Corps Letter of Instruction #18 from the XVI Corps directed that the division would pass one combat command through the 35 Inf Div on the night of 27 - 28 February. The combat command was to attack N in Z on the Corps right flank and secure objectives 10 (KLINKUM 9683) and 11 (ARSBECK 9384). CCA which was then in division reserve was alerted and directed to move to an assembly area west of the ROER RIVER and from there to proceed with this mission.

Further information on the division mission was brought back by Capt. Clark, the division liaison officer with Corps. The division was to move on the right flank of the 35 Infantry Division. The initial objective was MERBECK 9687. From there, 8 Armored Division was to proceed to AMERN ST. GEORG (9694). At that point, Ninth Army was to decide whether the division would turn east and assist XIII Corps or continue to VENLO (9009). The 8th Armored Division would be relieved from the present zone by the 15th Cavalry Group and would follow CCA upon relief. The entire division was to be in zone east of the ROER RIVER by the morning of the 28th.

CCA crossed the ROER RIVER during the night. Traffic congestion over the HILFARTH bridge delayed the entire combat command.

28 February

The 15th Cavalry Group relieved CCB at 0100 hours and CCR at 0400 hours. Upon being relieved the combat commands started for the HILFARTH crossing and their assembly areas east of the ROER RIVER.

The head of CCA's column came to a halt outside WEGBERG (9883) at 0300 hours where the engineers from Company "A" of the 53d Engineer Bn were busy clearing the road blocks on the outskirts of the city. Troop A of the 88th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron protecting the engineers had a bitter small arms fire with enemy who were covering this road block. The road block removed and the enemy dispersed, the column continued on th its objective, MERBECK, but had to stop again at 0520 hours that morning because of a road block (abattis) one kilometer south of that town. This road block was well covered by small arms fire. The tanks came forward and knocked out the opposition with direct fire.

The advance guard became engaged in a small arms fire fight as they tried to enter MERBECK. A battery of artillery attached to the advance guard moved into firing position and neutralized the enemy fire. The infantry of the 7th Armored Infantry Battalion then entered the town and it was taken with slight opposition. During this period of fighting, the enemy put fairly heavy AW and mortar fire on MERBECK.

Having secured their objective, CCA's column then turned northwest toward TETELRATH (9688). On the road leading into the town was an anti-tank ditch vigorously defended by small arms fire. The road in the vicinity of this ditch was heavily mined and the mines had been set in the hard surfaced road. The engineers came forward and cleared the road under intense enemy fire. With the 398th AFA and the 18th Tank Bn firing in support, the infantry went into the town and were followed by the tanks. By 1620 hours, the town had been taken, mopped up and positions consolidated against counterattack.

CCR enroute to its assembly area vicinity of HUCKELHOVEN was notified at 1800 hours that evening to change its route of march and proceed to WEGBERG. In the meanwhile, CCB had reached its assembly area in HUCKELHOVEN and had pushed on from there to ARSBECK by 1400 hours. They continued on toward OBER KRUCHTEN (9389) but their advance was halted by a blown railroad bridge near ARSBECK. Company B of the 53rd Engineer Battalion went to work to construct a by-pass for the column.

1 March

XVI Corps Letter of Instruction No. 22 instructed the division that upon securing AMERN ST. GEORG they were to continue to the north and secure LOBBERICH (E9802). When this mission was completed, the 8th Armored Division was to assemble in the area to move either north or east.

During the night (28 Feb - 1 March) reconnaissance was made by CCA of the road leading to WALDNIEL (9892) and AMERN ST. GEORG. The road was found to be mined and actively patrolled by the enemy. Troop A of the 88th Cavalry Rcn Squadon engaged and dispersed the enemy and were followed by the engineers who cleared the mines and abattis. CCA jumped off and went through WALDNIEL and AMERN ST. GEORG and by 1830 that day, they were 1000 yards north of BOISHEIMV(K980980). Enemy resistance was scattered and consisted chiefly of small arms fire.

CCB and CCR were not in contact with the enemy. This may have been due to the fact that between WEGBERG and LOBBERICH, the division had only one axial road, thereby hampering the freedom of movement so essential in an armored thrust. The condition of the terrain was such that it prohibited cross country movement.

Late that night, XVI Corps Letter of Instruction No. 23 directed that the 8th AD advance rapidly in zone and seize the west bank of the RHINE RIVER in zone.

