HEADQUARTERS 49th ARMD INF BN
8th Armd Div
APO 258, U. S. ARMY

AFTER ACTION REPORT
APRIL 1945

INDEX

COMMAND REPORT

SECTIONS

I - ADMINISTRATION

II - INTELLIGENCE

III - OPERATIONS

IV - SUPPLY

HEADQUARTERS FORTY NINTH ARMORED INFANTRY BATTALION
APO 258, U. S. ARMY

COMMAND REPORT
1-30 April, 1945

RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:

During the period 1-30 April 1945 the Battalion. As part of CCB in conjunction with other elements of the Ninth U.S. Army and First U.S. Army, spearheaded and successfully reduced and broke the German Paderborn defensive line; was withdrawn and employed in the successful reduction of the Ruhr pocket, contributing materially to its final collapse; as part of CCB, it was then placed in Corps Reserve and given the mission of protecting the Southern flank of Army with the subsequent mission and accomplishment of occupation and governing of a portion of the Harz Mountain area.

COMBAT EFFICIENCY DURING THE PERIOD WAS VERY SATISFACTORY.

COMMENTS:

As evidenced in the Neuhaus action units must immediately upon taking an objective, set up its defense to repel a counter-attack. Security must be pushed out around the position to slow up the enemy and give timely warning to the unit commander of the enemy's intentions. Close-in defensive fires must be planned and coordinated in order that this fire will be effective and not result in as great an expenditure of artillery ammunition as was required to stop this particular counter-attack. Planned small arms, and artillery fire stopped the Blumenthal counter-attack before it became too great a threat.

In darkness, and where the enemy is known to be occupying the area and fighting delaying action, Armored Infantry can make more rapid progress in dismounted action and reduce greatly the possibility of ambush. Visibility is the determining factor as to whether mounted or dismounted action will more expeditiously accomplish the mission.

When Jerry begins to fire mortars and artillery, which has all the ear marks of map firing rather than observed fire, he is usually withdrawing. Constant probing and pressure will reduce a static situation and will catch the enemy in a dislodged situation and most vulnerable. The above type of map firing is consistently placed in the initial barrage area and troops may render it ineffective by moving their positions 100-200 yards in any direction. The best maxim is 'Keep pushing forward'.

s/M. G. Roseborough
M. G, ROSEBOROUGH
Lt. Col., Infantry
Commanding

AAR index

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Hq 49th A. I. B.
APO 258 U S Army

S - 1, PERSONNEL REPORT, 1 - 30 April 1945

INSPECTIONS:

The following inspections were conducted on either a Battalion, Company or Platoon basis during this report period:
    a. Road Block Inspections.
    b. Administrative Check-ups.
    c. PW and DP Camp Inspections.
    d. Clothing and Equipment Inspections.
    e. Weapons Inspections.
    f. Sanitary Inspections.
    g. Mess Inspections.
    h. Orientation Check-ups.
    i. Police of Area Inspections.
    j. Radio Equipment Inspection.
    k. Maintenance of Vehicle Inspection.
    l. Quarters Inspection.
    m. Stowage of Vehicle Inspection.
    n. Gas Mask and Accessories Inspections.

CASUALTIES:
      The following report covers Casualties for month of April, 1945.

Above figures do not include 10 EM and 1 Officer who were injured or wounded but were returned to duty immediately after treatment by Medical Units.