INTERVIEW

Unit: Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division
Action: Roer-Rhine

Source: Personnel of Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion
Capt. Humphreys Commanding
2nd Lt. Robert O. Richardson, Company Officer
Staff Sergeant Wolcott K. Hansen
T/5 Edwin J. Patterson
PFC William O'Shea

Interviewer: 1st Lt Howard L Oleck
Place and Date of Interview: Venlo, Holland; 16 March 1945

SUBJECT: Rheinberg Action - Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division.
TO: 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck; Historical Officer, Historical Section
FROM: Accounts given by personnel of Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division.
Reference - Overlay - Sheet 17-1:50,000 (Wesel, Germany)

Following are statements from some personnel of Service Company, 36th Tank Bn, 8th Armored Division accounting for the events leading up to and during the Rheinberg action concerning this organization which took place on 5 and 6 March, 1945 in the drive to the Rhine River, Germany.

Statement of Capt. Humphreys, commanding Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion.

On March 4th, 1945 about 2300, CCB of the 8th Armored Division was alerted to move from Aldekerk to continue the advance to Lintfort and Rheinberg and secure the bridge at Wesel.

The trains were alerted at 2300 on March 4th but did not move until about 1730 on March 5th. The orders then were to move to Lintfort, which had been taken during the day, and to resupply the Battalion which was between Lintfort and Rheinberg.

About 1500 on March 5th a radio message was received but due to an error in encoding, it was not decoded until the entire trains were ready to move. This message from Battalion was an order to send forward six (6) truckloads of ammunition.

The train arrived in Lintfort at approximately 1900 and were parked on various side streets. The town had not been cleared of snipers and the men remained with their vehicles to guard them. About a half hour after arriving there, the door of one of the houses opened and a guard sounded off "Come out". The door slammed shut. It was opened a few minutes later and the guard again shouted "Come out". The door again slammed shut.

Since the fourteen (14) gasoline trucks and 13 ammunition trucks would have been very vulnerable to an incendiary grenade, the guards strafed the houses on both sides of the street with sub-machine gun and 50 caliber fire to keep any enemy inside. Nothing else was heard from those houses during the night.

I went to Battalion Headquarters and there received orders from Captain Pasco, Assistant S-3, to send two groups of trucks forward to the companies. Each group consisted of three (3) gasoline trucks and four (4) ammunition trucks.

Group A under Lt. Carter and Lt. Richardson were to follow the road along the canal which leads into Rheinberg from the West. "D" Company and "A" Company were supposed to be in that locality, but there was no positive information as to a CP or what part of the companies remained in that area. They passed several burning tanks and finally came to a tank across the road which prevented them from going further. This was about a mile outside of Rheinberg.

Lieutenants Carter and Richardson reconnoitered ahead to the peep for three or four hundred yards when the peep hit a mine. Both were thrown from the peep and Lt. Carter was seriously injured. Mortar fire began to land nearby after the explosion and the column turned around and returned to Lintfort. It was a very dark night and the vehicles were driven in complete blackout all the way.

Group B, under Mr. Garczynski followed aroute which would take them cross-country to the main road leading into Rheinberg from the South. A guide took them to the point where the tanks had started cross-country during the day and they were to follow the route of the tanks until they reached "B" Company and "C" Company.

This group encountered mud and the trucks became bogged down. The noise of getting the trucks through the mud brought down mortar fire which landed a hundred yards or so away and it took several hours to get the trucks through this bad stretch of road.

About 0200 March 6, I was notified by Major Zizzamia, CCB Trains commander, that none of the trucks had reached their destination and three more gas and four more ammunition trucks started out under S/Sgt. Hansen and myself to follow Mr. Garczynski route.

We encountered a little sniper fire from fire from the upper story of one of the buildings in going through town, but no one was hit. By that time it had started to rain a little and we drove complete black-out.

We reached Mr. Garczynski about 0400 and both columns traveled together until we reached "C" Company at the main highway just before day-break.

Trucks with ammunition and gas were sent to "A" Company and "B" Company and the Tank Destroyers were in that area were also resupplied. The trucks all returned safely to Lintfort arriving there about 0930.

The main lesson learned in this night was that guides or the definite location of a CP must be available if supplies are to reach the forward elements on time.

Statement of 2nd Lt. Robert O. Richardson, Company Officer, Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division.

