from their command post throughout the action. (70)

The repeated calls for infantry assistance were answered by way of XVI Corps order to the 3d Battalion of the 137th Infantry Regiment to move up quickly to the assistance of the battered combat command, which could not continue to hold the edge of Rheinberg alone for much longer. (71).

The infantry did come to their assistance at last at about dusk after coming up in trucks to Winterswick and moving into Rheinberg at about 1900, proceeded to clear the town by house to house assault, completing the occupation by 0300 in the morning of 6 March. (72).

CCB, particularly the 36th Tank Battalion, had suffered great losses, but had broken the defenses, taken over 500 prisoners, and taken what the Germans evidently considered a key point, with one violent smash. (73).

While the action at Rheinberg was going on, the 35th Infantry Division had issued orders combining CCB and the 137th Infantry Regiment into one task force, under the name of Task Force Murray after the senior Commanding Officer, Colonel William S. Murray, for the continuation of the attack north from Rheinberg through Ossenberg (199303) for the Wesel bridges. (74).

Colonel Murray divided his task force into 3 groups, organizing each group into an infantry tank team, coordinated as closely as time would permit, with an average of 1 tank platoon (36th Tank Battalion) and 1 tank destroyer platoon (Company B, 809 Tank Destroyer Battalion) per company on infantry. (75)

The bridge across the canal just north of Rheinberg had been blown during the night and Task Force Murray was delayed for 18 hours while the bridge was being repaired, under artillery and air attack, by 60th Engineer Battalion. (76)

About 1900 on 7 March 1945 the leading elements of Task Force Murray moved across the bridge which had been completed at 1830, toward the factory at Ossenberg. (77). The first crossroad to the north of town at 210288 was seized quickly with small losses, despite considerable small arms and automatic weapon fire from the northwest. (78). From that point forward all the way to and through Ossenberg there was a machine gun or rifleman in every house along the route, necessitating slow house-by-house advance. (79). In addition, there were many anti-tank guns along both sides of the road to the northeast, plus enemy artillery fire from the east across the Rhine. (80).

The road from Rheinberg northwest to the junction at Grunthal (168336) is very straight, and enemy AT guns, some as large as 170 MM rifles, could fire straight down its length into Rheinberg. (81). Moreover, the area was thickly sown with mines and dotted with fox holes and small trenches. (82). Advance during daylight hours was too costly to be worthwhile. (83). Night attacks were more profitable but the fighting was close and bitter. (84).

On the night of 8 March an attack of infantry-tank teams was launched against the factory at Ossenberg and it was seized, and a brief but intense counter-attack from the north was beaten off. (85). The same night I Company of the 137th Infantry, accompanied by tanks of C Company of the 36th Tank Battalion moved quickly into and through the town of Ossenberg against slackening resistance, while the bulk of the armored forces led by Lt. Col. Roseborough swung east around the factory area and thence north and west to the village of Little Borth (195325), while the infantry continued its advance almost directly north to the same place. (86). Resistance was lighter on the 9th and the infantry moved slowly north, and by 1030 of the 10th of March the town of Wallack (197338) had been taken and the area northeast of Wallach to the Rhine at approximately 201360 was firmly held. (87).

That same day Fort Blucher (213390) on the west bank of the Rhine just across from Wesel, had been taken by other elements of the 35th Infantry Division, but the bridges to Wesel had been blown and the movement across the Rhine, perforce, halted. (88).

During the night of 10 March 1945, the 75th Infantry Division moved into the sector, relieving Task Force Murray, from which CCB also was ordered to be relieved and returned to the control of the 8th Armored Division. (89).

The combat command was withdrawn, by order of 8th Armored Division Headquarters, and ordered to move to a rest area in Venlo, Holland (E910091). (90). This was accomplished by 1700 of 11 March 1945. (91).

NOTES:

FORENOTE: Numerical references at the end of each sentence in the foregoing narrative are listed below. In almost all cases herein, annotation although specifically following only one sentence is voluminous and covers much additional matter, generally in considerable detail, which is entirely untouched upon in the overall narrative.

