After Action Reports and Interviews
58th A.I.B. - Co A - Linne/Merum - Feb 1945
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INTERVIEW

Capt. Tom W. Caywood, Commanding Officer and 1st/Sgt. Tom Barrett, Company A, 58th Armored Infantry Battalion, 1100 hours 11 March 1945, Wall, Germany, to Capt. Vasta.

Our command post was located at Aandenberg, Holland (748828) and the company was on the line (occupied a line approximately 749841 - 761832 - 775839). The first night on the line we were shelled. Most of the shelling was concentrated around the area of the company CP and the third platoon. Two days later, the second platoon was shelled and about the fourth day, the third platoon was shelled again.

On 24 February, two nights before the attack, a combat patrol of 20 men went out to reconnoiter the area in which the attack was to take place. The mission of the patrol was to get to the AT ditch and find out the enemy situation. The patrol got as far as the AT ditch (running generally 760868 - 777869). In front of the ditch were a series of communication trenches. The patrol didn't encounter any enemy during this entire reconnaissance. On the night of the 25th the same combat patrol went out but this time with a definite mission of going forward until they drew fire. However, they had to get back by 0200 hours. The patrol reached a point (approximately 774857) where they drew fire from machine guns located both at the northeast edge of Heide Woods (773858) and the woods directly to the southeast (vicinity 776857). The patrol got the locations of several machine guns and then withdrew to their own positions so that they could get in by the specified time.

The attack was made with the company supported by two platoons of tanks and one platoon of tank-destroyer. The line of departure (760846 - 777839) was crossed at 0600 hours. A platoon of infantry was in front and was followed by a platoon of tanks. Behind the tanks were two more rifle platoons and an anti-tank platoon used as riflemen. The tank-destroyer platoon brought up the rear. The mission of the tank-destroyers was to follow the tanks as they advanced and to occupy the position left by the tanks as they displaced forward.

The attack came through the center of the woods in vicinity of 773845 but the tanks skirted the edges of the woods keeping on a line with the infantry going through. The infantry saw no enemy and met no opposition. As they emerged from the woods, they turned and bore eastward. They ran into their first opposition in the vicinity of 755855. The opposition consisted of riflemen from across the river (Roer). No casualties were suffered and the men did not fire back because they could not see the enemy.

As our infantry kept approaching they noticed some enemy troops running out of the houses in the vicinity of 775859. Apparently they had been scared because they ran out of the house abandoning their weapons. The tanks knocked down the houses and burned the haystacks nearby because these haystacks were suspected of hiding enemy troops or emplacements. To the east of where the houses had been (vicinity of 778858), there were some bunkers. Tanks were ordered to fire HE into the bunkers and after the first burst, three of the enemy got out. To the northeast of these houses was a suspicious looking haystack. The tanks fired on it and three more of the enemy came out.

A base of fire was built along the embankment running from 775857 to 780855. The embankment was ideal for covering the enemy. This was accomplished shortly after 1200 hours. The base of fire consisted of five medium tanks, two light machine gun sections and two mortars. The tanks were to support the first wave of infantry as they covered the open ground to the woods directly in front (vic 779858). The second platoon, which was the first wave, got to this objective without a shot being fired at them. Then another platoon went forward together with a section of tanks (three tanks including the platoon leaders who went along). Three squads rode the tanks and two followed on foot. They got to the edge of the woods and then found that the road was thick with mines (AT and Schu mines). The tanks stopped and had to pull back but the riflemen got off the tanks and went ahead into the woods. Capt. Caywood brought up the third wave of infantry. Then the assault platoon guided the tanks through the mine field and didn't lose a single tank getting them through.

The company was quickly reorganized. Two platoon organized a base of fire while tanks were ordered to fire at all likely enemy positions. All of the officers went into a huddle and decided that the best way to attack was for two platoon to build a base of fire on the high ground and one platoon to skirt down to the river to go beyond the enemy positions to that they could come up to their dug-outs and ditches from the rear. Then another platoon and a section of tanks were to displace forward while one platoon of infantry and a section of tanks covered their movement.

The platoon that was to skirt down to the river and behind the enemy positions took off. After some time had elapsed, Capt. Caywood stopped and thought he saw one of the officers waving to him. So the infantry and tanks took off as planned. Just about 60 yards from the ditch in front of them (vic of 778864) the enemy poured everything they had at the men crossing the open ground. Fire was coming from across the river and in front of them, and from the west. Our men saw a lot of men running into the ditches directly in front of them but they thought that these were our own troops. When these men who had gone in the ditches started throwing grenades and firing at them, they found out differently. Capt. Caywood thought that he could get the other infantry platoon and section of tanks to the ditches by sheer weight of force. He succeeded in getting them abreast and then they all hit the ground. The volume of fire delivered by the enemy seemed to be increasing steadily.

The artillery forward observer was located at 779858. Prior to the attack, it had been planned to smoke the river but when they tried to smoke, it was not effective. The smoke shells were landing too far forward and to the east. Then Capt. Caywood asked for HE and time fire but all of this stuff was too far ahead of the men to be effective.

The situation wasn't too good. The tanks were on open ground and could not go forward because the ground in front of them was thickly mined. Capt. Caywood talked over the problem with his platoon leaders. They knew that there were about 20 machine guns around them but they could not spot them, so well camouflaged were they. The tanks were too close to fire into the ditches (they could not depress the muzzle of their guns sufficiently to fire into the ditches); so, they had to back up in order to fire into the ditches in front of the men. Everytime a man moved on this open ground, he was fired upon by a machine gun. Capt. Caywood decided that he had picked more than he could tackle by himself and therefore withdrew to the high ground (779858). The tanks were used to ferry the men back to the high ground. One of the tanks backed into a mine and was put out of action. Just after it hit the mine, it was also hit by an 88. Capt. Caywood remarked that apparently the enemy waited for the tanks to be put out of action by mines and then followed up with 88's.

Our own mortar (81 mm) tried to get smoke into the area, but it came down among the men. Capt. Caywood remarked that this had been a good thing because it provided some concealment for the men on that open ground.

Tank-destroyers were requested to fire across the river at every likely target they could see. They were successful in neutralizing the center of the fire being delivered by the enemy. In performing this mission, the tank-destroyers expended all their ammunition. Consequently, they had to withdraw.

After all the men had been successfully gotten to the high ground (vic of 779858), enemy mortar and artillery started falling thickly into the area. Since they were not dug-in, they had to withdraw to the embankment (776856 - 781854) and dig-in. Capt. Caywood notified the battalion CO of what had happened. The company remained in that position that night and until they were relieved on the night of the 27th.

Questioned as to what sort of opposition they had met in the drive toward the Rhine, Capt. Caywood remarked that the whole thing had been very uneventful. They took plenty of prisoners but there were men who came up and surrendered willingly.