On 5 March, 1945 at about 1700 I received orders from the Company Commander, Capt. Hubert S. Humphreys to take six (6) 2-1/2 ton trucks with gasoline and three (3) with ammunition forward to Lintfort to service the tanks of the 36th Tank Bn. I was to meet Mr Garczynski (ammo officer) there who would act as guide to take the fuel and ammo to the line companies. In the meantime Service Company received orders to move out by convoy to Lintfort. Do to traffic on the route if was impossible to take my trucks ahead and we moved out with convoy. On the way it was necessary to approach Lintfort over a cross-country route because of a bridge out at Kamp. When the trains arrived at Lintfort about 1900 we were cautioned that the town was not clear of snipers and to be careful.

We entered Lintfort and parked our vehicles (as indicated on the overlay.) Because of the warning given before entering Lintfort and because of suspicious actions on the part of two persons in apartments along the street where we parked gunners in some of the vehicles opened fire and raked the apartment fronts with machine gun fire. One person was killed – one wounded. There was no further firing. Having no contact with Mr. Garcznski and not knowing the whereabouts of the companies except that they were somewhere near or in Rheinberg we could not reach them immediately with supplies. At about 2130 Mr. Garczynski, Mr. Weiss, (Bn. Maintenance) and Lt. McDonald (Hq Co Mortar Officer) were available to guide two separate trains, by different routes to the companies. Lt. Carter (Transportation Officer, Service CO) and myself were to take seven trucks, guided by Lt. McDonald, over the main road leading East to Rheinberg. This will be referred to as Train "A". Train "B" was to be guided by Mr. Kaczynski and Mr. Weiss over the back route to Rheinberg. About 2200 Train A with Lt. McDonald, Lt. Carter and myself left as directed. Lt. McDonald left us at cross roads (grid cord 17.1 –24.55) and continued on road bearing straight through the crossroads. He directed us to turn right and travel about 1-1/2 miles to 2 miles on road to Rheinberg. There were many fires of burning tanks and buildings all along the road (as indicated on overlay). We proceeded about 2-1/2 miles on the road to Rheinberg and came to a halt abruptly as we found two tanks completely blocking the road. We could get the peep by but not the trucks. Lt. Carter and I decided to go ahead and try to contact somebody in the companies. We moved down the road slowly and cautiously. After traveling about a half mile we were fired on by a sniper. Neither of us we hit. We continued on for about 50 yards and the peep ran over a mine which seriously injured Lt. Carter (at the time I thought it killed him) and blew me about 10 yards away from the vehicle. I went back to the vehicle, it was destroyed, and attempted to arouse Lt. Carter with no success. About five minutes after the mine exploded mortar shells began falling in the vicinity of the peep. I hurried back to the column and summoned Corporal Lanier and Corporal Wojick to go back with me to try and get Lt. Carter. When we approached within 200 yards of the point where the peep was, we could go no further, the mortar shells falling heavily and small arms fire regularly. The three of us returned to the column and returned to Lintfort over the same route we came out. We never contacted anyone from the Battalion on the trip. It was about 0200, 5 March 1945 when we arrived back at Lintfort and discovered the other Train (Train "B") had become bogged down on its route. Capt. Humphreys organized another Train (Train "C") to follow the same route as Train "B". They found Train "B" just getting out of the mud and the two convoys joined and went forward to service the companies. Just after daybreak they found "C" Company. Two trucks were dispatched with Capt. Baird and Capt. Shaw to go to "A" Company. The rest went forward to "B" Company and Headquarters Company. None of the companies except "C" Company had very many tanks left. The trains "B" and "C" arrived back at Lintfort about 1030, 6 March 1945.

Statement of Wolcott K. Hansen, Staff Sergeant, ASN 32236918, Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division.

The company had been billeted in Aldekerk, Germany, a town that was taken by our Battalion on 3 March 1945. From this point we serviced the Battalion, which was in that town.

On the 4th March 1945 we were told that were in Corps reserve. Spent this day partly on refueling our train and maintenance of weapons and vehicles.

On 5 March 1945 the Battalion was committed again to take Lintfort and move on to Rheinberg and on Northward to meet the British in vicinity of Anton – on the West bank of the Rhine – opposite Wesel, its mission to clear the West bank of the Rhine of all hostile forces.

