History
Merbeck, Germany (F-9686) 28 February 45
Map 1/100,000 GSCS 4416 Sheet R1, KOLM
When head of column was at Wegberg moving N, Troop, A 88th Reported that there was a road block (Abattis) just S of Merbeck. 2d Platoon Co A 53d Engrs, who had been marching in middle of column, was moved up to tail of advance guard. One battery 398th FA went into position just S of Wegberg; FO and Battery CO rode in FO's tank at tail of tank platoon in advance guard. The resulting formation was; Infantry platoon - Medium Tank Platoon - Advance Guard CO's Tank - Artillery FO's Tank - Co B (-) 7th AIB - Co A (-) 18th Tank Bn - First plat Co A 809 TD Bn - Med Det.
Upon Approaching road block (963870 SE Nerbeck) at about 0400, heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire was received from tree line 400 yards to E and from the line of houses which ran E and W. From both areas the fields of fire were excellent for defenses, varying from 300 to 800 yards. An AT ditch had been dug generally E and W intersecting, but not cutting road at abattis; innumerable fire trenches and fox holes had been prepared over entire area.
Objective: To reduce the resistance in Merbeck and seize and hold the ridge 300 yards N of the town.
Plan of Attack:
2 platoons infantry to form open box bridgehead beyond road block to a min depth of 300 yards -no personnel to approach buildings closer than 75 yards until tank platoon started movement thru road block.
Engr platoon - Remove road block and check for mines on road surface.
Tank Co - 3d platoon move to high ground 300 yards E of road block, 2d platoon move to edge of woods W of road block, 1st platoon disperse just S of road block and be prepared to pass thru as soon as road was cleared. Mission all platoons; To support infantry bridgehead and engr road block removal by fire.
Artillery - 5 min concentration on S line of buildings during formation of bridgehead, thereafter intermittent battery concentrations within town. Another 5 min concentration on S edge of town (on order only) when tanks moved thru cleared road block.
Reserve - TD platoon and infantry platoon.
Time of attack - 0600.
Rcn Troop - Reconnoiter to E and W of town to determine presence of any Germans and for usable roads.
Operation was successful in pinning down Germans to such an extent that when a second road block just short of the S edge of town was found, the engr platoon was able to move forward and remove same with no casualties. The center tank platoon moved along streets and thru town to cover N side, 3d platoon moved into western end of town and covered that flank by fire.
This operation turned out to be very successful. There are 2 things which we failed to do which could have caused us a great many losses or even failure to accomplish our objective. When the second road block had been cleared, the tanks should have moved to the first street, machine gunned all possible machine gun of sniper positions and then the infantry should have cleared that street of any possible bazooka positions or at positions in alleys. The tanks then should have moved forward and the same operation performed down the next street. The second thing which we failed to do was to send a small rcn or security group far enough E and W of the village to assure ourselves that the enemy was not there in sufficient strength to counter-attack our flanks. It was later found that there were 3 German Bazooka teams and an 88mm gun less than 1000 yards E of the outer edge of town.
46 prisoners were taken plus 1 88mm gun and 7 prepared pillboxes.
Tetelrath, Germany (F95588)
28 February 1945
Co A, 7th AIB attached to advance guard.
When the objective at Merbeck had been gained, it was found that there was another AT ditch running E and W along the ridge between Merbeck and Tetelrath. At the point where the ditch intersected the road there was another road block constructed of upright logs and the approaches there to had been heavily mined both on the road surface and on the shoulders.
The tanks, then in position just S of the AT ditch, covered the engr platoon leader who went forward and reconnoitered the road block. Heavy automatic weapons and sniper fire was received from the S edge of Tetelrath and from the dugouts and fire trenches which had been dug in a network over the entire area. It is worth noting here that of the 4 pillboxes in this immediate area only one faced in such a direction that it could be used to bring fire to bear on us at the road block.
Objective; To remove the road block, reduce the resistance in the town (Tetelrath) and to seize and hold the high knob to the N of town.
Plan:
RCN: Continue flank route rcn and security.
Infantry: 2 Platoons Co A 7th AIB to form a bridghead over the AT ditch of sufficient depth to reduce the direct small fire on the road block.
Tanks: Lead platoon remain in place and support by fire.
Artillery: (Entire 398th FA Bn was then in position to support) FO to use observed fire and place concentrations on known enemy positions and intermittent harassing fire into the town.
Engr Platoon: Remove road block and clear mines on road surface.
Reserve: 1 platoon Co A 7th AIB, Co B 7th AIB, TD platoon, Co A (- platoon) 18th Tank Bn.
