49th Armored Infantry Battalion
'C' Company - Daily Historical Notes
March 1945

After Action Unit Report to Battalion Hq.
Verbatim Copy Made by : 1st Lt. Howard L. Oleck, Historical Officer
AT: : VENLO, HOLLAND 1400 hours, 16 March 1945

3 March 1945, C Co. as part of advance guard. Third Plat as point left on road march 1030 for Alderkerk, Germany. Maj. (Charles P., Jr.) Brown advance guard commander. Spent night on road. 1300 4 Mar. continued march and arrived at Alderkerk late afternoon. Billeted in houses. C Company charged with disposition of meat in packing house.

Left Alderkerk 0500. 5 March 1945. Third platoon departed 0430 to protect Engineers constructing bridge in vicinity of Lintfort and Rheinberg. Co. C dismounted in vicinity of Eyllsche B. crossed blown bridge in approach formation to clear route for Bn. through Lintfort. Light enemy resistance met in northern edge of city. Took 16 P.W.'s and killed and wounded 1. Fired on by B Co. half-track. Order of march: 2nd.. 1st.. 3rd Platoons. Strafed by one enemy plane.

Half-tracks picked up Co. and left Lintfort at 1300. Order of march: 1st.. 2nd.. 3rd Platoons. Co. separated from rest of Bn. by heavy traffic. Met by Lt Shufford with orders from Col. (Edward A.) Kimball to rush an Infantry Co. to aid of Tank Companies. A fire fight between vehicles and enemy in woods en route. Lt. (Lawrence E.) Lybrand and Capt. (Elmer W.) Clark on recon in peep located route Co. was to take and brought Co. around edge of woods to the vicinity of Col. Kimball. Vehicles separated because of marshy ground and part of 1st Platoon was sent ahead by Col. (Morgan G.) Roseborough mounted. Separated from Plat. Leader with orders to go ahead mounted until fired upon by enemy. Remainder of Co. brought up by Co. Commander and dismounted and brought up on foot, passing through part of 1st Plat. Still mounted at a road junction faced by farm buildings. On approaching farm buildings, enemy discovered in vicinity and about 40 captives taken. Contacted by Maj. Vanhorten and told to attack on the right of his tanks to Rhineberg across open fields. The tanks were to secure left flank and give supporting fire. Co. in approach formation: 1t Plat. on left, 2nd Plat on right, 3rd Plat in support, A.T. in vicinity of vehicles. Co. moved out and 3rd Plat. without any warning to Co. Comdg. was confused by four separate orders, the last from Col. Kimball, to move at once, mounted, to aid the tanks. Members of 1st Plat that had disposed of prisoners, without warning to Plat. Ldr., on order of Col. Kimball under charge of Capt. (Edward H.) Look, plus the C.P. personnel of Co. C, the machine gun squad of 3rd Plat who had become detached when vehicle got stuck in the mud, were all loaded up and sent on same mission. All this, without any warning to the Co. Comdr. in the attack or platoon leaders involved. At this time the A.T. Platoon was also committed to this mission with a great deal of confusion as to orders. The balance of Co. C proceeded in the attack to be pinned down by heavy small arms fire near a small canal and a large farmhouse. The platoon leader, Lt. (Felix F.) Kupris, being killed outright by machine gun fire. Co. Comdr, being pinned down by machine gun fire with 2nd Platoon. The Co. Comdr. had near him Pfc (Earl W.) Read on a 300 radio set, and upon the fire fight starting, ordered the first platoon to advance as far as possible on the left. T/Sgt (Edward J.) Rutkowski, seeing the situation moved up his light machine gun and mortar squads through a small draw after having crossed under machine gun and small arms fire, and having one casualty in the process.

The accuracy of the lmg and mortar squads, and volume of fire delivered, allowed the 1st plat. to move closer to the enemy positions and threaten their left flank. At this point the Co. Comdr. called for his support platoon (3rd Plat.) to discover that they had been sent on an entirely different mission when they jumped off. Fortunately, the platoon leader had dismounted upon being fired upon in attempting to go through the enemy positions in half-tracks and had moved so as to be on extreme left flank of the enemy positions. It was during this action that the tanks which were to secure our left flank, had pulled out through the enemy positions on the road and moved out completely.