Approximately 1600 5 March 1945 a six (6)-truck ammo train was formed and dispatched forward to resupply the Battalion.

The train was halted by traffic and a detour. In the meantime the balance of the company along with CP trains was ordered to move forward to Lintfort. At approximately 1700 the column left Aldekerk.

On this march the column moved slowly due to severe traffic and a very bad detour cross-country. The march through this detour was a very rough one. The drivers straddled deep ruts in order not to get mired in the mud. While on this march the maintenance truck and one fuel truck and lube truck was halted due to a dike breaking, washing the roadway out. The maintenance truck was pulled through the wash but the fuel and lube truck had to stay behind.

We arrived in Lintfort about 0200 this town was newly taken by the Battalion about 1400. The column was halted on the North side of town six trucks being halted between large apartment houses.

As the trucks halted, local security was immediately put out. At this time a door was opened, a man looking out. The sentry ordered the man to come out of the house. The man slammed the door. The incident was reported to me. We immediately deployed eight men along the hedgerow and one man each on a 50 Cal. machine gun and 30 caliber Machine gun mounted on the trucks. The man opened the door again and the order to fire was given. The boys pouring lead into the door, after which a hand grenade was thrown into the house. Then a search was made of the house, one man hiding behind a door was fired on.

About 2120 the same incident was experienced on the opposite side of the road. The same action was taken.

To prevent any sniping I ordered both sides of the road sprayed with 50 caliber every 15 or 20 minutes to hold down sniping while the column was halted between the buildings.

About 2215 we were ordered to form and dispatch two seven truck trains, to go forward to supply the Battalion which was engaged in a fierce battle at Rheinberg.

The two trains were dispatched on two different routes in order to better the chance of getting supplies forward. Lt. Carter and Lt. Richardson taking the column over the North route toward Rheinberg.

The other train under W/O Garczynski took a westerly route over an unimproved road then turned North a short distance and then Easterly across country for approximately 1/2 mile, then a North, North Easterly route cross country toward Rheinberg.

The No. 1 train on the Northerly route encountered blocked roads by knocked out trains. At this point, Corporal Lanier set up a local security with the drivers and assistant-drivers. Lts. Carter and Richardson went forward in the peep to reconnoiter. A few hundred yards down the road mortar fire started to fall, hitting the peep, injuring Lt. Carter severely, he was believed killed. Lt. Richardson returned and with Corporal Lanier and Corporal Wojcik tried to go forward to retrieve Lt. Carter, while the drivers turned the convoy around. Mortar fire and machine gun fire becoming very heavy. The trucks and men could not go forward so they withdrew to Lintfort. The balance of the Company column on the road at Lintfort was holding a strong local security.

When the No. 1 train came back with its story and no word from No. 2 train, all were sweating out the mission and safety of No. 2 train. It was later learned that No. 2 had gotten bogged down and was under heavy mortar fire.

So about 0200, 6 March 1945 another supply train was formed with Capt. Humphreys and myself taking it forward over the same route as No. 2.

Before moving out all drivers were told that no lights at all were to be used. They were also instructed as to the mortar fire and bad terrain and that they were to be very cautious in driving to hold the engine noise down to a minimum.

Train No. 3 moved out about 0215 working its way on the same route as No. 2 holding a little more easterly direction. About 0430 No. 3 met five trucks of No. 2 at a point where we were met by Capts Baird and Shaw. Capts Baird and Shaw took half of the trucks to the Northwest road to service A Company and part of D Company, I going on the Northeast road to "C" Company, "B" Company, and Headquarters Company.

By the time the trucks reached their companies it was daybreak. We found the remaining parts of these Companies in an assembly position where we refueled, reammoed. Then all trucks after fulfilling their missions assembled along main road south of Rheinberg in a defilade position. When all trucks returned to the assembly area we took out for Lintfort arriving about 1030 6 March 1945. Arriving at Lintfort, the vehicles were echeloned, men given time to eat chow, and off to the fuel and ammo dump for reloading.

7th and 8th March we were busy supplying Battalion and on Maintenance of vehicles.

Statement of T/5 Edwin J. Patterson, Service Co 36th Tank Battalion 8th Armored Division

We left Aldekerk about 5 PM and traveled with the trains to Lintfort. At Lintfort several trucks were separated from the rest of the trains. We turned our vehicles around and waited. All we could see was strings of Germans, prisoners, coming in from the front.

