AFTER ACTION REPORT
G-2 Section, 8th Armored Division

1 - 30 April 1945    

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

During the night of 31 March - 1 April 1945 the 8th Armd Div withdrew from the vicinity of RECKLINGHAUSEN (A6336) and marched north, crossing the LIPPE CANAL at DORSTEN. The division then traveled east toward an assembly area vicinity of SENNENLAGER (B6853) where it passed to control of XIX Corps.

After subsequent fighting in the Rhur Pocket, the 8th was rushed to the east, where it was employed to complete the destruction of the 11 Pz Army in the Harz Mountains.

Since the 8th Armd Div engaged German forces in two widely separated areas during the month, this report will be divided into two subsection.

a. ENEMY SITUATION 12 April 1945.

(1) General Summary: Twenty German divisions had been pocketed between the Ninth and First US Armies following a breakthrough by the 3rd Armd Div from the REMAGEN bridgehead and the virtually unopposed advance of 2nd Armd Div N of the LIPPE CANAL. This pocket had been closed in the vicinity of PADERBORN (B7184) but an escape route through NEUHAUS (B6850) between the 2nd Armd Div and 3rd Armd Div was still open. However, the 8th Armd Div was diverted to the SW from the vicinity of NEUHAUS and in conjunction with 95th Inf Div forced the German 116 Pz Div steadily back toward the SW. NEUHAUS (B6850), SOEST (B2631), WERL (B1328), HAMM (B0542), UNNA (A9727) were successively taken from the enemy, while continued pressure from US troops all around the perimeter of the pocket forced enemy troops into an ever diminishing space.

On the front of the 8th Armd Div the 116 Pz Div withdrew to the S of the RUHR RIVER on 11 April and began refitting in the general area of MENDEN (B0416). Continuous activity in this area plus numerous PW statements led us to the conclusion that the Germans would attempt to hold the high ground South of the RUHR RIVER. Here, good fields of fire, excellent cover and concealment, plus the benefits derived from the RUHR RIVER itself as an obstacle to our advance, all offered the German commander his best location for a last stand. His chance to break out of the pocket was gone and the enemy was faced with a poor choice between surrender or a futile defense to the end.

(2) Enemy Front Lines: High ground along South bank of RUHR RIVER.

(3) Units in Contact: On 12 April the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his forces opposing the 8th Armd Div to the South bank of the RUHR RIVER. Contact during the period 1 -11 April was as follows:

1 - 2 April: 22 AA Div, 1 AA Div, 146 PGR Repl Bn, 502 SS Tiger Tk Bn, 406 ZBV Div.
    2 - 3 April: 512 Hvy At Bn, SS Pz Repl Tng Bn Sennenlager, 146 PGR Repl Bn, 15 Convalescent Rcn Repl Bn, 500 SS Tk Repl Bn, Berg Wentfalen.
    3 - 8 April: 116 Pz Div, 146 PGR Repl Bn (incorporated into 116 Pz Div) plus an average of 10 miscellaneous replacement of training units.
    8 - 11 April: 116 Pz Div, 23 Para Regt, 2 Para Div, 1225 Regt, 190 Inf Div, miscellaneous units.
    11 -12 April: SS Sig Tng Bn Unna, 401 Volks Arty Corps, 445 Hwy AA Bn, miscellaneous landesschutzen units.

b. ENEMY SITUATION 30 APRIL 1945.

(1) General Summary: Only scattered remnants of the German 11 Pz Army remained in the HARZ MOUNTAIN area at the end of April. Another large pocket of German resistance had been eliminated completely.

Prior to the arrival of the 8th Armd Div, the enemy in the Harz had been opposing the 1st and 9th US Inf Div with some 18-20 odd battle groups under command of Lt Gen LUCHT. Comprising the battle groups were veterans of the RUHR and lower Rhine pockets, plus sizeable units from 5 Para Div, 26 VG Div, 9 Pz Div, and newly-formed divisions Potsdam and Worgitaky. Under steady pressure from all directions the enemy defenses became disorganized, finally crumbling completely as the 8th Armd Div gained contact with the 1st Inf Div on 21 April.

Due to the extremely rugged nature of the mountains and to the heavily wooded portions of the area, small groups of enemy soldiers remained undetected. Consequently minor skirmishes occurred as the process of screening the area continued. However, no organized enemy force remained in the Harz.

