INTERVIEW

Unit: Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division
Action: Roer-Rhine
Source: 2d Lt Robert M Hallam, Aide to Gen Devine, CG, 8th Armored division
Interviewer: 1st Lt Howard L Oleck
Place and Date of Interview: Lintfort, Germany; 0930, 7 march 1945

SECOND LIEUTENANT ROBERT M. HALLAM, Aide to Brigadier General John M. Devine, Commanding General, 8th Armored Division.
TO: 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, (Historical Officer)
AT: Lintfort, Germany, 7 March 1945, 0930 hours
Forenote: Lt. Hallam stated that his memory of chronological order of events was good but that his specific remembrance of dates was not certain.

Lt. Hallam worked with the 75th Infantry Division, the 35th Infantry Division and the British 7th Armored Division as General Devine's aide and personal liaison officer.

The 8th Armored Division moved into Echt, Holland on 22 February, 1945 relieving the Seventh British (7th) Armored Division in that sector without event. On the 23rd of Feb 1945, the general positions of the elements of the 8th Armored Division were as follows: right sector CCB, left sector CCR, relieving CCA. Frontage of the division was from Roermond, Holland on the left to Lodrop, Germany on the right, facing generally east. On that day activity consisted merely of patrolling in search for the enemy. All patrols were unsuccessful in contacting the enemy.

On the 24th, patrols disclosed some enemy strong points in the vicinity southeast of Roermond between the Roer and Maas River in the natural pocket formed by the said rivers. G-2 estimated one company or better of German paratroops to be there, apparently of the 8th Paradivision. CCR moved part way into the pocket against stiff resistance and halted in position to seal off that pocket.

On the 25th and 26th of February Lt. Hallam was on liaison duty to the 75th Infantry Division and could report nothing of note concerning the 8th Armored Division.

On the 27th of February Lt. Hallam was on liaison to the 35th Infantry Division.

On the 28th of February Task Force Byrne, an element of the 35th Infantry Division, consisting mostly of the 320th Infantry Regiment, and under the orders of the 16th Corps Headquarters, was ordered to move northeast through Hilfarth in a northeasterly direction. At the same time the 8th Armored Division was ordered to move in a northeasterly direction, also through Hilfarth. Thus both units received orders from the 16th Corps Headquarters which in effect ordered both units to use the same roads in the same area at the same time. As a result both units became very much mixed on the road with vehicles of both units mixed in within the columns and both units in a state of confusion. The worst spot in the ensuring confusion was at the southerly edge of Hilfarth, Germany where a bridge had been blown and a single treadway bridge was the only existing means of crossing at that time.

The area of the road net in question was that of Hilfarth - Hucklehoven - Wasenberg - Waldniel, about 15 miles in length. Along this route there was only one fairly good road.

Lt Hallam was with the 35th Infantry Division CP and moved about between the 35th Division CP, 16th Corps Headquarters, and 8th Armored Division Headquarters. He was, therefore, able to see the situation from all sides.

About 1200 of 28 February 1945 the confusion in the column became apparent throughout its length. Many vehicles were hopelessly jammed and units had become mixed to a very serious extent. The column was halted for a long distance due to the bottleneck at the bridge at Hilfarth.

Late that afternoon 16th Corps ordered CCB and CCR of the 8th Armored Division to pull off the road into an assembly area where ever they might be and permit Task Force Byrne to proceed. 16th Corps also sent an engineer unit to put in another treadway bridge and one bailey bridge at Hilfarth.

As a result of this order the 8th Armored Division was delayed and the 35th Infantry Division took the lead. This was contrary to the expectation of both divisions, that the 8th Armored Division (the faster moving unit) was to move ahead and spearhead.

Thus the 8th Armored Division as pinched off by sheer lack of room.

Lt Hellam coordinated the straightening out of the confusion, between General Devine, Col. Charles E. Dodge (Chief of Staff), Lt. Col. Burba (G-3), of the 8th Armored Division, and Lt. Col. Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (G-3), and Major Monkers (Assistant G-3) of the 35th Infantry Division. General Devine was much annoyed by the confused state of affairs as was every other individual involved.

CCA of the 8th Armored Division had started earlier the same day and meanwhile was moving to the attack of Arsbeck, Germany.

As soon as the roads were cleared, CCB and CCR proceeded again through Hilfarth. CCB relieved CCA in the vicinity of Arsbeck and then took Arsbeck. CCR moved up on the right flank. CCA stopped and let CCB come through them.

CCB continued attacking north in its sector over a very poor road net. In fact there were no roads worthy of the name in the CCB sector until Waldniel was reached.

CCA was held in reserve and CCR continued moving north over very poor road facilities.

On 1 March 1945, Lt. Hallam was engaged principally in liaison between the 35th Infantry Division and the 8th Armored Division. On March 2d CCB was still moving on the roads, and the 35th Infantry Division was moving on the left flank of their sector, Task Force Byrne leading.

On the 4th of March, by order of 16th Corps, CCB was attached to the 35th Infantry Division and was given the right flank of the 35th Division sector. The mission assigned to CCB was to move northeast from Aldekerk, their CP at the time, to clean out a pocket of resistance east of Rheinberg, Germany between Rheinberg and the Rhine River.

On the 5th of March at about 1000, the 35th Infantry Division organized Task Force Murray. Task Force Murray consisted principally of CCB of the 8th Armored Division and the 137th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Infantry Division. It was not until late that afternoon that Task Force Murray was actually in being as a unit, as the elements which were to form that task force were engaged in action all day, still under their previous organizations.

At that time CCB was attacking Lintfort and moving northeast on Rheinberg, its mission still to clean out the pocket east of Rheinberg.

Lt. Hallam was with the 88th Cavalry Squadron Mechanized on the right flank of CCB moving northeast. The 88th Cavalry Squadron, a part of CCB, was given the task of mopping up the pocket.

At Rheinberg, CCB (now part of Task Force Murray, but not yet reshuffled at 1700), had taken about 500 PW's. In the attack on Rheinberg CCB's tank losses were heavy, consisting of 17 medium tanks and 11 light tanks. Officer casualties and casualties among key noncommissioned officers also were heavy.

On the 6th of March the 88th Cavalry Squadron cleared the pocket which had been the original objective, in a few hours, taking 60 prisoners and suffering no serious casualties whatsoever. The 88th Cavalry Squadron came into position to attack the pocket by swinging somewhat south and east from 8th Armored Division CP at Grefrath and then northeast into the pocket on the right flank of CCB.