1. INTERVIEW, CAPT. DOUGLAS P. STOUT, Assistant S-3 and MASTER SERGEANT PAUL V. FRANCIS, Operations Sergeant, Headquarters, CCB. 8th Armored Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort Germany, 081500 March 1945. Paragraph 1.
   Also S-3 Journal, CCB, 22 February 1945.
2. Ibid (Interview) Paragraph 2.
3. G-3 Reports, Headquarters, Ninth U. S. Army, 22 - 28 February 1945 and Overlay to Accompany History of Operations, Headquarters CCB, 8th Armored Division, 1 - 11 March.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
   Also G-3 Reports, 8th Armored Division and 35th Infantry Division, 22 February to 10 March 1945.
6. Interview cited in footnote #1.
   Also Overlay Showing Defense on Roer River (23 February 1945) Headquarters 49th Armored Infantry Battalion.
   Also Overlay Showing Fire Plan of Battalion in Defense on Roer River (23 February 1945) same headquarters.
   Also Overlay Showing Enemy Situation, Vicinity St. Odilienberg 22 - 27 February 1945, same headquarters.
7. Interview referred to in footnote #1. Paragraph 2.
8. Ibid.
   Also G-3 Report, Headquarters Ninth U.S. Army, 23, 24 February 1945.
9. Interview cited in footnote #1. Paragraph 3.
   Also INTERVIEW, 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT M. HALLAM, Aide to Brigadier General John M. Devine, Commanding General, 8th Armored Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany, 070930 March 1945. Paragraph 3.
   Also S-3 Reports, CCB, 24 February 1945.
10. Interview cited in footnote #1. Paragraph 4.
    Also S-3 Report, CCB, 25 February 1945.
11. Interview cited in footnote #1, page 2, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5.
    Also S-3 Report, CCB, 25, 26 February 1945.
12. Interview cited in footnote #1, page 2
13. Ibid.
    Also G-3 Report, Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army, 27 February 1945.
14. Ibid (Interview) page 2, last paragraph, page 3, first paragraph.
    Also INTERVIEW 2ND LIEUTENANT ROBERT M. HALLAM, Aide to Brigadier General John M. Devine, Commanding General, 8th Armored Division, and Liaison Officer to 35th Infantry Division, page 2 and 3.
15. Interview cited in footnote #1, page 3, paragraph 4.
16. Ibid, page 3
17. Ibid, page 4, paragraph 1.
    Also S-3 Report, CCB, 1 March 1945.
18. Ibid (Interview) page 4.
19. Ibid, page 4.
20. Ibid, page 4, last paragraph.
21. INTERVIEW, UNTERARTZ WILHEIN SCHUERMANN, 8th Fallschirmjaeger Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Klinkum, Germany, 021800 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW, 1ST LT. ERNEST M. LOEW, 8th Armored Division P.W. Interrogator to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer at Hinsbeck, Germany, 051600 March 1945.
22. Interview cited in footnote #1, in toto. Also interview of 1st Lt. Ernest M. Loew cited in footnote 21.
    Also Overall Overlay, CCB, 23 February - 10 March 1945.
    Also After Action Report, CCB, 1 - 11 March 1945, (Narrative) dated 17 March 1945, page 1 and 2.
23. S-1 Reports, CCB, 22 February - 3 March 1945.
    Also Overlay Showing Operations Route of Advance, 23 February - 11 March 1945, Headquarters 49th Armored Infantry Battalion.
    Also G-3 Reports, 8th Armored Division Headquarters for month of February 1945.
24. After Action Report (Narrative) cited in footnote 23, page 2.
    Also 35th Infantry Division G-3 Report (overlays and extracts, 4 and 5 March 1945.)
25. After Action Report cited in footnote 24, pages 2 and 3, 35th Infantry G-3 Reports and Overlays, 5 and 6 March 1945. INTEVIEW COLONEL EDWARD A. KIMBALL, Commanding Officer, Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division, to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, 121500 March 1945 at Venlo, Holland, page 1.
    Also INTERVIEW, MAJOR HAL (NMI) THREADCRAFT, S-3, CCB, 8th Armored Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany, 071500 March 1945, page 1 and 2.
    Also INTERVIEW MAJOR JOHN H. VAN HOUTEN, Commanding Officer, 36th Tank Battalion to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 131430 March 1945, page 1.
26. Ibid.
27. Interview, Col. Edward A. Kimball, cited in footnote 25, page 1, paragraph 2.
28. Interview Major John H. Van Houten cited in footnote 25, page 1, paragraph 4.
