INTERVIEW
Unit: Combat Command B, 8th Armored Division
Action: Roer-Rhine
Source: 1st Sgt Harry M Clements, Company D, 36th Tk Bn; Sgt Robert W Morris, #5 Tk, 1st Platoon; Sgt Willard M Horine, #5 Tk, 3d Platoon.
Interviewer; 1st Lt Howard L Oleck
Place and Date of Interview: Venlo, Holland, 1500, 15 March 1945
1ST SGT HARRY M. CLEMENTS
SGT ROBERT W. MORRIS, #5 tank, 1st Platoon
SGT WILLARD M. HORINE, #5 tank, 3rd Platoon.
D COMPANY, 36TH TANK BATTALION
TO: 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, (Historical Officer)
AT: Venlo, Holland, 1500 hours, 15 March 1945
Foreword: Every officer of D Co, was killed or severely wounded in the action at Rheinberg on 5 March 1945. The non-commissioned officers interviewed herein all played prominent parts in that action and were well aware of the progress of the company on that day.
D Co. of the 36th Tk Bn was in reserve in Aldekerk on the morning of 5 March 1945. They were up all night awaiting orders to move into Lintfort. Orders came at 1130. The column ahead had been very slow.
On that morning the following officers were with the company:
WIA Captain Arthur C. Erdman, CO
KIA 1st Lt. Kenneth R. Robinson, 1st Platoon
WIA 2nd Lt. Thomas H. Ryan, 2nd Platoon
KIA 1st Lt. Frank Rich, 3rd Platoon
The company moved northeast to Lintfort, suffering one casualty from sniper fire, (of which they had been warned) enroute, (T/4 Samson C. Willoughby).
They passed through Lintfort from West to East with only an occasional sniper along the way and came out on the northeast edge of the town, still in column. CCB trains came with them, in fact all the way to just northeast of Lintfort.
Battalion trains also came with them, in fact moving ahead of the tank column until they were clear of the northeast edge of Lintfort. Here trains were passed and the tank column turned northeast toward Rossenray.
The column moved across an open field toward a patch of woods just north of Rossenray. Heavy small arms fire began to come from these woods. Trains halted in place (see overlay) and the tanks passed on to north of Rossenray where they moved around the southeastern corner of the woods, firing into the woods as they passed. Enemy machine guns and burp guns in the woods were silenced and the crews and infantry flushed out of the woods and driven north.
One platoon of the 809th TD Bn. was found there in line south to north, firing west into the eastern edge of the woods. Major Gurney's tank come up to about this time and he, seeing the situation, ordered D Co. to retrace its way and move from Lintfort directly north.
The company was in the order of: 3rd Platoon leading followed by 1st and 2nd platoons. In turning the platoons got slightly mixed and tanks were out of their proper numerical order in the column. This was to have disastrous effects later.
The column went back through Lintfort and turned north on the road leading to the Fossa Canal road. They passed some of then 49th Armored Infantry mopping up the northern edge of town. The column reached the canal road and turned northeast.
When the column had cleared the road crossing, and enemy infantry company dug in just north of the intersection, opened fire with small arms and machine guns, firing into the rear of the column. Before any D Co. tanks were forced to act, 2 tanks of the 784th Tank Battalion, which were working with the 49th Infantry, came up from the south and drove north into the German infantry positions, driving the enemy off to the north. Never the less, 2 tanks of D Co. were left behind to cover the intersection as a rear guard.
Along the canal road artillery fire from the northwest began to fall on the column, including many air bursts and time fire. Lt. Ryan was leading the column, and Major Gurney's tank was in the column.
At 1600 the column reached the bend to the north along the canal road just southwest of Rheinberg. Here Lt. Ryan's tank ran into a cable stretched across the road, injuring him and stopping his tank. He called on the radio to his second section leader, S/Sgt Hollis M. Towry to take the lead. Sgt. Towry's tank had gotten out of proper order in the town around mentioned above and was too far back to pass the column so Sgt Harry W. McRae, first section leader led the column (he was not the best qualified man to lead the entire company, with all due respects to his qualities.) The column became jammed at this point as no signals were passed back from the leading vehicle. One tank stalled, half blocking the road, but the column passed by and on to the next intersection and then north when fire from the east began to come in.
In an open field to the east two 88's entirely uncamouflaged, and one (later found to be well camouflaged) began firing. The column had turned north and several tanks returned fire. Sgt. McRae and Lt. Robinson (2 tanks) had turned. The rest of the column was still along the canal road.
The guns were silenced but more fire was coming from the east, and without any express order, the balance of the tanks backed down the canal road to a point just east of the woods which were along the north side of the road. At that point there was a semi-circular excavated area which afforded cover and concealment. The tanks entered that area and used it as a rallying point. Sgt. McRae and Lt. Robinson knocked out another anti-tank gun and one SP gun in a field to the northeast, before returning.
