INTERVIEW

Unit: Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division
Action: Roer-Rhine
Source: Capt David B Kelly, CO, Company B, 36th Tk Bn; 1st Sgt William J Donahue; 2d Lt Wesley S Buller, Plat Ldr, 1st Plat; Sgt Frank J Noce, Tk Cmdr, 105 Assault Gun; Sgt Monroe Arkozitz, Tk Cmdr; Tec 4 Harold L Bainbridge, Tk Driver; Cpl William Grote, Gnr; Cpl Joseph P Maher, Gnr; Tec 5 Arthur J Yost, Jr, Driver
Interviewer: 1st Lt H L Oleck
Place and Date of Interview: Venlo, Holland, 1450, 14 March 1945

CAPT. DAVID B. KELLY, Company Commander
1ST SGT WILLIAM J. DONAHUE
2ND LT. WESLEY S. BULLER, Platoon Leader, 1st platoon
SGT. FRANK J. NOCE, Tank Commander of 105 assault gun
SGT. MONROE ARKOZITZ, Tank Commander
T/4 HAROLD L. BAINBRIDGE, Tank Driver
CPL WILLIAM GROTE, Gunner
CPL JOSEPH P. MAHER, Gunner, Tank #16
T/5 ARTHUR J. YOST, Jr, Driver, Tank #8

COMPANY B, 36th TANK BATTALION
To: 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, (Historical Officer)
At: Venlo, Holland, 1430 hours, 14 March 1945.
Stenographer: Pfc Kenneth L. Kinser

(Forward by the historical officer: The details as to Capt. Kelly's personal bravery were given by the other men interviewed and were not volunteered by Capt. Kelly.)

At about 1000 o'clock, 5 March 1945, B Co. 36th Tank Bn., Capt. Kelly commanding, was ordered to proceed from its position, just west of Lintfort, through Lintfort east and thence northeast to attack Rheinberg.

A Co. of the 36th was at the head of the column and B Co. followed. The column entered town in column, meeting some small arms fire and passing through some artillery fire. The column proceeded through Lintfort to its southeastern edge. B Co. halted at the edge of town while A Co. moved out of town and swung north disappearing from our sight.

Major Moore, the Bn S-3, met us at this point and guided the company in a northerly direction out of town for about 300 yards. In passing through town we had followed the infantry and their half-tracks where we met Major Moore. As soon as we emerged from the eastern side of town, we began to receive small arms fire from the northeast. When Major Moore left us about 300 yards out of town, we proceeded in an easterly direction and slightly north in line until we reach the vicinity of 210230. At that point, the entire column was order to do a left flank into line and the line moved north. We flushed a number of dismounted enemy infantry from the woods at 203247. After we had passed the wooded area the column pivoted on its easterly and turned northeast, thence moved slightly north of east until we reached a stream running north and south over which there was a bridge at (213238). While we were moving, we fired occasional bursts of machine gun fire at bushes, fox holes, etc, flushing a few scattered enemy infantry men who moved out to the north. At the bridge Capt. Kelly and Cpl. Maher spotted a civilian in the act of placing 2 teller mines just at the approach to the bridge. On the other side of the bridge elements of the 88th Cav. Sq. were visible. One of their men took this German civilian away after he had been forced to remove the mines, which he had been placing.

At the bridge the company passed over in column and turned north onto the main north – south road leading north to Rheinberg. Just before the column reached Winterswick, Capt. Kelly received a radio message from Major Van Houten to proceed immediately to Rheinberg to help out A Co. there. Being thus led to believe that A Co. already was in Rheinberg. Capt. Kelly proceeded to pass through Winterswick to hurry to their assistance. While passing through Winterswick, machine gun fire was received from houses on both sides, (east and west) of the road. About halfway through town, slightly off the road and in a canted position there was a Mark IV tank which appeared to be knocked out.

Capt. Kelly, in the lead tank, passed the Mark IV, searching the area ahead for the enemy. The tank behind him, Lt. Buller's tank, fired one HE at the Mark IV, just in case, breaking its track, and continued after Capt. Kelly.