Mr. Garczynski came to us and asked us about ammunition trucks for the front but after that I don't know were he went. Here we formed our ammo trains for the front. Lt. Richardson and Lt. Carter were with the group I was in. It was dark by then and must have been near 9 PM. We moved out in perfect blackout not even using "cat lights". After traveling a short distance we came to several of our tanks still burning along the road. Everything seemed to be burning all around us and trees and wire was hanging or laying all over the road. We close hear the firing and saw flashes and knew it was close. No long after that we came to a tank blocking the road. Lt Carter and Lt. Richardson went ahead with the peep leaving Corporal Lanier and a few others to fill in a hole so trucks could get by the tank. They had gone just a short distance when we saw a flash. The peep had hit a mine. Lt. Richardson came back for help but they couldn't get to Lt. Carter who was seriously injured. We began to turn out trucks around. This was nearly impossible as we had trailers and road was narrow. All trailers had to be unfastened and rehooked. We left 1 or 2 behind us there in the road. I believe the 88's and mortar fire was awful close as we could hear it go over our heads. It seemed as if the whole place was burning and the firing was all around us. After leaving there we returned to our area without delivering the ammo. It wasn't possible to get through the way we had tried as the German were covering the road. We got coffee and stayed at our area until 3:30 AM I believe. I had no watch and judged it was about 3:30. Firing was still going on and it seemed as heavy as ever. Capt. Humphreys led this group of trucks in T/5 Walker's peep. Just as we were leaving our area a sniper opened up on us. I don't know what happened to him cause we didn't wait to see. This time we didn't go the same place but went across a field where we met Mr. Garczynski's column. On this road 1 or 2 of our trucks got stuck and Capt. Humphrey's peep bogged down. We had to leave it as we didn't have time to pull it out. He and my assistant driver and I rode in the first truck and we led the convoy till we reached Mr Garczynski. It was getting daylight then and we pulled into an assembly area and left from there to supply the companies about 10 AM. We pulled out and joined Service Company at the area in Lintfort.

Statement of PFC William O'Shea, Service Company, 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division.

On March 3rd, Service Company of the 36th Tank Battalion, 8th Armored Division was alerted at its billet in Aldekerk, with orders to be ready to move on receipt of notice. When notice arrived, we moved out in column, behind CCB trains. I was riding in the 3/4 ton truck assigned to Battalion Supply Office, in company with PFC Fred Hortop. The trip was uneventful and just like so many other trips we had made, as we moved up in back of the line companies, from one town to another. We arrived in Lintfort, Germany at about 2200. Lintfort had been taken the same day and suspects were still being rounded up. The men were aware of this and were a little tense. Our convoy was parked on the road for over an hour waiting for instructions.

At 2100 Capt. Humphreys, Service Company CO informed T/Sgt Pellicano that he would require three men from BSO to ride as Assistant Drivers on gas and ammunition trucks which were required to regas and reammo the line companies, then inaction in Rheinberg. I was assigned to ride with T/5 Boris on a gas truck. WOJG Garczynski rode with us and WOJG Weiss led our convoy of eight trucks. No lights were permitted on the vehicles, and of course no smoking when dismounted. Our rate of speed was very low and visibility was nil. We proceeded for over an hour and a half and eventually reached the Forward Aid Station in Lintfort. At this point MR. Weiss left us and Mr. Garczynski, without any knowledge of the terrain, assumed command. We proceeded to cross an open field on a dirt road, with a cook from Headquarters Company as our guide. Somehow or other we missed a turn on this road and the trucks eventually bogged down in the soft dirt and mud in the fields approximately 75 yards off the road. It looked like a hopeless situation with all the trucks bogged down, and without a wreaker to pull us out, it seems as though we would be there forever. However, Mr. Garczynski, having more knowledge of the seriousness of the situation, and realizing the importance of delivering our supplies to the companies, proceeded to organize the men with the idea of getting the trucks back on the road as soon as possible. Exhorting the men and spurring them on, and directing their efforts, one by one the trucks were winched and pushed back to the road. Finally after hours of effort, the convoy was ready to resume at 0500 the next morning. At this time another convoy of trucks under command of Capt Humphreys, joined our convoy and the two convoys proceeded into Rheinberg in time to resupply the Companies.