29. Memo Letter, Headquarters 8th Armored Division, G-3 Air to Commanding General, XVI Corps, dated 7 March 1945. (Certified True Copy made by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer).
30. Ibid.
    Also Troop Diary, Troop B, 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Mechanized, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161530 March 1945, page 1 and 2.
31. Unit History, 399th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161530 March 1945, page 1.
    Also INTEVIEW
    1ST SGT HARRY M. CLEMENTS,
    SGT ROBERT W. MORRIS,
    SGT WILLARD M. HORINE,
    D Company, 36th Tank Battalion to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 151500 March 1945, page 6, paragraph 2.
32. INTEVIEW
    LT. COL. MORGAN G. ROSEBOROUGH, Commanding Officer,
    Major CHARLES P. BROWN, JR., Executive Officer,
    CAPT. EDWARD H. LOOK, S-2,
    CAPT. MALCOLM J. DUGAS, S-3,
    M/SGT RICHARD F. MATLAT, Bn, Hq, Det,
    to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 131100 March 1945, page 1
    Also After Action Report (Narrative) CCB Operations 1 - 11 March page 8, dated 17 March 1945. Also Col. Kimball interview cited in footnote 25.
33. After Action Report cited in footnote 32. Also Interview Major John H. Van Houten cited in footnote 25.
34. Interview Col. Edward A. Kimball cited in footnote 25. Also Interview Major Hal Threadcraft cited in footnote 25.
35. Ibid. Also Troop Diary, Troop B, 88th Cav. Rcn. Sq. Mecz. Cited in footnote 30.
36. Interview cited in footnote 25.
37. Ibid.
38. INTERVIEW, LT.COL. ALBERT M. BUTLER, Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 137th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Rheinberg, Germany, 111300 March 1945.
39. Interview, Col. Kimball cited in footnote 25, page 1.
    Also After Action Report by 1st Lt. Michael T. Sands, Commanding Officer, Company B, 53d Armored Engineer Battalion, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161630 March 1945.
40. Interview, Lt. Col. Butler cited in footnote 38.
41. Interviews cited in footnotes 25 and 38.
42. Ibid.
43. Interview, Col. Butler, cited in footnote 38.
44. Interview, Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough, cited in footnote 32.
    Also Industrial Map of City of Lintfort with routes of Task Force Roseborough drawn in by Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough, attached to interview and German Industrial Map of the Area Aldekerk - Lintfort - and the Rhine with routes of various units drawn in by Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough and Captain Stout of CCB.
45. Ibid.
46. INTERVIEW Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough cited in footnote 32.
    Also DAILY HISTORICAL NOTES, B Company, 49th AIB by PFC John A. Cheever, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161500 March 1945.
    Also After Action Unit Report Company C 49th AIB, by Pfc Donald R. Bolle, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck at Venlo, Holland, 161400 March 1945.
    Also Company Diary, Headquarters Company, 49th AIB by Pfc Bernard Handwerker, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161500 March 1945.
47. Ibid.
    Also INTEVIEW LT. COL. BYRON W. SCHWARTZ, Executive Officer, Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany, 081400 March 1945.
48. Interview Major Van Houten cited in footnote 25.
49. Interview, Col. Edward A. Kimball, cited in footnote 25, page 2.
50. Ibid. Also Interview Major Van Houten cited in footnote 25.
51. Interview, Major Van Houten, cited in footnote 25. Also map showing routes drawn by Major Van Houten indicating the movement of his forces. Mao attached to interview.
52. Ibid.
53. Aerial Photographs (Strip Photos) Sortie #33/2077 (24 December 1944) and Sortie #33/2350 (21 February 1945). Unit 363 TRG - 33 PR. Maps GSGS 4042, 434. Sheet number K 52, 29 and 39.
    Also Terrain Photographs taken by Historical Officer, 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, during 6 - 11 March 1945.
    Also Observations on Terrain and CP's - Lintfort, Rheinberg, Ossenberg by Historical Officer, 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, at Grafrath, Germany, 171300 March 1945.
54. Ibid.
55. Interview, Major Van Houten cited in footnote 25 and attached map.
    Also INTERVIEW CAPTAIN DAVID B. KELLY, Company Commander,