The presence of mind of the Co. Comdr. of Hq. Co., Lt. (Charles E.)Young, two assault guns moved up behind the 1sr Plat. and gave close support to the action. One rifle squad of 2nd Plat. under Sgt. (Sylvio) Biagini, was pushed forward with the advance of the 2nd Plat. sustaining three casualties. It was in this action that Pvt. (Thomas W.) Howard and Pvt (Kenneth M.) Edmunds both went to relief of wounded men. Pvt Howard, with the aid of the assault gun commander, Sgt. (Thomas D.) Cook, loaded a wounded man on the rear deck of the tank, under machine gun fire, and got him off the field. Pvt Edmunds, under fire, crawled to the aid of two other wounded men and effected first aid. At this particular point a white flag was seen on the enemy positions and order was given to cease firing and 137 prisoners were taken in this action and 15 dead were accounted for. That part of the Co. that was present for this action sustained casualties of 1 officer, 3 EM killed, 4 EM wounded. Action ceased about 1800 and Co. reorganized digging in to hold that ground and await further orders. The second plat. being pulled back in support, in a clump of woods.

6 March about 1800, by order of Bn, Comdr, the Co. moved into buildings in vicinity of Rhein only to be alerted to move out about 2030 to vicinity of Rheinberg, with C Co. as advance guard to take Wesel. The men were alerted and stood by all night awaiting orders. At 0500, 7 March, the Co. was ordered to mount up and move to vicinity of Winterswick. The Co. Comdr. was to go forward and receive orders at Rheinberg, Nothing definite was forthcoming until tentative orders were issued to disperse vehicles and get off the road in vicinity of Winterswick, to await further orders there. The company was moved to the vicinity of a large farmhouse and barn and bedded down for the night.

At 0100, 8 Mar 1945, Co. Comdr. received a tentative warning order to move company dismounted from it's present position as a reserve for elements of the 35th Inf. in attacking through Ossenberg. At 0500, orders were received to move out dismounted. At 0530, the order was changed to leave mounted. Personnel were returned and mounted and equipment was redistributed. Co. then moved out. The Co. Comdr. moved forward to receive further orders.

At Rheinberg the order consisted of attacking along a left fork of a road running through Ossenberg with the 35th Inf element on the right and B Co. 49th AIB on the left. C Co. was to take the final objective, a triangle piece of woods north of Ossenberg. The Co. was to bypass the factory zone along which was described as a thick stone wall, changing an original order while the Co. was on march calling for buildings to be taken on the left of this wall. Upon reorientation of the platoon leaders of the company's original attack order, the company moved into this zone to find that the fence consisted of very thin wooden slats exposing our left flank to small arms fire and moving past houses that there was no information concerning the enemy available. The Co. took it's intermediate objectives, a group of houses, at a road intersection north of Ossenberg after having been told that we might find friendly troops there, handicapping our our operation and making us hold our fire until actually fired upon. Nine prisoners were taken at this objective. The Co. was ordered to wait at this point until elements of the 35th Inf were on line on our right and B Co 49th AIB ready to off on the left.

Contact was made with the 35th at this point about 0900 or 1000, and information exchanged by Co. Comdrs, involved as to our plans. Things were held up until 1530 when B Co 49th AIB came up abreast and ready to jump off on our left. B Co. jumped off about this time and cleaned out their objective. Before final objective was taken it was decided to pass C Co. through B Co. to move on the final objective. Contact was lost with the 35th on the right but it was believed that they were moving on the small woods to the southeast of the final objective. All this action was undertaken under heavy artillery fire. C Co. moved up taking 2 casualties from artillery. The third platoon was to deploy on the left, 2nd on the right and 1st to follow as support. The 3rd platoon deployed prior to jumping off the woods, the 2nd was deploying when an automatic weapon opened up on the right flank. The Co. Comdr. being with the 2nd Platoon called for 2 tanks and a squad of Infantry to move in the direction of a hedgerow on the left where enemy were seen to be digging in.

It was the Co. Comdrs understanding the tanks were in position at this point ready to support our attack, but it was disclosed that they were in B Co area several hundred yards to our rear. A runner was sent to rear to bring up a section of tanks and place in position prior to assault on hedgerow. Only one tank came forward at this time and the squad of infantry, supported by this tank, pushed off in the attack. This force disclosed three 20mm guns, and numerous automatic weapons, plus riflemen in positions along south edge of the final objective and along the hedge on our right flank. Heavy small arms fire developed and 7 casualties were sustained on the initial fire and the tank was knocked out by a bazooka.

