|
HEADQUARTERS 58th ARMD INF BN
8th Armd Div
APO 258, U. S. ARMY
AFTER ACTION REPORT
APRIL 1945
INDEX
COMMAND REPORT
SECTIONS
I - ADMINISTRATION
II - INTELLIGENCE
III - OPERATIONS
IV - SUPPLY
AAR index
HEADQUARTERS 58th ARMD INF BN
8th Armd Div
APO 258, U. S. ARMY
COMMAND AFTER ACTION REPORT
Period 01001 April 1945 to 302400 April 1945
1. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS:
a. The battalion attacked South from LIPPSTADT from 3 April. Advancing a distance of 6.6 miles to a point South of KLIEVE.
b. From 6 April to 9 April the battalion carried out defensive missions East of SOEST and along the MOHNE River South of SOEST. Again on 13 April the battalion defended West of BILLMERICH. These defensive missions were successfully accomplished.
c. From April 9 to April 12 the battalion attacked West from NIEDER-ENSE, advancing a distance of 15 miles to a line West of BILLMERICH.
d. On 21 April this battalion, under CCB, attacked from BLANKENBURG and made contact with the 1st Infantry Division on the Northern edge of HUTTENRODE.
e. An estimated 1443 prisoners were captured by this battalion during the period.
2. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:
Combat efficiency was excellent.
3. COMMENTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF UNIT, ETC:
The battalion operated throughout April organized into task forces built around two rifle companies and a reserve. This organization was not rigid and was modified from day to day as the situation dictated. In general, each task force was organized as follows:
1 Rifle Company (One company had a platoon detached)
1 Tank Platoon
1 Tank Destroyer Platoon
1 Platoon (either Mortar, Machine Gun, or Assault Gun)
1 Engineer Squad
The reserve was constituted generally as follows:
1 Rifle Platoon
1 Tank Company (less 2 platoons)
1 TD Company (less two platoons)
1 Engineer Platoon (less two squads)
1 Platoon (either Mortar, Machine Gun, or Assault Gun)
This organization permitted the rifle company commanders, who commanded the task forces, the opportunity of planning and conducting their own operations with full assurance of cooperation and control. It permitted close cooperation and mutual support between tanks and infantry and resulted in rapid and effective use of supporting weapons.
In attacks, the battalion operated with one task force in assault, one in support, and a reserve which could deliver supporting fire. The two task forces leapfrogged each other, attacking successive objectives in turn. When a tank or TD platoon with a task force became crippled by loss or damage to vehicles, it was replaced by the reserve tank or TD platoon.
It is believed that this organization and scheme of maneuver is an effective means of insuring continuous pressure on the enemy without undue loss in combat efficiency. Control is also facilitated.
S/J. C. Harris, Jr.
J. C. Harris, Jr.
Maj. Inf.,
Cmdg.
| 