Having rallied, the whole company returned southwest to the factory at the intersection north of Lintfort, bringing their wounded along on their tanks. A storm of fire was falling over the rally area and all along the road, coming from anti-tank guns in an arc from the south, swinging west and up to the north. The tank moved back, firing at every possible gun location but the enemy fire did not slacken.
While thus withdrawing, several more tanks were hit and left in positions shown on the overlay. Lt. Robinson's tank was hit and burning. Sgt. McRae's gun had jammed and he remained in the woods trying to repair it. Lt. Ryan's tank had been stopped by the cable across the road. Lt. Robinson's tank was hit by a bazooka. Sgt James A Geiger's tank was hit. Sgt Alonza Larkin's tank was hit by an 88 as was that of Sgt Edward A. Wargo. Sgt Vernon G. Carr's tank struck a mine. The road was lined with blazing tanks, artillery was bursting all along the route, and the remaining tanks backing away were firing desperately at very few visible targets. The remaining tanks reached the factory to find no medics to give them assistance, except one Negro medic from the colored tank company who could evacuate only one man on his peep. Six casualties were loaded on the back of one tank and evacuated.
Captain Erdmann led the 7 remaining tanks up the road again toward the rallying area. Enroute, S/Sgt Lewis J. Sullivan had his hand smashed, and dropped out to return with his tank to the factory.
Now there were 6 tanks ready for action at the rallying area (the excavated area mentioned above). Lt. Rich led the tanks out in line across a field to the northeast of the rally area, in assault toward the western edge of Rheinberg. An anti-tank gun, well camouflaged along side a house to the north, was knocked out. Three tanks continued northeast in line (those of Sgt Towry, Sgt Marcell O. Saborn and Sgt Horine), see overlay.
Two of the tanks, those of Lt. Rich and Capt. Erdmann, turned south to the road and moved east along the road to the railroad station. Every tank was firing rapidly with all guns.
Capt. Erdmann's and Lt. Rich's tanks were hit and knocked out at the railroad station where the canal road crosses the railroad.
The other 3 tanks to the north were under heavy fire and Sgt Towry's tank was hit and began burning.
Sgt Horine and Sgt Sayborn finding themselves thus alone, put their tanks into reverse, still firing, and got behind houses. Sgt Sayborn's machine guns were jammed and he was working on them. Sgt. Horine's tank, alone, could continue to fire. This was about 1700 hours.
Sgts Horine and Sayborn withdrew to the canal road. There they met Major Gurney, Col. Kimball and Lt. Robinson with the anti-tank platoon of C Co. of the 49th AIB. Lt. Robinson mounted the back of Sgt Horine's tank and fired the 50 caliber machine gun over the turret. The infantry platoon deployed along both sides of the road and they began to move up toward Rheinberg again in the ditches. At this time all the heavy guns (anti-tank) had been silenced and only sporadic small arms fire was being received from the town. The fire from the right flank (southeast) began to increase. The tanks fired smoke mortars from their turrets, smoking the south side of the road. There was enemy infantry on the north and machine guns firing on the south. An AT gun opened up again from the east.
Lt. Robinson, on Col. Kimball's order, called the infantry for help. Sgt Horine's tank was hit. Sgt. Sayborn, in the only remaining tank, backed up, turned, picked up some dismounted tankers and returned to the north edge of Lintfort. As he was leaving some of our armored infantry came up, joining the few who already were moving toward Rheinberg, and they all moved into Rheinberg against only light small arms fire.
REMARKS
Regarding infantry assistance:
First Sgt Clements saw the scouts of the 35th Infantry Division coming up from the south at the northern edge of Lintfort at 1545 that day. They were moving very slowly.
Sgt Morris saw this same infantry waiting slightly northwest of Lintfort at dusk and saw the infantry turn back with their tank destroyers, when 400 yards out of Lintfort. One infantryman told him that the 35th Infantry (this was the 137th Infantry Regiment of the 35th Infantry Division) was going to move south and attack Rheinberg from another direction. They were going east to move up and attack Rheinberg from the south.
We had smoke for the 75's but no smoke ammunition for the 76's. It is a good idea to have plenty of smoke aboard.
That night after recovering what tanks they could, the company had six tanks left in all, three of which were fit for action. Only one tank had returned from the fight under its own power.
No artillery was called for during the day to the knowledge of these men, who would have heard it on their radios, except once when Captain Tucker of A Co. did call for artillery. But no supporting artillery fire ever appeared.
The tanks moved with no prior reconnaissance, and had no idea of what was ahead.
Throughout the action the tanks received no orders nor directions whatsoever. Just once some unidentified voice on their radios had called, "Keep going. Keep going."
The men all believed that if they had waited for infantry to help take out some of the anti-tank guns, it would have been comparatively easy to take Rheinberg.
Remark by Historical Officer:
The men all recognized clearly that many of the principles taught to them had been violated in this action. They were willing to talk freely, were all of a high level of intelligence and had a clear understanding of what had transpired.
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