AFTER ACTION REPORT
G-2 Section, 8th Armored Division

1 - 31 March 1945    

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.

The month of March saw three distinct phases in the enemy situation on the front of the 8th Armd Div. Consequently, these phases will be discussed separately.

a. ENEMY SITUATION 11 March 1945.

(1) General Summary: On 11 March 1945 the German divisions opposing our advance to the Rhine River had extricated all of the troops they could possibly get across the river and had blown their two remaining bridges at WESEL. Although, the 8th Armd Div, as a whole, was not in contact with the enemy, having been stopped at TONISBERG (A1313) by Corps order on 3 Mar 1945. CCB, attached to the 35th Inf Div remained to represent the 8th to the collapse of German resistance. The German, after blowing their bridges, were assembling on the east bank of the Rhine, frantically regrouping and reorganizing their decimated forces. Elements of 2, 7, 8 Para Divs, 176, 180, and 190 VG Divs, and 116 and 130 Pz Divs were left behind in our prisoner bag, but other parts did succeed in escaping to the temporary safety of the east bank. 130 Pz moved south to counterattack the U.S. First Army's bridgehead at REMAGEN, but 116 Pz Div remained in the vicinity of WESEL. 180 and 190 VG Divs also remained between WESEL and BUISBERG keeping a watchful eye on the Rhine while they hastily patched up their organization. 7 and 8 Para Divs stopped their retreat near DUISBERG and moved north of WESEL while 2 Para Div moved slightly south of DUISBERG to outpost the river lines.

(2) Enemy Front Lines 11 March 1945 - East bank of Rhine River from WESEL (A2241) to DUISBERG (A3017) in XVI Corps zone. 8th Armd Div not in contact.

(3) Units in Contact on 11 March 1945 - The 8th Armd Div was out of contact with the enemy. Units last in contact with CCB on 9 March 1945: 116 Pz Div, 7 Para Div, 8 Para Div, 2 Para Div, 190 Inf Div.

b. ENEMY SITUATION 27 March 1945.

(1) General Summary: On 27 March the 8th Armd Div was not in contact with the enemy. However, since the division was to attack on the 28 March 1945 a brief summary of the enemy situation between the LIPPE and RHEINE HERNE CANALS will be given.

Between the two canals the 190 Inf, 180 Inf, and 2 Para Divs opposed the advance of our 30th, 35th, and 79th Inf Divs. 180 Div was holding generally the north half of the sector with its right on the LIPPE CANAL while elements of 190 Inf Div held the southern sector with its left on the RHEINE HERNE CANAL. 2 Para Div was disposed generally in the populated DUISBERG area. After three days of fighting following the Rhine crossing, 180 Inf and 190 Inf Divs were reduced to such straits that 116 Pz was committed in an effort to stem the tide. The tank regiment of 116 Pz Div was at this time the only known available reserve.

(2) Enemy Front Lines: GAHLEN (A4041) - A4336 - A4134 - A4030 - A3628 - canal at A335238.

(3) Units in Contact: 8th Armd Div not in contact with the enemy.

c. Enemy Situation 31 March 1945.

(1) General Summary: On 31 March 1945 the German troops between the LIPPE and RHEINE HERNE CANALS had been forced back to a line running generally N - S through RECKLINGHAUSEN. Here remnants of 180 Inf Div, 190 Inf Div and 116 Pz Div were being hard pressed by the 8th Armd Div and by the 75th US Inf Div which had taken over the north half of the 8th Armd's sector. Although by-passed on the N by our 2nd Armd Div the enemy had a secure right flank offered by the LIPPE CANAL and a secure left flank on the RHEINE HERNE CANAL. However, although RECKINGHAUSEN was declared a fortress he could not hope to stave off our assaults for long. He had the choice of holding to the last in a futile struggle at RECKINGHAUSEN, of moving south into the heavily populated RUHR cities where he could perhaps exist for a longer period of time, or of attempting to delay our advance while he withdrew to the east toward DORTMUND.

(2) Enemy Front Lines: A5942 - A5936 - A598341.

(3) Units in Contact: 116 Pz Div, Elms 180 and 190 Inf Divs, 4th AA Div, miscellaneous Engr, Arty, and AA units.

2. Enemy Operations During Period.

a. 1 - 11 March 1945: After over-coming stiff enemy resistance and obstacles at TETLERATH (K968882) our troops advanced against scattered resistance offered by elements of 176, 183, and 190 VG Divs to the outskirts of LOBBERICH (E984020). Here mines, blown bridges, and roadblocks defended by approximately 400 German troops held up CCA until 2 March 1945. Over-coming this resistance CCA pursued the enemy NE to WACHTENDONK, where again the Germans blew a bridge, laid mines, and blocked the routes with abattis. Nowhere was an organized enemy line in existence, although every critical road junction, every vital bridge, every village was defended by forces whose only mission was to stop our advance at all cost while the main enemy force continued to move to the east and north-east. Our attack toward the north had caught the enemy on the flank. His prepared defenses were constructed so as to meet a threat from the west toward the east. On 3 March 1945 the German stiffened once again at STENDON (A105140) where he employed mortars and small arms in quantity. The division was stopped at this time by Corps order, and contact with the enemy forces was lost. This gave the enemy in our zone a breathing spell so that by 5 Mar 1945 when CCB moved out of ALDEKERK with objective WESEL, the enemy had established a strong defensive line. LINTFORT was organized as a portion of his OPL while RHEINBERG and OSSENBERG constituted strong points in his MLR. By the evening of 5 March 1945, CCB had cleared LINTFORT and was fighting German forces in RHEINBERG. Here for the first time the Germans employed AT guns in mass. RHEINBERG was ringed with 88mm guns as well as with high velocity 75mm guns. Along all routes and covered approaches, paratroopers of the 2 Para Regt, 2 Para Div, were dug in ready to man AW and Panzerfaust. In addition, heavy artillery supported the German defenders. This artillery was accurately adjusted and could cover any desired area in the vicinity of RHEINBERG.