The squad was withdrawn to the cover of buildings, and the 3rd Plat. having received heavy fire was withdrawn to buildings. Heavy art. fire, plus small arms fire continued from our right flank. It was decided that the open field we would be forced to cross to take final objective would be too costly an undertaking until the 35th Inf on our right had taken the small woods and secured our right flank. There was no contact with that element and it did not seem advisable to maneuver into their zone of action in front of them. The Co. stopped, reorganized and prepared to hold the position until coordination could be made with the 35th.

During the night the tank crew under the cover of light machine gun squad recovered the tank which was found to be in running condition. This was undertaken in view of the fact that it was possible for the enemy to turn the tank against us. Through this entire action contact was lost with the forward observer and all requests for artillery made by the Co, commander through Bn. was refused on the basis that friendly troops were reported to be in the vicinity of where the heaviest fire of the enemy was emitting from. The rifle squad, under S/Sgt Biagini, proved to be very aggressive and laid down heavy fire - their casualties were promptly picked up under heavy fire by prompt action of Pvt. (Joseph J.) Marshall and Cpl. (Frank) Tavares. The platoon was forced to take shelter under the only cover available consisting of an old stable which was vulnerable to 20mm fire. It was imperative that a basement be found for the wounded for shelter from artillery. It was especially difficult because of B Co.'s troops being in the vicinity and automatic fire having a complete killing zone around the stable. However, one was found and the platoon, with it's casualties was moved to this shelter, less light machine guns and riflemen dug-in in strategic points to defend the buildings.

The 3rd Platoon had suffered 3 casualties initially, Pfc (William F.) Phipps and Pvt (Thurman H.) Bacthelor removed one of the seriously wounded in a rush across open ground under sniper and automatic weapons fire.

At 0200, 9 March, the Co. Comdr received through Lt. (William D.) Ballinger, an order to move out on a coordinated attack with the 35th to seize the final objective. No communication was available with the 35th and a sharp watch was kept on our right flank for their movement so that C Co. could jump off once it's right flank was secure. During the entire day the 35th never made an appearance and upon notifying Bn. was told to hold fast. At 2200 that day the Co. Comdr reported to Bn CP and received orders to occupy the final objective by 0100 10 March. By first sending a strong combat patrol and then moving the company on the objective the combat patrol reported positions clear at 0120 and the Co Comdr awaited further orders to be sent to him by Lt. Ballinger verbally. At this time he was informed by the Exec. Officer to push on without awaiting orders that were forthcoming. He was further ordered to keep out a support platoon in his present position and to remain with it. This mission was accomplished as prescribed.

8 March Sgt (William J., Jr.) Rogers removed an FO Officer from a burning tank that had been knocked out by an 88. The officer was seriously wounded and abandoned by his tank crew. This tank was under fire of the same 88 that had been knocked it out. These tanks in the area had been moved up during the night against the express wishes of the Co. Comdr. who had warned all concerned that they would take the chance of a loss in so doing and was given the added responsibility of guarding them during the night.

On 5 March two squads of the AT Platoon and other elements of the first platoon of C Co. were ordered to mount up by Col. Kimball, and under charge of Capt. Look, proceed to the aid of tanks on the outskirts of Rheinberg, which were supposed to be giving supporting fire to Co C.

The 4 half-tracks were proceeding along the road to a blown out bridge where they dismounted, and from there the infantry pushed off up the road towards Rheinberg under whatever fire the remaining tanks could give us. As we were moving into Rheinberg, Capt Look waved a tank to come to us, and, as the tank turned the corner to come to us it was knocked out by a bazooka.

About 10 members of the AT Plat. with Capt. Look were pinned when the second tank tried to move forward to give supporting fire. However, it was knocked out by an 88 before it could be warned not to move forward. Immediately Capt. Look ordered the men to take cover in a building, also to evacuate a wounded tank officer to the same place. At this time Pvt. (Anthony) Gool carried the officer across an open gap approximately 50 yards which was being swept by enemy machine gun fire. One man was killed by machine gun fire while attempting to get back into the building. Meanwhile, S/Sgt (Nicholas J.) Prokop, while attempting to bring more men forward was also killed. The men who had not reached this point were cut off and under the cover of darkness made their way back to the company after 4 men were wounded.

The men in the building, with 2 wounded officers were cut off by machine gun fire and during the night sent a runner back to bring up medical aid, which did not arrive until the next day. During the night the 35th Inf. took the town which at the time was unknown to us.

One German soldier and a German Medic came to this building during the night looking for German wounded, whom we immediately sent to the rear with S/Sgt Burney. Their purpose was to bring up medical aid for the two wounded American Officers.

Next Day after the Medics arrived we went back and stayed with Serv. Co. for one day before being returned to our company.