As soon as the infantry had moved to the line of the AT ditch they were pinned down by small arms fire and started to dig in in place. Enemy mortar and artillery fire began to fall on the town of Mersbeck and the approaches to the road block. The engr platoon leader with his demolition men was able to work his way forward along the ditches to the road block. He exploded and removed all of the mines which he was able to reach.
Due to the heavy artillery AW and other small arms fire an additional infantry platoon was sent forward to reinforce Co A. Co B (-1 platoon) was to proceed along edge of woods on W side of town and attack E into town on the enemy's right flank. Artillery was to fire a 15 minute concentration initially on the S edge of town and onto the area to our right flank where there were known AW positions which direct fire from the tanks could not reach. All of this operation to begin on flare signal by Co B 7th AIB from edge of woods just W of town. Time of be 1345 or as soon thereafter as Co B could get into position and fire the flare.
Co B 7th AIB contacted heavy resistance in woods and was not able to reach point from which signal was to be given.
At 1445 the order was given for the artillery concentration and for the attack to start. The infantry of Co A were successful in reaching the edge of town. The tank platoon moved thru the road block (2 tanks were lost on mines which the engr had been unable to reach at the road block).
Upon passing thru the town an enemy bazooka knocked out one of our tanks.
Enemy offered no resistance to our occupying the high knob N of Tetelrath.
Again the main lesson to be learned is that the tanks are too vulnerable to bazooka fire to warrant their pouring thru a village with no immediate infantry support. That individual rifleman can cover the advance of the tank and not give the bazooka team a chance to get in his shot and likewise the MGs on the tank can spray the area to the front and flanks and hold to protect the infantryman. They have got to work together.
Results: Mission accomplished; 167 prisoners taken; 2 88mm guns captured; and 11 concrete pillboxes reduced.
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH TANK BATTALION
8 March 1945
LOBBERICH - 2 March 45
As in the previous cases upon approaching the town from the South a road block, flanked by an AT ditch, was encountered. As before heavy small arms fire was received from the various fire trenches and from the buildings at the edge of town. In addition to the above fire was received from an AT gun on our right flank. The road block was not mined but was constructed of up-right bar steel pieces spaces at 3 feet and 3 rows depth. No immediate by-pass was available.
Two platoons Co "A", 7th Armored Infantry Bn moved forward dismounted and formed a small bridgehead around the road block. The engineer platoon checked for mines and also, by using demolition charges, blew out a sufficient number of steel up-rights at the road block to clear one lane. The only available supporting cannon fire for this operation was the cannon company of an adjacent infantry division. They adjusted and fire some very helpful concentrations during the entire period. Later one battery of 398th FA Bn was in position with the cannon company.
Reconnaissance had shown that there was another route of approach to the town from the Southeast. Small arms fire had been received but no road block was encountered along the route.
The command was reorganized into 2 small Task Forces. Task Force Number 1 to pass through the road block which had been blown and Task Force Number 2 to enter the town from the Southeast.
Objectives:
TF1 - RR Crossing at 978031.
TF2 - High ground and avenues of approach in the vic 984029.
The operation was to begin at 0600 with a 15 minute artillery concentration followed by the advance of the 2 task forces and the shifting of the continuing artillery fire by direct observation of the advance of the task force.
TF1 moved a tank platoon through the breach in the road block and advance with the infantry into the edge of town. Another road block was encountered. The tanks were withdrawn to cover by fire the infantry elements. As soon as the noise of our own firing had ceased it was realized that no enemy fire was being received from the vicinity of this second road block. The infantry proceeded on into the town and the engineer platoon removed the road block. No further resistance was encountered.
TF2: Upon approaching the town from the Southeast also encountered a road block. A bypass was found which allowed them to pass thru the eastern edge of town and to their objective. The scattered resistance found was easily disposed of.
Remarks:
1. Again the infantry and tanks did not mutually support each other closely enough.
2. Patrols that are sent out have got to report everything they see and have got to determine the desired information if it is humanly possible to do so. It is believed that in this case had the patrols that were sent out pushed forward they would have been able to report the presence of the second road block in front of TF1. They also could have observed the withdrawal of the German troops in that area which obviously occurred just prior to daylight.
3. When the column was halted along the roads south of the town, as well as throughout the entire operation, the majority of vehicles halted in the center of the road and some on the left center. This condition made it next to impossible to bring forward badly needed elements from the rear. It is the responsibility of every vehicle commander and officer to insist that the vehicles always halt on the right side of the road and sufficiently far over to allow bypassing by elements from the rear.
William Crittendon,
Lt. Col.,
Ass't Bn Commander,
18th Tank Battalion.
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