    1ST SGT WILLIAM J. DONAHUE
    2NT LT. WESLEY S. BULLER, Platoon Leader
    SGT FRANK J. NOCE, Tank Commander of 105 Assault Gun
    SGT MONROE ARKOZITZ, Tank Commander
    T/4 HAROLD L. BAINBRIDGE, Tank Driver
    CPL WILLIAM GROTE, Gunner, Tank #16
    T/5 ARTHUR J. YOST, JR, Driver, Tank #8
    COMPANY B, 36TH TANK BATTALION
    to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 141430 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW, 1ST SGT HARRY M. CLEMENTS
    SGT ROBERT W. MORRIS, #5 Tank, 1st Platoon
    SGT WILLARD M. HORINE, #5 Tank, 3rd Platoon
    D Company, 36th Tank Battalion to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 151500 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW CAPTAIN ROBERT W. SHAW, Commanding Officer,
    SGT JAMES W. JOHNSON
    Company A, 36th Tank Battalion to Captain Joseph Vasta, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 151400 March 1945.
56. Company Interview cited in footnote 55.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. Also interview Lt. Col. Schwarts, cited in footnote 47, page 2.
60. Ibid.
61. Interview of Capt. Kelly, B Company cited in footnote 55.
62. Interviews cited in footnote 55.
63. Interview with D Company men cited in footnote 55 and attached overlay.
64. Interview, CAPTAIN STANLEY BODIN, Company Commander
    1ST LT MILTON M. CAMPBELL, Platoon Leader, 2nd Platoon
    1ST SGT LAWARANCE R. SISSON
    SGT MARTIN W. DUNCAN, Section Leader, 1st Section, 1st Platoon
    SGT LLOYD KENNEDY, Tank Commander, 2nd Platoon, #10 Tank
    C COMPANY, 36th Tank Battalion to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 141130 March 1945
65. Interview, Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough, cited in footnote 32 and attached maps.
66. Interviews cited in footnote 55.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview, Col. Edward A. Kimball, cited in footnote 25. Also Interview, Lt. Col. Schwartz, cited in footnote 47.
70. D Company Interview cited in footnote 55, last page.
71. Interview, Col. Edward A. Kimball, cited in footnote 25. Also Interview Col. Butler, cited in footnote 38.
72. Interview cited in footnote 55. Also Col. Butler's interview cited in footnote 38.
    Also INTERVIEW CAPTAIN JOHN PASCO, JR, S-3, Air, 36th Tank Battalion, to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 131530 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW CAPTAIN DOUGLAS P. STOUT, Assistant S-3, CCB, 8th Armored Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany 091300 March 1945.
73. S-1 and S-4 Reports, CCB, 8th Armored Division for 5 - 10 March 1945.
    Also G-2 Report, Headquarters, Ninth U. S. Army, 19 March 1945, setting forth captured enemy document regarding use of German AA Troops and guns as AT and infantry anti-tank units in the vicinity Lintfort - Rheinberg.
    Also 35th Infantry Division Operations Memorandums, 24 and 25, and overlays dated 4 and 9 March.
    Also G - 2 Periodic Report #232 dated 7 March 1945, Headquarters, 35th Infantry Division.
    Also G-3 Reports and G-2 Reports, 35th Infantry Division, 5 - 10 March 1945.
    Also Unit History, 78th Medical Battalion, 5 - 11 March, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161500 March.
74. Col. Butler interview cited in footnote 38. Also Col. Edward A. Kimball interview cited in footnote 25.
    Also 35th Infantry Division G-3 report 5 - 10 March 1945.
75. Ibid.
    Also After Action Reports, CCB, 1 - 11 March 1945.
    Also Report of Captain Jacob Goldman, 4th Information and Historical Service on general movements of 35th Infantry Division, 22 February - 11 March 1945.
76. Col. Bulter's Interview cited in footnote 38.
77. Ibid.
    Also After Action Report, CCB, 8th Armored Division (1 - 11 March 1945) dated 17 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW T/SGT EDWARD E. RIPPLEMEIER, Headquarters Company, 49th AIB to PFC Kenneth L. Kinser, Historical Assistant, at Venlo, Holland, 141030 March 1945.
    Also INTERVIEW CAPTAIN JOHN W. JONAS, Liaison Officer, from CCB, 8th Armored Division to 35th Infantry Division, to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany, 071400 March 1945.
    Also S-3 Overlays, 7 March - 10 March 1945, CCB Operations Map (as part of Task Force Murray).