(2) Enemy Front Lines 30 April 1945.

No organized enemy front in existence. 8th Armd Div not in contact.

(3) Units in Contact 30 April 1945.

8th Armd Div not in contact with the enemy. Contact during period 12-30 April as follows:
    12-19 April: CCB in contact with miscellaneous small units.
    19-21 April: 5 Para Div, 9 Pz Div, 26 VG Div, Div Potsdam, Div Worgitsky, Pz Regt Luetzew, SS Regt Wuedlingburg, NCO School Eisenach, 356 Arty Regt, 46 AA Bn, 688 Engr Bde.
    21-30 April: Contact with remnants and stragglers in Harz Mtns. only.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD:

a. 1 - 12 April 1945.

Enemy forces consisting principally of training and replacement units opposed the advance of the 8th Armd Div's leading elements in the vic of DELBRUCK (B5752), SANDE (B6542) and SENNELAGER with scattered small arms fire on 1 April. As the division closed into the general DELBRUCK area, CCB advanced SE upon NEUHAUS (B6750). Here, on 2 April, enemy resistance by SS units and AA personnel in NEUHAUS was fierce. During the night of 2 April, a counterattack by 2 to 3 companies of Inf supported by a platoon of tanks was repulsed without loss of ground. At this time, 116 Pz Div, which had broken contact with US forces further west in the vicinity of RECKLINGHAUSEN (A6336) began moving east toward SOEST (B2631) with the intention of forcing a breakthrough toward BIELEFELD (B5581). During 2 April, CCA and CCR attacked S past LIPPSTADT and contacted elms of 116 Pz Div's outpost line. The enemy fought stubbornly at ERWITTE (B4235), EIKELOH (B4636) and STRIPE (B4036), defending these vital points by A/T, AW and Arty fire in addition to using foot troops supported by small groups of tanks. During this phase of the fighting the first definite identifications of the PG Regts of 116 Pz Div were made. Despite frantic efforts to stem our advance, the enemy was forced steadily back. ROBRINGHAUSEN (B3729), KLIEVE (B3830), ELBINGHAUSEN (B3735), HORN (B3535), BERNBROCK (B3834), KALDEMEL (B3738), UNINGHAUSEN and SCHALLERN (B3333) fell on 5 April with little fighting. Due to the threatened encirclement of SOEST from the south, the enemy offered only token resistance there, while the main body of 116 Pz Div continued to withdraw. With the loss of SOEST, the enemy lost his last suitable springboard for a breakthrough to the NE.

While CCB and CCR continued the attack to the W, CCA employed the attached 194th Glider Regt to sweep the mountainous, wooded terrain S and SE of Lake MOHNE. Resistance in this area was moderate only, consisting mainly of protected road blocks along avenues of approach through the area. At 1500, 6 April, in the vic of KALLENHARDT (B4717), a hastily organized Battle Group Haas, composed of 150 - 200 men, launched a counterattacked against the 194 Glider Regt. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. It was in this area that Franz von Papen and his son were taken prisoner during our advance. Von Papen was evacuated directly to Ninth US Army.

North of the RHUR River the 116 Pz Div with its assorted supporting units continued a slow withdrawal to the West, leaving delaying detachments at all road junctions, towns and critical terrain features. WERL, an important communications center fell to CCB on 8 April. Resistance stiffened as we approached UNNA (A9726), which was attacked on 11 April. Fighting in UNNA was fierce, but our feint to the west, while the main effort came from the south, caught the enemy off balance so that by nightfall the town was completely in our hands. 116 Pz Div, however, had once more withdrawn, this time south of the RHUR River to the vicinity of MENDEN.

Once more changing directions, the 8th attacked south and southwest from UNNA meeting only occasional light resistance in advancing to the north bank of the RHUR River.

The 116 Pz Div, one of the oldest and proudest of German divisions, had finally encountered a pocket from which it could not escape. In its movement to the south it took along as PWs two officers and two enlisted men of the 8th Armd Div. It was fitting that after the 8th had once more swung about and had left the RHUR pocket, the officers remaining as PWs with the 116 Pz Div led the surrender party in to American lines when the entire RHUR pocket gave up.

PWs During Operation - 13,171; PWs to date - 15,586.
    Enemy tanks destroyed - 26.
    Enemy AT guns destroyed - 48.

