Capt. Calvin H. Shaw, CO, Company B, 58th AIB, 1400 hours 10 March 1945, Grefrath, Germany, to Lt. Kitts.

On 25 February 1945, Company B, 58th AIB was ordered by battalion to send out a patrol to make reconnaissance in the vicinity of the Heide woods to its immediate front. To accomplish this, Capt. Shaw sent out Lt. George Southern with two squads from his platoon, the 1st, and the patrol left at 1700 hours 25 Feb. It returned at 0200 hours 26 February and reported freshly-dug trenches at the southern edge of the Heide woods and thus confirmed a report to the same effect made by the British elements which the 58th relieved in that area on the 19th.

Company B, the middle company in the attack, jumped off at 0600 hours under orders to skirt the Heide woods and pass to the right of them. The company formation was a column of platoon with the 2d, 3d and 1st in that order. Before they arrived at the southern edge of the woods the 2d platoon set off some trip flares and warned the defending forces of their coming. Immediately Company B was met by machine gun, rifle and mortar fire from the woods. Advancing under fire the 2d platoon made its way to the right edge of the woods as planned but in the darkness the 3d platoon found itself at the left edge before they realized their mistake. The 1st platoon remained at the rear as reserve. Capt. Shaw was with the 3d platoon and tried to establish contact with his other two platoon without result. The platoon leader of the 2d platoon was wounded and radio contact could not be made with the platoon leader of the 1st platoon.

By noon the 3d platoon had made its way to the small row of houses at the left edge of the woods and had established contact with the 2d platoon by runner.

It was impossible to advance because of the fire they were met with from the woods which was being held by a force of about one company. At 1300 hours 26 February the battalion CO ordered Company B to withdraw to the south and move from there into the A Company zone to the right to assist them. The battalion CO planned to call up a company from the 7th AIB (in reserve) to attack the woods.

At 1615 hours Company B launched another attack on the woods. Four tank destroyers were put in firing position at the left edge of the woods to give fire cover to the company by firing at the houses to the north of the woods. One platoon was mounted on the available tanks which consisted of three medium and two light tanks. These were to advance into the woods at the left edge and proceed north thru the widest part followed by two waves of infantry at 50 yards. Each wave consisted of one platoon.

The attack was successful in clearing all but a small part of the woods. The shock action of the tanks and mounted infantry firing machine guns was more than the enemy could cope with. 91 of the enemy were killed and 15 taken prisoner. At 1830 hours however, as night was coming on, the battalion CO ordered the attack stopped.

The next morning at 0825 hours a five-minute preparation by the tank destroyers was fired and at 0830 hours Company B again attacked in order to clear out the northern neck of the woods. The tanks were employed the same way as they were the day before. By 0900 hours the woods were completely flushed out.

A defensive line was set up at the northern edge of the woods and was held until the battalion was relieved by the 15th Cavalry Group.

(At 1830 hours 26 Feb Capt. Shaw was relieved of command by Major Artman, CO, 58th AIB for "losing control of his company". Capt Shaw explained the confusion in his company by the fact that he received the order to attack too late to brief his key non-coms and in the event of his platoon leaders becoming casualties the non-coms were unable to grasp the situation and assume command in the absence of officers.)

Capt. Shaw states that he learned the following lessons from this company action:

1. Never depend on physical reconnaissance only. Always use reconnaissance by fire.
2. Skirting woods is not an infantry mission. It is a tank mission.
3. Keep the engineers up with the company. If they are kept in the rear to be called up on request, they cannot be brought up in time to be of assistance.
4. When an officer become a casualty an enlisted man must take over. (Although this was impossible in this instance because the enlisted men were not sufficiently informed.)