By the evening of 6 March 1945 the enemy, after a suicidal stand, had been cleared from RHEINBERG. On 7 March 1945 the Germans opposed the advance of CCB and a task force from the 35th Inf Div toward OSSENBERG with the same type of defense that had been encountered earlier at RHEINBERG. OSSENBERG, however, was less strongly held and was taken by 0800 8 March 1945.

During this ever increasing squeeze the enemy employed barges, and his bridges at WESEL to continue evacuation of all possible troops. North of OSSENBERG heavy fighting continued. Mines, which had not been numerous up to this point began to appear, and our progress was slowed resultingly.

PW's during Operation: 1,216 ---- To Date: 1293.

b. 11 - 27 March 1945: 8th Armd Div not in contact with the enemy. Period spent in screening the XVI Corps area, training, rest, and maintenance.

c. 27 - 31 March 1945: The German forces disposed between the LIPPE and RHEINE-HERNE CANALS fought a stubborn delaying action while they withdrew to the east. Once again we were opposed by the 180 Inf Div and by 116 Pz Div, which was committed in toto against us as we passed through the 30th and 79th Inf Divs. Resistance on the morning of 28 March 1945 was scattered in the vicinity of A420365, but became increasingly heavy as we entered IMKOH (A436365) and KIRCHHELEN (A433340). In addition to two divisions the enemy employed his heavy AA defenses to the maximum. On the open flat country between the two canals his many 88 and 105mm guns, emplaced for years to defend the vital RUHR area, hampered armored movement and cut down progress to a slow mopping-up type of action. Miscellaneous artillery battalions, engineer battalions, AA units, in short, every available German soldier who was not manning an AT gun or who was not already a part of the 180 or 116 Pz Divs was thrown into the battle line to bolster the weakening enemy forces. During the night of 28-29 March 1945, CCA attacked and entered DORSTEN (A4751). This city offered good bridging sites over the LIPPE CANAL which were desired by Ninth US Army. By noon 29 March 1945, DORSTEN had been cleared but only after the enemy had defended it in severe house to house fighting, employing AW, HV, mortar and heavy caliber artillery fire.

South of DORSTEN 180 Inf and 116 Pz Divs withdrew to the high ground running generally from MARL (A5539) to POLSUM (A525365) to BUER (A525315). Falling back, he contested every inch of ground. Our advance from A445347 and 468339 met scattered resistance initially which changed to a determine stand at ZWECKEL (A4833) and WESTERHOLT (A5434). By 0700 31 March 1945 the MARL-POLSUM-BUER line had been broken and only scattered resistance was met as our troops approached RECKLINGHAUSEN (A6336). However, the enemy had established another line generally N-S through RECKLINGHAUSEN. The city itself was declared a fortress. Here the enemy intended to hold in order to protect the crossing which lay to the east over the RHEINE-HERNE CANAL. By 31 March 1945 our troops had advanced against determined enemy resistance to a point 2500 yds west of RECKLINGHAUSEN where we were halted on order from Ninth US Army.

Throughout the entire action 116 Pz Div employed its tanks piecemeal in support of infantry elements. By so doing, the 116 Pz lost the ability to launch a formidable counter-attack, while the small groups of platoon size that were committed could hope to slow down our advance only temporarily.

PW's during period - 1,122. Total to-date: 2415
    Enemy tanks KO'd - 11
    AT weapons destroyed - 27 Hvy AT, 19 Lt AT

3. Enemy Capabilities 31 March 1945.

a. To defend to the last a N-S line along high ground vicinity RECKLINGHAUSEN, fortifying the city heavily and employing 116 Pz Div and elements of 180 and 190 Inf Divs with 16 Pz Regt as a mobile reserve.

b. To defend RECKLINGHAUSEN as long as possible with infantry elements of 160 and 190 Inf Divs while 116 Pz withdraws to the east or southeast.

4. WEATHER & VISIBILITY (Annex C)

5. G-2 Section Operations.

a. General Summary.

1 - 12 March 1945: G-2 was absorbed in the tactical situation, with dissemination of information, and with supervision over security and counter-intelligence in the division zone.

13 - 27 March 1945: On 13 March G-2 began a systematic security screening of the XVI Corps zone. In order to accomplish this mission it was necessary to secure the addition of all available CIC, MII, and IPW teams and under the direction of Major J. M. Kirchheimer, G-2 Section 8th Armd Div, the screening was begun. In general, a "screening center" was established in each town. All entrances and exits to the area were guarded and troops were then sent in teams under the supervision of an officer to search all houses and to examine all civilians. All persons lacking proper identification or who seemed at all suspicious were sent back for thorough examination at the "screening center". The task was a monumental one but proceeded more rapidly than was expected.

One major result was the apprehending on 16 March of two members of the German sabotage society 'WEREWOLF'. By skillful interrogation, details on the organization were learned and the cleverly camouflaged hideouts of other members were discovered. This matter was reported to Ninth U.S. Army who placed the stamp of secrecy on the whole affair until more could be learned. The mission of screening XVI Corps area was completed on 19 March 1945.

During the latter four days of the period the G-2 Section converted a 2-1/2 ton truck into a complete mobile office. This mobile CP saved delay and loss of efficiency in rapidly moving situations.

On the night of 26 March all members of G-2 helped guide columns across the Rhine River bridges.

27 - 31 March 1945: G-2 was absorbed in the tactical situation, dissemination of information and coordination, with G-3 on operations.

b. Team Methods and Results. Annex "B"