About 50 yards north of the Mark IV Capt. Kelly saw the tell-tale bulb of a panzer faust protruding from the corner of a building on the right. He immediately stopped his tank and lifted his submachine gun, realizing that he could not bring his tank guns around quickly enough or perhaps could not depress them enough to hit the bazooka man at the base of the building. At the same time, since the radio was out, he began to signal with one hand to Lt. Buller in the tank behind, trying to signal him off the road in a supporting firing position.

As soon as the lead tank stopped, the German bazooka man peered around the corner to see why the tank had stopped. Capt. Kelly shot him with his tommy gun.

Lt Buller had heard Major Van Houten's radio message on his 508 and also had supposed that A Co. already was in Rheinberg. Accordingly, he mistook Capt. Kelly's signal for an order to move ahead while Captain Kelly took another position in the column, and proceeded to pass Capt. Kelly's tank. Lt. Buller's tank passed the railroad track which crosses the road at Winterswick. As he approached the northern edge of the village the tank was hit by a German bazooka fired from the ditch to his right. The road at this point and for some distance is built up to height of 3 or 4 feet above the flat surrounding meadows. Lt. Buller was not certain of what was wrong, but his gunner, Cpl. Francis O. X. Smyth, told him that he could not traverse the turret. Lt. Buller backed his tank off to the right, thereby affording himself at least some protection from the northwest. He also ordered S/Sgt Vernon McLean to proceed up the road.

The next tank commanded by Sgt. Bennie L. Hart, moved up the road a short distance behind and was struck by anti-tank fire from 2 anti-tank guns which were emplaced at 217267 to the northeast. #3 tank next moved by and was struck by a bazooka very close to #2 tank. Sgt. McLean's tank with Cpl Grote, gunner, was the next tank to move by and immediately was met by a storm of fire from the west, the east and north. The tank backed a little off the road to utilize what protection could be had from a wall there and then opened fire on the 2 guns (88's) to the west at 206265. The 2 guns were silenced and then the tank was moved back and around and fired on the 2 anti-guns which had been spotted to the east. The guns on the east were silenced.

(The absence of infantry was felt again later that day when anti-tank guns, whose crews had been silenced by the advance of the tanks, were manned by new German crews and resumed the fight.) Capt. Kelly's tank radio had been adjusted by this time and he was calling battalion for infantry, as the area was swarming with German bazooka men and infantry. Capt. Kelly dismounted from his tank despite the volume of small arms fire from all directions, and directed the tanks from the ground. He sent Sgt. McLean's tank back to try to get infantry support to them as quickly as possible.

Captain Kelly stopped at Sgt. Arkozitz's tank and told him to call the company on his radio and order them to move into fire positions and to support the lead tanks. He also signaled with hand signals, on the ground to all tanks to take up the firefight.

The tanks deployed into the field. Capt. Kelly signaled the tanks to move off to the east and all the tanks moved out into the field to the east. An anti-tank gun to the east at about 226266 opened up at this point and hit #12 tank, Sgt. Donald G. Severine's. All this time artillery fire, including much time fire, was bursting amidst and over the tanks. The tanks moved into a line from west to east facing the enemy to the north. It was now about 1430. Lt. Herbert L. Erickson, although wounded in the head and with blood streaming down his face, led the first tank section, #6. #7, & #8 north toward the enemy, with the other tanks covering his advance. #8 was struck and stopped before reaching town. #6 and #7, commanded by Lt. Erickson and Sgt. Fred Kuta, entered the southern edge of town and disappeared from view. Lt. Erickson's tank took up position at the road junction there and fired along the road leading south of east out of town, clearing the area for the following tanks. Meanwhile, Sgt. Kuta's tank went through town and was found the next day beyond the northern outskirts of town. Capt. Kelly led the remainder of the tanks north to the town. The tanks, meeting various obstacles on the terrain, became strung out. Capt. Kelly penetrated into the center of town, with his tank, to the square before the Rheinberg Cathedral. Captain Kelly's tank circled the church which was the center of town and stopped to await the other tanks which were slow in following. While he halted, a German bazooka man darted from a hallway and leveled his panzer faust at the tank. Capt. Kelly cut him down with his tommy gun before he could fire at the tank. He also pitched grenades in the vicinity of German infantryman to keep them at a respectful distance from the tank. Then he found that there was an 88 MM gun firing down the main street and the shells were passing close to the tank. He turned and moved to the edge of town to pick up the rest of his company. Throughout this move from Winterswick to Rheinberg, the men who had had their tanks shot out from under them, dismounted and fought on foot, in many cases they remained in stopped tanks and continued firing. sometimes firing from the decks of the tanks with the 50 cal. Machine guns, their small arms and the tank 30 Cal. Machine guns. Lt. Buller remained with his knocked out tank and the other stopped tanks, controlling the supporting fire and coordinating it. For example – One tank which was immobile, but whose gun was functioning, was pulled into position by another tank which was mobile but whose gun was inoperative. Between the two they made one mobile gun firing out of 2 wrecked tanks.