B. 12 - 30 April 1945 -

Between the 12th and 22nd of April 1945, the 11 Pz Army, defending the Harz Mountains, was completely smashed. CCB, 8th Armd Div, acting as flank security for XIX Corps, was in contact initially with scattered units south of HALBERSTADT. Further south, two regiments of Div Potsdam, a hastily organized division whose mission was to force units back from the ELBE, plus elements of 5 Para Div, 9 Pz Div and other large battle groups fought stubbornly against the 1st and 9th Inf Divs which were attacking NE and NW from the southern perimeter of the Harz.

On 20 April 1945, CCA and CCB attacked south. Due to the state of general confusion in the pocket, resistance was sporadic and unpredictable. BLANKENBERG fell to CCB by nightfall on 20 April, while CCA continued clearing the woods and mountainous area W of BLANKENBERG (D2260). Resistance to CCA consisted of moderate small arms and automatic weapons fire at road blocks and minefields along the routes. Artillery fire was generally light. On 21 April, following the fall of CATTENSTEDT (D2358) and MICHAELSTEIN (D1961), CCA and CCB reached the Ninth US Army boundary line where they contacted elms of First US Army. Organized enemy resistance in the Harz ended this date.

Included in the PW count for the operation and during the following cleanup of stragglers, were the following German officers:
    CG & Staff, 11 Pz Army
    CG, Werkreis 9
    CG & C/S, 66 Corps
    CO, Div Warzitsky
    CO, 5 Para Div
    CG, 26 VG Div

Also included was a horse drawn supply train captured intact - the last of the 116 Pz Div.

In the following days of the month, enemy activity as a planned operation ceased. Individuals and small groups of soldiers fought skirmishes with our outposts or were picked up as they tried to escape from the area. There was a mass movement on the part of remaining soldiers and officers to slip through our lines undetected in order to return to their homes. When challenged, the majority of them gave up, but minor incidents of individual resistance continued to crop up.

PWs during the period - 10,295; PWs to date - 25,881.
    Enemy tanks destroyed - 1.
    AT guns destroyed - 4.
    Motor Transport destroyed - 30.

3. ENEMY CAPABILITIES - 30 April 1945:

a. To surrender individually or in small groups.

b. To engage in Werewolf activities by harassing supply and signal installations in the Hartz Mountains.

c. To attempt to return home individually by using civilian clothing and false papers.

4. WEATHER & VISIBILITY (Annex C)

5. G-2 SECTION OPERATIONS:

a. General Summary:

1 - 12 April 1945: G-2 was occupied with the tactical situation. The many swift changes in direction made map supply and determination of enemy defenses quite difficult. On 4 April, Major Kirchheimer, Asst. G-2 was evacuated through medical channels for injuries to his back. Efforts to obtain a psychological warfare loudspeaker team to assist in the Division's advance were unsuccessful. A special service loudspeaker was tried, but it was found that the volume was not great enough to be effective.

12 - 20 April 1945: G-2 Section supervised security screening of Division area. Emphasis was placed on location reporting and safeguarding the many German scientific and industrial establishments in the BRAUNSCHWEIG-WOLFENBUTTEL area.

20 - 22 April 1945: G-2 occupied with tactical situation in Harz Mtns.

22 - 30 April 1945: G-2 set up an Intelligence Target system. Units were notified of possible intelligence targets in their areas and directed to fill out forms which were reproduced in quantity. The form indicated Target, description, address, condition and other pertinent details. A file of reports was kept and daily reports were submitted to Corps on the status of Intelligence Targets. Guards were instructed to prohibit entrance to anyone not possessing a standard Division pass. In this way, the G-2 section was able to keep track of the many specialist teams that entered the Division area without first reporting to DHQ. In conjunction with CIOS Trip 113, Capt Donaldson, G-2 Section, discovered a valuable store of top secret German documents, which had been dumped down an abandoned, water-filled mine shaft at REYERHAUSEN (C5637). These documents contained results of tests and experiments on airplanes, propelled missile, submarines and rockets. After four days of work by an engineer squad, the documents had all been recovered, and were evacuated by air to PARIS.

With the cessation of organized resistance, the OB, PI, MII and IPW Teams were given to CIC in order to augment that team. This addition of PI, OB, and IPW to CIC helped alleviate the shortage of CIC personnel, in addition to providing valuable linguists for CI work.

On 25 April 1945, Major Kirchheimer returned to the G-2 Section.