INTERVIEW

Unit: 80th Tank Battalion, CCR
Source: Lt. Col. W. S. Crittendon, Commanding Officer.
Interviewer: Capt. Joseph Vasta.
Place and Date of Interview: 3 May, Goslar, Germany

At the time of the action, Lt. Col. Crittendon was Assistant Battalion Commander of the 18th Tank Battalion.

The mission of Task Force Crittendon was to go up and take Dorsten. At that time, elements of the 75th Infantry Division were along the high ground running north to south - 420385 to 420408.

On 28 March the reconnaissance platoon moved out about 1530 hours, one half hour earlier than the rest of the unit. They moved from 392371 to 400381 to 412386 to Besten - east from 419389.

There was a series of six craters on the east-west road from Besten to the railroad overpass at 441393, all of which were mined and were covered initially by a weak small arms fire and required an engineer dozer for filling before any vehicles could pass. The reconnaissance was unable to find any bypasses. The road east of 433391 was covered by direct self-propelled fire.

The mission of the reconnaissance was to locate and report additional craters and mines, the condition of the bridge at 441394 and locate firing positions of enemy SPs in the vicinity of 448397. From the first crater east, the reconnaissance platoon was required to proceed dismounted. They were pinned down by small arms and direct fire from the self-propelled guns. The platoon leader was seriously wounded. The platoon sergeant worked his way back to the point where the column was still held up by craters and mines. Two platoons of infantry company under command of the company commander were moved dismounted forward to positions where their supporting fire could allow the reconnaissance platoon to withdrawn. They took positions in the vicinity of 442394. The recon platoon was still unable to withdraw due to the direct fire from the self-propelled guns located to the north and east of their positions. This was at about 1815 hours. The engineer platoon made all possible speed to get the leading tank platoon thru the mined areas and past the craters. (The reason the infantry couldn't move to get the self-propelled guns was that they were well separated and well covered by small arms fire.) In working thru difficulties of the particularly dark night (it had been drizzling that day and when it got dark, it was really black), the roads being very muddy and the consequent sliding of the vehicles into a number of bomb-craters, it was midnight before the entire command was up into a position where it could be moved forward.

The craters were made by 500 lb bombs, a fact that was ascertained by finding one unexploded bomb. The ground was very soft and when the crater was skirted by the vehicles, the earth would loosen so that occasionally a vehicle, while skirting the crater, would slide right into it. Because the road was so narrow, each time a vehicle slid into a crater, it had to be pulled out before anything else could get by. At least three tanks and one 1/4 ton were seen in craters during the night.

Just prior to midnight, the Combat Commander came to the CP, accompanied by the infantry Battalion Commander, and issued the following instructions: Task force Crittendon and the infantry battalion would be combined under the command of Col. Harris. Orders had been received from higher headquarters that Dorsten would be seized and held prior to 0800 hours. The command was to be on a north-south line from 455400 to 455409 by 0600 hours 29 March. Following a 15 minute artillery preparation to begin at 0600 hours and which was to be placed on Dorsten, we would jump off, move directly east and take Dorsten. Task force Poiner was to be on an east-west line (see overlay on Dorsten).

The infantry battalion was to move, two companies abreast and one in reserve, with the road between 442394 and 455402 inclusive as their right flank. The infantry company of TF Crittendon was to move abreast of the infantry battalion with the above mention road exclusive as their left flank. The engineer platoon was to sweep the road immediately behind the infantry for mines and be prepared to remove any road blocks or obstacles found. The tank company was to move in column following the engineers. All the infantry elements (minus those in reserve) were to take up positions along the line 455400 - 455408 and prepare to jump off at 0615 hours. The boundaries between the two infantry elements was to continue along the road, south edge of the traffic circle to the railroad crossing at 471406. The limit of advance was to be the railroad embankment running north-south thru 471406.

The movement to the jump-off was made without incident and no mines or craters were encountered. The attack moved out from the line of departure, the infantry on its feet, moving forward and firing at 06145 hours. The last artillery rounds from the 15-minute preparation fell within 50 yards of these troops. For this reason, the infantry was able to take full advantage of the artillery preparation and suffered no casualties from enemy small arms fire while moving thru the town to the limit of their advance. The bridges at 467410 and 468415 had been destroyed.

The tanks had followed and covered the infantry advance into the town and took up positions to cover the organization for the defense of the town.

Task Force Poinier coming up from their zone were not aware of the fact that Task Force Harris's zone extended to the south of the town. They were under the impression that TF Harris would be in the city proper. As a result of this mis-understanding, elements of TFH and TFP were pinning each other down until contact patrols were sent out. Fortunately, the casualties resulting from this were negligible.

From observation points that were never located, the German laid and directed extremely accurate HV HE fire into the southeast and northeast portion of the town during the entire day and night. It was definitely observed fire; it was brought to bear whenever small groups as few as two or three individuals or a vehicle moved in that portion of the town.

TF Crittendon stayed in Dorsten that night. The next day the 49th Armd Infantry battalion took over the town. A series of conflicting orders come thru and the net result was that TFC was to remain in the town. The main part of the task force was to secure the bridge sites and the town itself. We remained there until the Division moved through and we fell in column.

W.S. CRITTENDON,
Lt. Col,
80th Tank Battalion,
Commanding.