The constant fire from the tanks which were just above Winterswick made it possible for the other tanks to penetrate. In addition, Lt. Erickson's fire enfiladed the enemy positions along the road leading east out of Rheinberg and forced them to withdraw.

There were 2 guns in 2 small houses at 221269. Capt. Kelly ordered fire brought on these 2 houses. Later the 2 houses were found to have contained 88 MM guns which had been smashed by this fire.

The street was too narrow for his tank to turn in, so Capt. Kelly's tank backed down the street to the intersection at 216275, where he turned and moved back to the northern edge of Winterswick to rally and reorganize his company. On the way back to Winterswick, Capt. Kelly's tank passed a position where 2 infantrymen were firing on Sgt. Arkozitz's dismounted crew and he silenced them with a grenade when passing. At Winterswick the company was reorganized preparatory for further action.

Capt. Kelly's tank was hit twice on his return route but continued. At about 1630 Capt. Kelly had returned and begun the reorganization of the company. At this time there were a total of 7 tanks which were mobile and in good condition. Three tanks were in the town as described above. The balance of the tanks, although battered by fire, were still using their guns.

At 1700 the infantry had not yet put in an appearance but the defense of Rheinberg was pretty well broken. Other elements of CCB were driving into the disorganized defense from the southwest.

The 49th Armored Infantry arrived at approximately 1730, and shortly before dark, the B Co. tanks leading, reinforced by B Co, of the 49th Armored Infantry, moved out and entered Rheinberg from the south in force. Capt. Kelly led the way on foot, until the infantry company commander came up and mounted on the back of one of the tanks and led his company into town.

Major Van Houten ordered Capt Kelly, who had been injured during the day by a near shell burst, to the rear. Lt. Buller took over the command of the tanks and supported the advance by fire.

The southern edge of town was firmly held at about 2100, when the leading elements of the 3rd battalion of the 137th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Butler, appeared from the south and helped to complete the cleaning up of the town. At about 0300 in the morning the town was reported completely secured, and outposted to the north.

REMARKS: BY CAPT. KELLY.

It is advisable to have a tommy gun handy on the rim of the turret and a supply of hand grenades handy on top of the turret before moving into an area in which any resistance may be encountered.

In open areas, such as those in the area discussed herein, frequently a tank will find itself in an open, exposed, flat field when attacked. The best reply is an assault, moving with gyro-stabilizer in operation and firing as rapidly as possible. The enemy must be given something to worry about.

REMARKS: BY LT. BULLER.

It was found that HE used in an attempt to silence fire from buildings was ineffectual. APC ammunition, however, penetrates and blasts inside a building and gets resistance that cannot be reached otherwise. It penetrates into the basement if properly aimed. The basement is the usual strong point of a house, which is used as a point of resistance.

REMARK: BY CPL. GOROTE, GUNNER.

It was found that hyper-velocity 76 ammunition was by far the best for anti-tank fire. It probably would be the best also for fore against concrete pillboxes or emplacements. No other ammunition that we have at present is as satisfactory for this purpose.