    Also S-2, 3 Sitrap, 8 March 1945 of same headquarters.
78. Ibid. Also Interview Captain Stanley Bodin, C Company, 36th Tank Battalion, cited in footnote 64. Also overall overlay operations CCB Headquarters Cited in Footnote 22.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid. Also Major Van Houten Interview cited in footnote 25. Also Lt. Col. Morgan C. Roseborough Interview cited in footnote 32.
    Enemy Situation Overlay Vicinity Ossenberg dated 7 - 8 March 1945.
81. Aerial photographs and photographs by the Historical Officer cited in footnote 53.
82. Ibid. Also footnotes 77 - 80.
83. Interview cited in footnotes 77 and 78.
84. Ibid. Also INTERVIEW SGT JAMES CASH, K Company, 3d Battalion, 137th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division to1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Rheinberg, Germany, 111500 March 1945.
85. Ibid.
86. Interview and references cited in footnotes 76 - 81.
87. Ibid.
    Also G-3 Reports 9, 10 March 45, 35th Infantry Division.
88. Ibid.
89. INTERVIEW 1ST LT. BENTLEY S. FREEMAN, Regimental Headquarters, 291st Infantry Regiment, 75th Infantry Division Liaison Officer to 35th Infantry Division to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Lintfort, Germany, 110900 March 1945.
    Also After Action Report, CCB (1 - 11 March 1945) dated 17 March 1945.
90. After Action Report cited in footnote 89.
91. Ibid.
92. Additional miscellaneous reports and interviews in support of this report, not cited in the narrative, are listed as follows:
93. Statement of Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division to Historical Officer, 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, at Venlo, Holland, 16 March 1945 and attached overlay.
94. Statement, After Action Notes to Battalion Headquarters from Company B, 49th AIB to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 071330 March 1945.
95. Current Daily Historical Notes By Cpl. T. J. Michael, A Company, 49th AIB. Verbatim extracts made by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161300 March 1945.
96. Verbatim copy of After Action Notes of 1st Platoon, Company A, 49th Armored Infantry Battalion made by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161315 March 1945.
97. INTERVIEW, CAPTAIN EDWARD H, LOOK, (S-2) 49th Armored Infantry Battalion to 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 171400 March 1945 and attached map.
98. Verbatim Extract, Company Diary, Service Company, 49th Armored Infantry Battalion, made by T/Sgt Richard D. Sarnell, Copied by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161430 March 1945.
99. After Action Notes, Medical Detachment, 49th AIB, made by T/3 Nunzio J. Vaccaro, extracted by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 161330 March 1945.
100. Unit History, Company B, 809th Tank Destroyer Battalion made by Captain Douglas P. Stout, Copied by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 171600 March 1945.
101. Unit History, Battery A, 473 AAA AW Battalion (SP) copied by 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer, at Venlo, Holland, 171600 March 1945.
102. Rosters of Staff and Command of 35th Infantry Division, 8th Armored Division, CCB, 137th Infantry Regiment, Task Force Murray and 399th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.
103. S-2 Reports to all Units CCB, 9 March 1945.
104. Original Field Order from Headquarters 137th Infantry Regiment to CCB, 091600 March 1945.
105. S-3 Reports and Overlays CCB, 4 - 15 March 1945.
106. Industrial Map, Area Lintfort to Rhine River (Jagdbezirke 1935 - 6)
107. Similar Map (1/25000). Grundbesitzkarte
108. The following Signal Corps photographs of the area Rheurdt - Lintfort - Rheinberg are available through Headquarters Ninth U. S. Army if desired:
     5 March - ETO Hq 45
     17657
     17792
     17793
     17794
     
     6 March - ETO Hq 45
     18199
     18200
     18201
     18203
     18204
     18207
109. List of cities and coordinates referred to throughout narrative and accompanying documents.
     
     All the action herein above described, with the exception of the approach march, was in the area of sheet #17 (Wesel) GSGS Map 4507.

Carbon copy of each interview has been delivered to the interviewer and approved.

Howard L. Oleck.