2 March

On March 2, CCB coming up behind CCA was instructed to try to work its way to the left flank of CCA by way of side roads. Despite all its efforts to do so, CCB was unable to find roads that would permit it to come along side CCA. In the meantime, CCR coming up from the rear of the division was successful in working its way to CCA's right flank.

Since CCB was fresh and ready to go, Brigadier General John M. Devine, CG 8th Armored Div, directed that it pass through CCA and take up the offensive. The details of the passing through were to be arranged between Brigadier General Charles F Colson, CG, CCA, and Colonel Edward A. Kimball, CO, CCB.

Instructions for CCA brought back by the liaison officer were that the combat command was to continue on to LOBBERICH. At 0800 hours, a one-hour artillery preparation was laid on the town and the town was taken at 0900 hours. There was an estimated garrison of 400 enemy troops protecting the town. 125 prisoners were taken initially and stragglers were brought throughout the day. This mission having been accomplished, CCA was ordered to take corps objective 23 (WACHTENDONK). The command proceeded north through HENSBECK (0110), AERBECK (0111), and HAIZBECK without meeting practically any opposition. Coming into WANKUM (0012), they encountered stiff small arms fire which was quickly neutralized by the tanks. The column then turned east toward WACHTENDONK. Before entering the town they laid down an artillery preparation on it. An infantry bridgehead was established over the NIERS CANAL. This enabled the engineers to put a treadway across the canal where the bridge had been blown. The infantry then advanced and cleaned out the town.

Colonel Kimball and General Colson met in WACHTENDOCK to arrange for CCB's passing through CCA and taking over the zone. The passing through was underway by the morning of 3 March.

On the previous night (1 March) CCR had been alerted by Division to be ready to move out by 0300 next morning. At 0230 the liaison officer returned from Division Headquarters with plans and instructions for their mission. Task Force No. 1, under the command of Major Austin Walker was ordered to proceed along the route of advance until contact was made with the rear of CCA. This contact was established by 0700 hours that morning. Then Troop C of the 88th Cavalry Rcn Squadron was ordered to reconnoiter the area for alternate routes to by-pass CCA. No roads could be found that would lead around CCA within the division zone. CCR then contacted the 84th Inf Div for permission to go through its area to by-pass traffic congestion but permission was refused. Consequently, CCR had to sit and wait until CCA got out of its way.

It wasn't until late that evening that CCR was able to move. Then Task Force No. 1 jumped off and by 1800 hours they had captured GREFRATH. They remained there for the night. In the meanwhile, Task Force No. 2, under command of Major George Walker had been unable the move out of LOBBERICH where they remained for that night. During the night, Company C of the 53d Engineer Bn prepared crossing over the NIERS CANAL (A043055) so that CCR could continue on its mission which was to advance in zone and take objective No. 24 (MOERS 2318).

Division was notified by XVI Corps of change in boundaries which would pinch out the 8th Armored Division on the following day. Corps Letter of Instruction # 26 instructed the division to continue to advance, take ALDEKERK (0817), and mop up the area to the limit of their zone. When this mission had been completed, the 8th AD was to assemble in ALDEKERK - WACHTENDONK - ZEIGELHEIDE (0509) area in corps reserve and prepare to move either north or east on corps order.

3 March

CCB completely mopped up and occupied WACHTENDONK and then reverted to division reserve.

CCR crossed the NIERS CANAL at 0600 hours and started out to take MOERS. The combat command went in column until they came to the crossroad at VOSCH (0809) where the task force split. Task Force 1 went by way of ST. HUBERT (1009) and VINNBRUCK (1312) where they were stopped by a blown bridge. The engineers went to work at once and put up a treadway. The task force had one tank over the crossing when they notified to stop and withdraw and go to a bivouac area.

In the meanwhile, Task Force 2 which went by way of ALDEKERK began encountering stiffening resistance in the vicinity of SAELHUYSEN (108168) and further along in the vicinity (120168). The resistance was overcome and the advance continued. They had gotten to SCHAEPHUYSEN (127168) when they received orders to stop where they were and withdraw to a bivouac area. This notice to stop came at about 1500 hours.

The 8th Armored Division was very much disappointed when it was pinched out. It was finally in a zone wide enough and with a sufficiently good road nets so that the combat commands could operate freely. The division was moving very rapidly through disorganized resistance when the restraining order was received.