INTERVIEW

Unit: Hq 8th Armored Division
Source: Brig. Gen. John M. Devine, CG, 8th Armored Division
Interviewer: Capt. Joseph Vasta
Place and Date of Interview: Gottingen, Germany, 3 May 45.

We crossed the Rhine River (27 March) behind the 30th Infantry Division. They remained in place while we passed through with Combat Command A and Combat Command R abreast. There was no breakthrough. We fought a tank-infantry action.

It had been planned to by-pass Dorsten and take it from the east. XVI Corps called and told us that we could not by-pass the town. They asked when we could take Dorsten. I sent Colonel Dodge (Chief of Staff) to see Brigadier General Colson (Commanding General, CCA) to see if we could take the town. He said we could.

We turned everything we had on Dorsten. CCR was to go up the railroad tracks (between Kirchhellen and Dorsten) and roll up the flank, while CCA was to come up the road (leading from Imloh to Dorsten) and also road from vicinity of 4439 to Dorsten.

For awhile, we lost contact with Wallace (CCR) but shortly before 0500 hours the next morning (29 March) we had everything cleared up. At 0500 hours, all forces were on the restraining line and the artillery preparation on the town was begun. Shortly after this, we got a call from the Corps Commander telling us that we had to take Dorsten that morning. When the town was taken, CCB (49th Armored Infantry Battalion) was sent in to clean out the town and release CCA.

(In summing up the fighting during this period (28-31 March), General Devine made the following points): Every ridge had an 88mm gun that had to be maneuvered out. They were cleverly arranged and well dug-in. We could not bomb them out. The enemy fought hard and they were hard in remove. Artillery had to be used to soften them up before the infantry could tackle them. Another thing that delayed our advance was the number of blown bridges each combat command encounter. This gave the enemy time to reorganize.

When the 75th Infantry Division took over our zone (31 March), we crossed the Lippe River. We had to fight to get into our assembly area in the vicinity of Selm. At that time, we had orders from the XVI Corps to go to the Elbe River. These orders were changed later and we were told to get to Berlin. Our reconnaissance units were out reconnoitering the routes. But Army sent us back to close the Ruhr pocket. Army had the choice of sending us or the 83d Infantry Division on this mission. Since armor could travel faster than infantry, there was no question as to why the 8th Armored Division was sent on this mission.

The night we took Erwitte (4 April) was the night that the 116th Panzer Grenadier Division was to attack. As we were moving in, we picked up a German Jew who spoke English with a Harvard accent. He told us that the Greyhound (116th Pz Gr) Division was down the road and was poised for a breakthrough. Our guards captured their outpost (26 men) and thereby threw the enemy off balance. Upon entering Erwitte, it was evident that the Germans had made an extremely hurried exit. Dinner was still warm and on the table and practically no personal belongings had been taken by the enemy.

Unna

Originally, CCB had the mission of taking Unna. They were told that as soon as the town was taken, they would be relieved. They came down the road (Ostburen yo Unna) which had deep ditches and tall weeds along both sides. Evidently, they stopped along the road. The Germans opened up on them with Panzerfausts and everything else they had. Had to relieve them and pass CCA through to continue the attack.

The enemy had expected CCA to come up the road and were in their foxholes along the road waiting for troops to come up. Instead, CCA came cross-country and drove them out like rats. As CCA came up, the Germans opened up on our rear. The tankers whirled their turrets around, fired at them and kept moving forward. It was the best executed action I have seen in battle. CCA made only one mistake - no troops came up on the south side of the town to cut off the escaping Germans. We fought for another two days in that area before we moved east.

Blankenburg

There was very little fighting at Blankenburg. Otherwise, it was a very successful attack. XIX Corps wanted us to take the town by 1800 hours (19 April). We told corps that it would take at least three days. The Germans had roadblocks all over the place and seemed determined to resist.

Colson (CG, CCA) and Burba (CO, CCB) were sent in there to do the job. Additional infantry was needed because both combat commands were spread thinly. The 58th Armored Infantry Battalion from CCR was sent in to provide the additional infantry needed.

The next morning Corps called again and asked if we couldn't take the town that day. We told Corps we could. Before the attack was launched, Burba tried to get the Germans to surrender. After much discussing and not getting anywhere, surrender talks were stopped and the attack was begun with Burba coming in from the east and northwest. There were shots fired in the town but the fighting was extremely light. Our casualties for that day were one man killed and six men wounded.

Blankenburg was secured by 1730 hours (20 April) and when we advised Corps of this, they were quite pleased.

JOHN M. DEVINE,
Brigadier General
Commanding General,
8th Armored Division.